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ABSTRACT 
This research study contributes to emergent interests in both academic and 
professional literature to uncover variations of corporate social responsibility 
practices across national institutional contexts by focusing on stakeholder 
salience as a precursor to corporate social responsibility and its ancillary 
constructs and practices - e. g. corporate governance and accountability. The 
stakeholder groups considered in the study are: (1) Employees, (2) Networks, 
(e. g. alliances/partnerships and suppliers), (3) Shareholders, (4) Environment, 
(5) Community, (6) Consumers and (7) Management. Stakeholder salience, 
as used in the study, in a nutshell refers to the importance accorded to any of 
these particular stakeholder groups by firms. 
The study complements the managerialist theorisation of corporate 
stakeholder salience, which has hitherto dominated the extant stakeholder 
management literature, by leveraging the institutionalist theoretical lens. It 
draws specifically from the varieties of capitalism model to examine how 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns are not only products of managerial 
strategic choices, but are also reflections of the institutional contexts in 
which they are embedded and enacted. To do this, the study focuses on a 
specific population of firms - i. e. Fortune Global 500 firms - across two 
national institutional contexts (UK and Germany) and three sectoral contexts 
(Aviation, Financial Services and Utilities). This yielded a total of 73 firms (37 
UK and 35 German firms). It particularly tracks the manifestations of 
stakeholder salience in corporate social reports, produced by these firms, as 
artefacts of organisational communication, accountability and legitimacy. The 
study is longitudinal (2000 - 2oo6) in order to capture the dynamics of 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns in the two institutional contexts over 
time. 
Empirical data are extracted using the content analytical methodology 
focusing on such disclosure media as texts, graphics and photographs. In all, 
the corporate social reports of the firms used in this study from 2000 to 20o6 
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- which amounted to a total of three thousand eight hundred and twenty 
two pages of report (3,822) - generated a cumulative total of two thousand 
nine hundred and eighty six (2,986) images, one thousand eight hundred and 
thirty three (1,833) graphics, and one hundred and twenty five (125) pages of 
Chairman (management) Statements (CS) and eight hundred and seventy 
two (872) paragraphs of these Chairmen (management) Statements. Data 
from corporate social reports are triangulated with data from online survey 
of these Fortune Global 500 firms (61% response rate). The data are analysed 
using three different but complementary statistical methods: (1) 
correspondence analysis, (2) Pearson's chi-square statistic and (3) 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). 
The results of the study identify recognisable and differentiable patterns of 
corporate stakeholder salience between the UK and German institutional 
contexts moderated by sectoral patterns of corporate stakeholding patterns 
- thereby suggesting that corporate stakeholder salience patterns are 
implicated in interactions between national institutional characteristics and 
sectoral attributes. This finding confirms the main proposition of the research 
study that corporate stakeholder salience patterns are not only outcomes of 
managerial discretional choices, but that they are also products of their 
institutional contexts. However, it brings to the fore a different dimension to 
understanding the impacts of institutional contexts on corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns and broader corporate social responsibility practices, which 
have hitherto being under-explored in the literature. This different dimension 
is the fact that institutional contexts are not necessarily homogenous, as 
often presented by the varieties of capitalism model, but are outcomes of 
continuous contestations between heterogeneous local and global 
influences, sometimes embodied in trans-national spaces exacerbated by 
either globalisation and or trans-national actors. The study further explores 
this interaction between heterogeneous local and global influences on 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns; and later concludes by highlighting 
possible areas for complementary future research. 
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CHAPTER 1: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, STAKEHOLDER 
SALIENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
1.1: Tone Setting 
Do UK and German firms signal specific patterns of corporate stakeholder 
salience practice that reflect the unique characteristics of their different 
institutional contexts? The study of corporate stakeholding practice has 
largely adopted a micro-level approach, in which stakeholder related 
decisions are often assessed based on their ability to reflect managerial 
discretion and rationality, as well as firm level attributes. This micro-centric 
(i. e. managerial and firm levels) approach to studying corporate stakeholding 
practices, broadly speaking, has contributed significantly to the growing 
trend in such areas as corporate governance and accountability, which tend 
to construct managers and firms as autonomous actors with the ability to 
transform their practices (in this case, do `good' and be more accountable) 
often in isolation of their institutional contexts. In other words, the influence 
of institutional contexts appears to be under-represented in the extant 
literature on both corporate stakeholding practice and accountability. This is 
even more prominent in the post-Enron era in which most of the changes in 
accounting rules and corporate governance, by individual private actors, 
governments and professional bodies, to minimise managerial or agentic 
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hazards, and thus enhance accountability, are heavily manager-centric. While 
acknowledging the managerial dimension to corporate stakeholding 
practices and accountability, it will be necessary to complement this view by 
understanding if and how stakeholder salience practices are also influenced 
by the institutional contexts in which they are embedded and enacted. One 
of the ways to uncover this influence is to explore corporate stakeholding 
practice, as a firm behaviour, through the lens of new institutionalism. 
New institutionalism has in recent times provided some rich analytical lens to 
examine the influence of institutions on managerial practices, firm 
behaviours and organisational fields. New institutionalism does not ignore 
managerial discretion and rationality, as well as firm level influences, at the 
micro-level, but abstracts from these practices to examine how they are both 
enabled and constrained by the institutional contexts in which they are 
embedded and enacted. In other words, new institutionalist analytical 
frameworks suggest that managerial actions and organisational behaviour, in 
particular, are products of dynamic interactions between structure 
(institutional contexts) and agency (i. e. organisational behaviour, managerial 
discretion and rationality). Notwithstanding, the extant literature on 
corporate stakeholding practice and accountability is yet to fully recognise 
and incorporate this analytical lens in understanding and explaining its 
subject matter of stakeholder salience and accountability despite efforts by 
new institutionalist scholars to infiltrate this field of study (e. g. Whitley, 
1999b; Lounsbury, 2007). 
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The primary goal of this research study, therefore, is to reinforce the 
institutional approach to the broad contemporary corporate social 
responsibility discourse - which will ipso facto include discourses of social 
accounting, corporate governance, stakeholder management and 
accountability. It is important to point out at this juncture that this broad 
understanding of contemporary corporate social responsibility discourse will 
run throughout the thesis with only a thin line of demarcation between these 
discourses. The thinking behind this approach is that stakeholder salience is 
critical and central to each of these inter-related discourses. For instance, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to disentangle discourses of social accounting 
from those of corporate governance, stakeholder management and or 
stakeholder accountability. All these come together to constitute the reality 
of the contemporary corporate social responsibility discourse and 
movement. The study will particularly introduce this institutional dimension 
to debates in corporate stakeholding and trace possible institutional 
differences in corporate expressions of stakeholder salience, which is a 
precursor to both corporate social accountability and corporate social 
responsibility (Jones, 1999; Wood, 1991). In the words of Jones (1999: 177): 
"Stakeholder management is unquestionably one of the most significant 
manifestations of social responsibility". In this regard, the study aims to 
explore if there are identifiable patterns of these traces in different 
institutional contexts (national and sectoral) leveraging one of the prominent 
theoretical frameworks of new institutionalism - i. e. the varieties of 
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capitalism theoretical framework. This chapter outlines the main storyline of 
the thesis and sets the stage for further exploration. It is anticipated that the 
outcome of the study will be of benefit to managers, consultants, academics, 
as well as policy makers and all others interested in promoting corporate 
governance and accountability both at the national and international levels. 
1.2: Corporate Stakeholder Salience, Institutional Context and 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate stakeholding is an orchestrated contemporary practice that 
emphasises the firm as a product of multiple constituencies - and not just 
only shareholders - that need to be attended to or factored-in in 
organisational decisions, in order to ensure smooth running of firms in 
meeting their varied objectives (Barnett, 2007). It is a direct response to 
shareholder capitalism which tends to emphasise maximisation of 
shareholders' wealth as the sole responsibility of business (Friedman, 1962). 
Corporate stakeholding is a practice that recognises the fact that firms are 
entangled in much broader interests than those of shareholders; and to be 
competitively sustainable, firms need to pay attention to and aim to satisfy or 
pacify these multiple constituencies - which could include employees, 
customers, suppliers, regulators, local communities, non-for-profit 
organisations, environmental NGOs, et cetera. As a result of its attention to 
multiple constituencies that could affect or be affected by the firm's actions, 
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corporate stakeholding is inextricably implicated in the rejuvenated interest 
in contemporary corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement, which is, 
arguably, gradually becoming a strategic force that is shaping business 
actions and performances in developed and developing countries alike. It has 
been reported that research conducted at the Canadian Centre for Social 
Performance and Ethics at the University of Toronto in 2003 indicates that, 
over the longer term, companies that rate highest on ethics and corporate 
social responsibility are the most profitable (Warren, 2003). These findings 
have also been demonstrated in similar studies (e. g. Orlitzky et al., 2003; Zairi 
and Peters, zooz). Many of today's successful companies are operating with 
their stakeholders in mind. About 80% of FTSE-ioo companies now provide 
information about their environmental performance, social impact, or both: 
Their progressive corporate social performance contributes to their long- 
term financial viability, which further promotes healthy communities and 
stable economies. 
There are as many definitions of CSR as there are writers, leaving the 
construct fuzzy (van Marrewijk 2003, Gobbels 2002, Henderson 2001) and 
open to conflicting interpretations (Windsor 2001). All these render CSR a 
multi-purpose and contested construct (Moon 2oo2; Matten and Moon, 
forthcoming). Despite this surge in interpretations, the EU definition of CSR 
'See this website for a list of UK companies already adopting the CSR concept as a 
strategic initiative: http: //www. societyandbusiness gov uk/company/studies htm 
visited on April 8,2003 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 18 of 438 
as `a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis' as they are increasingly aware that 
responsible behaviour leads to sustainable business success' and Carroll's 
(1991: 42) suggestion that '... the CSR firm should strive to make a profit, obey 
the law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen' are very popular. At the 
heart of this definition and suggestion is McWilliams & Siegel's (2001: 117) 
explanation of CSR as `... actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law'. This 
explanation in itself raises further questions relating to the motives behind 
CSR as a corporate practice. 
Table 1-o-1: Multiple Interpretations of CSR 
Interpretations 
Business ethics and morality 
Corporate accountability 
Corporate citizenship 
Corporate giving and philanthropy 
Authors 
Stark 1993, Fülöp et al. 20oo, Freeman 
1994, Bowie 1998, Phillips 1997,2003, 
Phillips & Margolis 1999 
Owen et al. 2000, O'Dwyer 2005 
Carroll 2004, Matten & Crane 2005, Andriof 
& Waddock 2002 
Carroll 1991,2004 
2 http: //europa. eu. int/comm/employment social/soc-dial/csr/csr2002 col en. pdf P. 4 
visited on April 8,2003 
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Interpretations 
Corporate greening and green 
marketing 
Diversity management 
Environmental responsibility 
Human rights 
Responsible buying and supply chain 
management 
Social responsible investment 
Stakeholder engagement 
Sustainability 
Authors 
Hussain 1999, Saha & Darnton 2005, Crane 
2000 
Kamp & Hagedorn-Rasmussen 2004 
DesJardins 1998, Rugman & Verbeke 1998 
Cassel 2001, Welford 2002 
Drumwright 1994, Emmelhainz &Adams 
1999, Graafland 2002, Spekman et al. 2005; 
Amaeshi 2004 
Warhurst 2001, Jayne & Skerratt 2003, 
Synnestvedt & Aslaksen 2003, McLaren 
2004 
Freeman 1984,1994, Andriof et al. 2002, 
Donaldson & Preston 1995 
Bansal 2005, Amaeshi & Crane 2005, 
Korhonen 2002 
CSR has been argued to be driven by many interdependent factors. Notable 
drivers of the CSR movement in the literature include government (Moon, 
2004), national business systems (Edwards 2004, Matten & Moon 2004), 
personal/managerial values (Hemingway & Maclagan 2004; Visser, 2007; Choi 
and Wang, 2007) and power relations (Prakash 2001), institutional 
isomorphism (Saiia et al. 2003), social network pressures (Burke et al. 1986, 
Burke & Logsdon 1996), competition and globalisation (Korhonen 2002), 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 20 of 438 
pressure groups/ social actors, consultants (Young et al. 2003). It could be 
argued that one of the reasons for the topical interests in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is as a result of the growing societal expectations from 
business organisations. These expectations are to a large extent driven by 
the global quest for peace and prosperity, which dominated the later half of 
the loth century and has continued to trail the 21st century fight against 
terrorism and poverty. Some have argued that business organisations are by 
necessity indebted to the society in the form of a social contract (Gray et al. 
1988, Carroll 1999, Campbell zooo). In order to create conducive environment 
for businesses to thrive, it becomes imperative on corporations and other 
social institutions to be more concerned and more involved in shaping a 
better future. Accordingly, Kaku (1997) argued that "... it is in the interests of 
the world's most powerful corporations to work for the advancement of 
global peace and prosperity... (because) ... global companies have no future 
if the earth has no future". Notwithstanding, arguments for and against CSR 
have mainly been driven from three main perspectives: the (a) shareholders, 
(b) stakeholders and (c) society. 
The shareholders perspective of CSR is anchored on the economic and legal 
responsibilities firms owe to their owners. Friedman (1962) recognised these 
responsibilities when he argued that the primary responsibility of firms is to 
pursue profits within the limits of the law. This view, which is known in the 
literature as the agency theory of corporate social responsibility (Ross, 1973; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Garriga and Mele, 2004) implies that directors of 
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an organisation are agents of the owners and are duty bound to act so as to 
maximise the interests of those owners, who made the investment, in the 
first place, for this reason (e. g. Sternberg, 1994). The economic logic leans 
heavily on what Korhonen (2002) called the 'dominant social paradigm' (DSP) 
of profit maximization for the owners of the firm. The DSP emphasizes such 
issues as competitive advantage, cost minimization, equilibrium, market 
efficiency, optimal returns on investments (including labour) and market 
dominance. In itself, it has no place for emotions, feelings and benevolence. 
The economic logic has its culture - way of operation. It is the bedrock of 
modern capitalism in all its varieties (Whitley, 1992; 1998; Hall and Soskice, 
zoos). Adherence to this culture of capitalism often comes with its rewards in 
terms of increase in shareholders wealth and firm growth; although it 
sometimes leads to market failures and social externalities (i. e. monopolies, 
pollutions, et cetera). Nevertheless, this logic is not inherently anti-welfare as 
most anti-capitalists would tend to argue and all things being equal, the logic 
promises to deliver global economic development. One of the key drivers of 
the economic logic is the fact that it is measurable and thrives on calculative 
rationalism. This measurability lends great significance to the `bottom-line' 
accounting philosophy on which the success or failure of firms are 
benchmarked. Thus, business enterprises strive to ensure that the bottom- 
line looks good at all times even at the at the expense of other things. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the stakeholder theory of corporate 
social responsibility, which emphasises a much broader set of social 
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responsibilities for business. Stakeholders, as used in this theory, refer to 
those individuals or groups who may affect or are affected by the 
organisation (Freeman, 1984 and 1994; Clarkson, 1995). They include a wide 
variety of interests, and as suggested by Mullins (2002) may be grouped 
under six main headings of: employees, shareholders, consumers, 
government, community, the environment and other organisations or groups 
such as suppliers, trade unions, business associates and even competitors. In 
this sense, the stakeholder perspective is much more inclusive than the 
shareholder view. 
Table 1-o-2: Key distinctions between shareholder and stakeholder firms 
Attribute Shareholder firm Stakeholder firm 
Goal(s) Maximize shareholder Pursue multiple 
wealth objectives of parties with 
different interests 
Governance structures Principal-Agent model: Team Production Model: 
and key processes managers are agents of coordination, 
shareholders. Control is the cooperation, and conflict 
key task. resolution are the key 
tasks. 
Performance Metrics Shareholder value Fair distribution of value 
sufficient to maintain created to maintain 
investor commitment commitment of multiple 
stakeholders 
Residual Risk Holders Shareholders All stakeholders 
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Attribute Shareholder firm Stakeholder firm 
Stakeholder Finance/investor/owners More than one 
Salience/Influence only stakeholder with stakeholder with 
sufficient power and sufficient power and 
legitimacy to achieve legitimacy to achieve 
"definitive" status in "definitive" status in 
governance processes governance processes 
Culled trom Kochan and Kubmstein, 2000, p. 3b9 
Contemporary interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) could be aptly 
described as a `stakeholder movement' because the stakeholder approach is 
central to the CSR discourse. In essence, CSR is a reinvigoration of the 
stakeholder ethos as it continuously draws attention to multiple actors and 
nexus of relational networks in which firms are embedded. These 
relationships could be with customers, employees, local communities, 
investors, the media, competition, pressure groups, the society at large, as 
well as such inanimate entities as the natural environment and ecology. The 
argument is that these networks could affect or be affected by the firm's 
activities (Rowley, 1997). In this regard, CSR can be broadly defined as an 
organisation's commitment to operate in an economically and 
environmentally sustainable manner while recognising the interests of its 
stakeholders (CSBR, 2003)3. 
3 http: //www. cbsr. bc. ca/what_is_csr/index. cfm visited on April 8,2003 
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Although difficult to reconcile in practice, the two approaches (agency - i. e. 
shareholder - and stakeholder theories) are not completely incompatible: to 
a stakeholder theorist, shareholders count as one type of stakeholder, but 
not the only type to which duties are owed by the firm. Thus, the broad 
definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an organisation's 
commitment to operate in an economically and environmentally sustainable 
manner while recognising the interests of its stakeholders (CSBR, 2003); and 
`a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns 
in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on 
a voluntary basis' as they are increasingly aware that responsible behaviour 
leads to sustainable business success (EU, 2002). Stated in more pragmatic 
and managerial terms, the CSR firm should strive to make a profit, obey the 
law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen (Carroll, 1991: 42). 
Despite its broad definition, corporate social responsibility theory and practice 
has over time been dominated by a narrow normative ethos. It is not 
uncommon in the literature, and in practice, for CSR discourses to be overly 
constructed along such moral ends as philanthropy (Carroll 2004; Carlisle & 
Faulkner 2004) and altruism (Lantos 2O01)4. Despite the need for business to 
be morally conducted, one of the primary concerns in CSR debates is whether 
organisations pursue it for economic reasons or simply because doing so has 
intrinsic merit (Donaldson & Preston 1995). Unfortunately there have been 
I Notable exceptions include: Burke & Logsdon (1996), Maignan & Ferrell (2001), and 
McWilliams & Siegel (2001) 
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few or no empirical tests in support of the intrinsic merit motive (Harrison & 
Freeman 1999), which makes CSR practice susceptible to the popular 
accusation of being a gimmick for profitable public relations and marketing 
strategies. The emergence of `strategic' CSR (Lantos 2001) or `strategic' 
philanthropy (Porter & Kramer 2002), as a comfortable cover for firms to 
further their natural quests for profit and self interest, is thought not to be 
only self defeating, but provides anti-corporatists with ready made tools to 
quickly uncover the activities of these firms and eagerly shame them as 
`hypocritesi5. Moreover, as CSR continues to make in-roads into the business 
arena, the harder its proponents are pressed to provide business exemplars 
justifying its continued legitimacy as a business practice. The CSR sceptics go 
down this 'business-case' route because of their seeming belief that the quest 
for `strategic' CSR while not only an oxymoron (Hirschhorn 2004; Marsden 
2000), will inevitably evoke the old dilemma of possible tradeoffs between 
material profit and normative morality - i. e. being good for goodness sake. 
Concurrent with the strategic theorization of corporate social responsibility 
practice, is a growing interest on the institutional embeddedness and 
5A recent incident is the case where ChristianAid criticised the CSR reports of Shell 
Nigeria and the British American Tobacco (BAT), respectively, and went as far as 
publishing its own version of `what should be' the CSR reports for these two 
companies, in an attempt to name and shame them. See these websites for details: 
http: lLw-ww. christianaid. org. uk/indepth10401csr/index. htm 
http: Uwww. christianaid. org. uk/indepthl02olbatlindex. htm visited June 10,2005 
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variations of corporate social responsibility (Matten and Moon, forthcoming) 
and corporate governance (Aguilera et al., 20o6; Jackson, 2005) practices, 
respectively. This interest is mainly driven by the understanding that 
organisational practices are not only determined by managerial rationality, 
but are also constrained and enabled by their institutional configurations and 
social conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Granovetter, 1985; Hall and 
Soskice, 2000; Amable, 2004; Crouch, 2005; Whitley, 1998,2004; 
Hollingsworth, 1998; Jones, 1999; Greening and Gray, 1994). In other words 
this perspective focuses on how firms connect up with general societal 
concerns and emphasises the role of business in the society. This perspective 
extends the corporate agenda beyond shareholders and manager-designated 
stakeholders and talks of the firm as a citizen with rights, which in 
themselves lead to some responsibilities as well (Matten and Crane, 2005). 
Following this line of argument, corporate social responsibility is no longer a 
matter of managerial choice, but a form of civic duty. This understanding of 
corporate social responsibility as a civic duty appears to be alien to the 
shareholder capitalist system of the US, for instance. However, Matten and 
Moon (forthcoming) theorise that the civic duty element has been at the 
core of the European business model. Although corporate social 
responsibility practices have been left to the realm of self-governance (auto- 
regulation), it is argued that they are also - directly or indirectly, like any 
other corporate behaviour -governed by ultra-firm governance mechanisms 
embedded in the societal norms, expectations and institutions in which they 
operate. These ultra-firm governance mechanisms are thought to account for 
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variations of corporate social responsibility practices across national contexts 
(Matten and Moon, forthcoming; Jackson, 2005 Aguilera et al., 2003). Despite 
the increasing attention paid to the institutional embeddedness of corporate 
behaviour and performance in business and management literature, the 
application of institutional theory to account for stakeholder salience and 
accountability is rather scarce in the broad corporate social responsibility 
literature6 - possibly because this area remains `largely undeveloped' (Gray 
2002: 698) and therefore largely in search of some theoretical foundations 
(Gray, 2002). 
This research study will aim to mainly contribute to the corporate social 
responsibility literature by further exploring the link between institutional 
contexts and stakeholder salience, through a corporate social accountability 
artefact - i. e. social reports. The interest in the use of corporate social 
reports as repertoire of corporate stakeholder salience patterns include the 
fact that social reports are largely seen and constructed as instruments of 
6 Cormier et al., (2005) and Cormier and Magnan (2003) are exceptions 
7 Corporate social reports fall under the broad category of social accounts which 
Gray (2002: 687) described as "... a generic term for convenience to cover all forms 
of `accounts which go beyond the economic' and for all the different labels under 
which it appears - social responsibility accounting, social audits, corporate social 
reporting, employee and employment reporting, stakeholder dialogue reporting as 
well as environmental accounting and reporting. " These varieties would be used 
interchangeable in this document, although social reports would be dominant. 
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accountability - wherein firms express their commitments to pursuing 
sustainable business practices and presenting themselves accountable to 
varieties of stakeholders. This understanding of social reports, at least, 
appears to dominate the extant literature on corporate governance, 
accountability, stakeholder management and corporate social responsibility. 
In addition, there is a warming up to the increasing interest in production of 
social reports by firms, as a positive sign of responsible and transparent 
business practice. Corporate social reports have, also, become essential 
features of the contemporary business landscape and it is estimated that 
about 80% of Fortune Global 500 firms now produce one type of report or the 
other on their social and environmental impacts (Kolk, 2003). Given the 
prominence these reports are gaining in the business world, one would at 
least, expect them to have some consumption consequences either in the 
form of shaping discourses and or initiating actions (Phillips et al., 2004; 
Burgess, 199o). 
The interest in stakeholder salience derives also from the fact that it is core to 
the understanding and pursuit of stakeholder accountability -'the giving and 
demanding of reasons for conduct" (Roberts and Scapens, 1985: 447) to and 
by different stakeholder groups. Hitherto, the corporate social responsibility, 
and particularly social accounting, literature has presented decision making 
on stakeholder salience as something solely internal to the firm and under 
managerial perceptions and bounded rationality (Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et 
al., 1999). Some prominent scholars in the field have even described social 
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accounting as a form and an expression of managerial capture of 
organisational actions (see Owen et al., 2000 for example). This research 
study aims to complement the managerial hegemony and thinking that have 
dominated the social accounting field of research for a long time (Gray, 2002) 
by suggesting that the institutional configurations of economies could, for 
instance, account for why certain stakeholder groups are considered or not, 
on one hand, and why certain accountability measures and mechanisms (e. g. 
codes of conduct, GRI and AAiooo standards) are accepted or not, and or 
adopted/adapted, on the other, by firms in these economies. While, 
theorising stakeholder salience as the perceived ability of a stakeholder to 
exercise a combinatory factor of legitimacy, power and urgency, which could 
sway organisational control and influence (Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et al., 
1999), this research study, in addition, argues that using managerial and firm- 
level practices as sole criteria to judge, evaluate and interpret corporate 
social responsibility and accountability practices, as often suggested in critical 
accounting literature (e. g. O'Dwyer, 2002,2003,2005; Owen et al., 2001; 
Swift, 2001), could be very limiting due to the over-dependence of such 
accountability arguments on discretional managerial and organisational 
rationality. 
In order to provide a complementary view to the notion of managerial 
capture of corporate accountability (Owen et al., 2000), the study 
accepts the logic that corporate stakeholder salience patterns could be 
shaped differently not only by managers and organisational 
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characteristics, but also by the institutional configurations in which they 
are embedded and enacted (Sharma, 2000). For example, Agle et al. (1999) 
in their study of USA firms found that different stakeholder groups 
exhibited different salience based on their perceived power, legitimacy 
and urgency. This view does not claim any superiority to the managerial 
view but rather complements it. It suggests that equal attention should 
be paid to both institutional contexts and managerial discretions in 
corporate social responsibility and social accounting discourses. This is in 
recognition of the fact that: "Firms are not simple `institution-takers'; 
firm strategies interact with the institutional framework, which can lead 
to institutional reconfigurations, especially in the process of adjustment" 
(Borsch, 2004: 370). In addition to identifying and recognising stakeholder 
salience in different institutional contexts, an issue that is still debated 
in this field of enquiry is the order of importance (salience) the different 
business systems attach to the different stakeholder groups - i. e. their 
`relevant publics' (Lindblom, 1994). 
The institutionalist approach to understanding corporate social responsibility 
and stakeholder salience is not completely new (see Jones, 1999; Sharma, 
2000; Greening and Gray, 1994; and more recently Matten and Moon, 
forthcoming; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, for example). Notwithstanding, 
most of these studies either talk of institutions from a very loose perspective 
(i. e. without being specific of any theory or school of thought within 
institutionalism they draw from) and or talk of stakeholders as if they were a 
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unitary and uniform group. This lack of specificity of stakeholders and loose 
talk of institutions, in particular, constitutes one of the major stumbling 
blocks in advancing the literature on the institutional embeddedness of 
stakeholder salience and corporate social responsibility in recent times. 
Therefore, relying on a specified institutional theory - i. e. the varieties of 
capitalism (VoC) theoretical framework - and specified list of stakeholders 
(i. e. community, consumers, the environment/nature, shareholders, 
employees, and networks) this research study presents an empirical study 
of corporate stakeholder salience patterns in two different capitalist 
systems - the UK and Germany. 
The choice of UK and German institutional contexts is not arbitrary. The two 
institutional contexts are recognised in the comparative capitalism literature 
as excellent representations of liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), respectively (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Whitley, 1999; Vitols, zoos; Hancke et al., 2007; Crouch et al., forthcoming). 
Drawing from a longitudinal study of corporate social reports in these 
countries, the research study will 'exploratorily' argue that stakeholder 
salience is not only expressions of isolated managerial choices, 
organisational characteristics and rationality, as often presented in the 
broad corporate social responsibility and social accounting literature, but is 
also a product of its institutional contexts. In order for the argument on 
the institutional influence of stakeholder salience to hold water, it is 
anticipated that the UK and German institutional contexts will produce 
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different patterns of corporate stakeholder salience. The study is largely 
exploratory and does not present or adopt any normative stance (or 
`best practice' approach) towards corporate stakeholding, governance 
and accountability. These are rather examined as neutral business practices 
(Amaeshi and Adi, 2007). 
Table 1-o-3: Relevance of the varieties of capitalism model to understanding 
corporate stakeholder salience 
Relevance Citations from a couple of recent major works on 
Varieties of Capitalism (Hancke et al., 2007 and Vitols, 
toot) 
Ability to link micro to VoC is concerned with the macro-characteristics of 
macro practices national political economies. But one of its most 
important contributions has been to give micro- 
foundations to a more general theory of cross-national 
capitalist organization and adjustment. By placing the 
firm at the centre of the analysis, and adopting a 
`relational view' of its role as an exploiter of the core 
competencies and capabilities in its environment, VoC 
demonstrates the links between the competitiveness of 
the firm and the `institutional comparative advantage' 
of national economies. (Hancke et al., 2007: 5) 
Varieties of capitalism Institutional comparative advantage arises from the 
suited for understanding complementarities between the following key 
relevance of multiple components of a political economic system: (a) labour 
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Relevance Citations from a couple of recent major works on 
Varieties of Capitalism (Hancke et at., 2007 and Vitols, 
2001) 
actors (stakeholders) in relations and corporate governance, (b) labour relations 
national institutional and the national training system, and (c) corporate 
contexts governance and inter-firm relations. The relationships 
between them determine to the degree to which a 
system is coordinated or not (Hancke et al., 2007: 5) 
Offers leeway to The `coordinated market economy' (CME) is 
integrate stakeholder characterized by non-market relations, collaboration, 
management theory with credible commitments, and the `deliberative calculation' 
new institutionalism of firms. The essence of its `liberal market economy' 
(LME) antithesis is one of arm's length, competitive 
relations, formal contracting, and supply-and-demand 
price signalling (Hancke et at., 2007: 5) 
"VoC offers a framework within which the linkages 
between external investors and other actors relevant to 
the firm can be systematically explored. The concepts of 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal 
market economies (LMEs) provide a broader 
institutional context within which stakeholder and 
shareholder models of governance, respectively, can be 
analyzed" (Vitols, 2001: 337/8) 
... rational owners and stakeholders in CMEs will not 
demand a wholesale adoption of Anglo-American 
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Relevance Citations from a couple of recent major works on 
Varieties of Capitalism (Hancke et al., 2007 and Vitals, 
2001) 
management practices if it would endanger their 
comparative institutional advantage. Although an 
economic shock may trigger changes of existing 
institutions and practices, and may even entail a period 
of conflict and suboptimal outcomes, a new equilibrium 
will be induced by the incentives for renewed 
coordination imparted by existing deliberative 
institutions.... Change, therefore, is most likely to be 
path-dependent, and significant path-shifting or 
equilibrium-breaking behaviour on the part of actors - 
producing a fully fledged shift from a CME to an LME, 
for example - is very unlikely to occur due to the 
`general efficiencies' for distinctive political economies 
created by `complementatiries' (Hancke et al., 2007: 6) 
VoC provides a vehicle to "Since VoC stresses the embeddedness of national 
integrate stakeholder institutions as well as the possibility of 
management theory with `complementarities' between different combinations of 
globalisation and debate these institutions, VoC hypothesizes that responses to 
on convergence and [internationalisation or globalisation] other than 
divergence national convergence are possible. Companies may respond very 
systems differently to similar sorts of pressures and distinct sets 
of `best practice' contingent on the national context 
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Relevance Citations from a couple of recent major works on 
Varieties of Capitalism (Hancke et al., 2007 and Vitols, 
2001) 
may emerge" (Vitols, 2001: 338) 
The thesis is divided into three main and inter-linked sections. The first 
section discusses stakeholder salience, corporate social responsibility, 
corporate governance and accountability; and their links to the varieties 
of capitalism analytical framework. The second section focuses on the 
theoretical underpinnings of the methodology used in the study as well as 
the application of this methodology. Section three presents the results of the 
study and offer some explanations, suggestions and recommendations, as 
well as highlighting possible areas of further research - and then the 
conclusion follows. The table and the diagrammatic structure below, give an 
overview of the overall structure of the thesis. 
Table i. 0-4: Thesis Structure 
Captions Chapters 
Introduction Chapter 1 
Section 1 Chapters 2,3, and (4) 
- Literature Review Chapter 2 
- Research Problematique Chapter 3 
- Research Propositions Chapter 4 
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Captions Chapters 
Section 2 Chapters (4), 5, and 6 
- Research Propositions 
Chapter 4 
- Methodology -theoretical underpinnings 
- Methodology - application 
Section 3 Chapters 7 and 8 
- Data analysis and findings 
Chapter 7 
- Discussion - stakeholder salience and institutions Chapter 8 
Conclusion Chapter 9 
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Figure 1-0-1: Overall Thesis Structure 
Introduction 
Literature 
Review 
Research 
Problematique 
Propositions 
Methodology 
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CHAPTER 2: MULTI-LEVEL THEORISATIONS OF CORPORATE 
STAKEHOLDING: IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
2.1: Tone Setting 
it is the position of this study that corporate stakeholding practice, as a firm 
behaviour, is implicated in dynamic interactions between managerial 
discretion and rationality, on one hand, and institutional contexts, on the 
other (Sharma, 200o; Jones, 1999; Greening and Gray, 1994; Matten and 
Moon, forthcoming). In other words, corporate stakeholder salience practice 
is both constrained and enabled by the institutional context in which it is 
enacted, as well as by managerial influences. This study intends to explore 
the interactions between managerial discretion and institutional contexts 
through corporate social reports as visual artefacts of corporate social 
responsibility and stakeholder accountability. In this regard, this chapter is a 
literature review of the following: 
" Corporate stakeholder salience - in order to highlight the state of the art 
thinking in this field and the pre-dominance of the managerialist (actor- 
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centric) view. Implications of this view on theory and practice will be 
explored in relation to CSR, corporate governance and accountability 
" Institutionalism - in order to particularly highlight the interactive role of 
structure (institutional contexts) and agency (managers) on firm 
behaviour. This will draw mainly from new institutionalism, which is much 
more appropriate for the study of meso and macro level organisational 
practices than, shall we say, Giddens (1984) structurational theory. The 
goal here is to emphasise that the institutionalist perspective can add 
some value to our understanding of corporate stakeholding and 
accountability practices 
The chapter will briefly cover the history of the stakeholder perspective to 
business and organisational studies, discuss the different underpinning 
philosophies of this perspective, and how they relate to the corporate social 
responsibility movement. It will also highlight the significance of examining 
the roles and influences of stakeholders, their interactions with managers as 
well as the institutional configurations in which they act, and are acted upon, 
in order to further explain variations in behaviour of firms in different 
institutional contexts. In essence, the goal of this chapter is to set the stage 
to unpack corporate stakeholder salience pattern within the UK and German 
capitalist systems, respectively. 
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2.2: Corporate Stakeholder Salience 
2.2.1: Brief History of Stakeholder Salience in Management Literature 
The stakeholder perspective to organising and managing firms is one of the 
major management paradigm shifts in the late last century. The theory, in its 
present form, is traceable to Freeman (1984: 246) who defined stakeholders 
as "... those groups and individuals who can affect, or are affected by the 
achievement of an organization's purpose". More recently, Freeman 
provides a more instrumental definition of stakeholders as "... those groups 
who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation" (Freeman, 
2004: 58). The use of the term stakeholder in an economic sense could be 
traced to the works of the Stanford Research Institute (now SRI) in the 1g6os 
(Freeman, 1984; Slinger, 1999; Freeman and McVea, 2001). It was then used 
as a metaphor to encourage an inclusive approach - that takes wider 
perspectives - to adapting to the turbulent business environment. From the 
start, the stakeholder approach grew out of management practice (Freeman 
and McVea, 2001: 190) to such areas as corporate planning, systems theory, 
organisational theory, and corporate social responsibility. It took another 20 
years from the 196os for the stakeholder approach to crystallise. It was in 
pulling together of these perspectives that Edward Freeman in the early 
198os articulated the stakeholder approach as a framework for strategic 
management (Freeman and McVea, 2001) in his classic - Strategic 
Management: A stakeholder Approach. And since then, the concept has been 
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embedded in management scholarship and in managerial practice (Mitchell 
et al., 1997). 
2.2.2: Definitions of Stakeholding 
Despite its contemporary popularity and proliferation since Freeman (1984), 
the term `stakeholder' has joined the league of words (for example, the word 
`strategy') that are over-used and yet not clearly understood, or at best are 
still contested (Friedman and Miles, 2oo6). This is more so, especially as the 
word easily lends itself to multiple applications in support of what could be 
considered as `fashionable constructs' of the time. For example, it has 
featured in such combinations as stakeholder society ((Ackerman and Alstott, 
1999), stakeholder capitalism (Kelly et al., 1997; Jones, 1999), Stakeholder 
Corporation (Kay, 1997), et cetera, which renders any attempts to provide a 
succinct definition for stakeholding cumbersome. Nonetheless, many authors 
have gone round to define stakeholders by the nature of "stakes" they hold. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) provided a list of such definitions as shown below: 
Table 2-o-i: Definitions of Stakeholder Concept 
Source I Stake 
Stanford memo, 1963 1 "those groups without whose support the organization 
would cease to exist" (cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983; and 
Freeman, 1984) 
Rhenman, 1964 "are depending on the firm in order to achiever their personal 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 42 of 438 
Source Stake 
goals and on whom the firm is depending for its existence" 
(cited in Nasi, 1985) 
Ahlstedt and "driven by their own interests and goals are participants in a 
Jahnukainen, 1971 firm, and thus depending on it and whom for its sake the firm 
is depending" (cited in Nasi, 1995) 
Freeman & Reed, Wide: "can affect the achievement of an organization's 
1983: 91 objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an 
organization's objectives" 
Narrow: "on which the organization is dependent for its 
continued survival" 
Freeman, 1984: 46 "can affect or is affected by the achievement of an 
organization's objectives" 
Freeman & Gilbert, "can affect or is affected by a business" 
1987: 397 
Cornell & Shapiro, "claimants" who have "contracts" 
1987: 5 
Evan & Freeman, "have a stake in or claim on the firm" 
1988: 75 - 76 
Evan & Freeman, "benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are 
1988: 79 violated or respected by, corporate actions" 
Bowie, 1988: 112, n. 2 "without whose support the organization would cease to 
exist" 
Alkhafaji, 1989: 36 "groups to whom the corporation is responsible" 
Carroll, 1989: 57 "asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes" - 
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Source Stake 
"ranging from an interest to a right (legal or moral) to 
ownership or legal title to the company's assets or property" 
Freeman & Evan, contract holders 
1990 
Thompson et al., 1991: in "relationship with an organization" 
209 
Savage et al., 1991: 61 "have an interest in the actions of an organization and ... the 
ability to influence it" 
Hill & Jones, 1992: 133 "constituents who have a legitimate claim on the 
firm... established through the existence of an exchange 
relationship" who supply "the firm with critical resources 
(contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to 
be satisfied (by inducements)" 
Brenner, 1993: 205 "having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with an 
organization [such as] exchange transactions, action impacts, 
and moral responsibilities" 
Carroll, 1993: 60 "asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in 
business" - may be affected or affect... 
Freeman, 1994: 415 participants in "the human process of joint value creation" 
Wicks et al., 1994: 483 "interact with and give meaning and definition to the 
corporation" 
Langtry, 1994: 433 the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or 
they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm 
Starik, 1994: 90 "can and are making their actual stakes known" - "are or 
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Source Stake 
might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers 
Clarkson, 1994: 5 
Clarkson, 1995: 106 
Nasi, 1995: 19 
Brenner, 1995: 76, n. 1 
Donaldson & Preston, 
1995: 85 
of, some organization" 
"bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some 
form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a 
firm" or "are placed at risk as a result of a firm's activities" 
"have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a 
corporation and its activities" 
"interact with the firm and thus make its operation possible" 
"are or which could impact or be impacted by the 
firm/organization" 
I "persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural 
and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity" 
Adapted from Mitchell et al. (1997: 858) - see Mitchell et al. for the details of references 
above. 
2.2.3: Broad and Narrow Perspectives to Stakeholding 
These definitions, above, mainly show that stakeholder conceptualisation and 
use in management literature ranges from broad, inclusive definitions to 
narrow views of the firm's stakeholder environment. The narrow view of 
stakeholding refers specifically to those stakeholders that have vested 
'stakes' in the firm. Carroll (1993: 22) defines them as: "individuals or groups 
with which business interacts who have a `stake', or vested interest, in the 
firm". These could be employees, shareholders, management, government, 
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society, etc as long as they have explicit stakes and or vested interests in the 
firm. The broad view of stakeholding goes beyond those stakeholders that 
have explicit stakes and vested interests in the firm to extend to those 
stakeholders that could affect and or affected by the activities of the firm 
(Starik, 1995,1994). Starik (1994: 92), for instance, suggests that these 
stakeholders, from a broad view of the concept, could be "any naturally 
occurring entity which affects or is affected by organizational performance". 
In essence these stakeholders will include living entities such as plants and 
animals as well as non living beings such as the natural environment and 
ecology. It could also be stretched to include such groups as `unborn 
generations' (Freeman and Miles, 2oo6), as often articulated in sustainable 
development discourse. The `stakes' and vested interests associated with 
stakeholding are further categorised into primary and secondary 
stakeholding. Primary stakeholding involves fiduciary obligations from the 
firm while secondary stakeholding does not involve such obligations. In this 
regard, examples of primary stakeholders will include shareholders, 
employees and managers, while those of secondary stakeholders might be 
local communities, environmental groups, suppliers, etc. This notion of 
fiduciary and non fiduciary stakeholding underpins most of the existing 
corporate governance frameworks and typologies (Aguilera, 2005; Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003; Slinger, 1999). Commenting on this from a comparative 
governance perspective, Aguilera and Jackson (2003: 454) write: 
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The corporate governance literature largely neglects employees 
.... This omission partly reflects weak employee participation 
in 
the United States relative to that in economies such as Germany 
or Japan, where labor participation is politically important and 
often a source of competitive advantage .... In addition, a major 
assumption of agency theorists is that shareholders are the only 
bearers of ex post residual risk, and, thus, employee interests are 
treated only as an exogenous parameter. 
In addition, some inclusive definitions are driven by the understanding that 
stakeholders have intrinsic value and managers have a moral duty to be 
responsible to a variety of stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Evan & 
Freeman, 1988; Freeman & Evan, 1990). More narrow strategic or 
instrumental perspectives (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), on the other hand, 
define stakeholders as those groups or individuals that are in a mutually 
dependent, risk-based, or exchange relationship with a firm (e. g., Clarkson, 
1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). The oscillation between the narrow and broad 
interpretations often leads to multiple views and practices of stakeholding in 
management literature. 
2.2.4: Varieties of Stakeholding Paradigms 
Donaldson and Preston (1995)'s major contribution to the stakeholder theory 
in management studies, is identifying that the stakeholder concept is largely 
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theorised in the literature from three main perspectives: (a) descriptive (b) 
instrumental and (c) normative 
2.2.4.1: Descriptive perspective 
The descriptive aspect of the stakeholder theory, as the name suggests, 
merely describes what the corporation is - "... a constellation of co-operative 
and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value" (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995:. 66) and who they consider as possible stakeholders. It also highlights 
the interactions between firms and their stakeholders with the aim of 
contributing to knowledge, theory and practice. Its justifications are to show 
that theory corresponds to observed reality. It is neither judgmental nor 
prescriptive. However, it is difficult to claim that it is value neutral, as research 
and researchers are often and even inadvertently value-laden and value driven 
(Darke et at., 1998; Appadurai, 1999; Hardy et at., zoos; Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
2.2.4.2: Instrumental perspective 
This perspective theorises stakeholding by examining the consequences of 
corporate stakeholding. It is underpinned by the paradigm that meeting 
stakeholder needs, could be driven by instrumentalist goals and objectives 
(Jones et al., 2007). According to Jones et al., "... instrumentalist firms place 
preeminent value on the pursuit of corporate self-interest with guile. Other 
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terms used to convey this orientation are enlightened self-interest, pragmatic 
morality, and strategic morality" (emphasis, theirs, p. 152). The instrumentalist 
form of stakeholder relationship does not necessarily give voice to 
stakeholders and is often characterised by a one way communication and 
unequal balance of power (Crane and Livesey, 2003). A more critical view of it 
suggests that it is not genuine; it is selfish and firms involve in it because "... 
it makes good business sense ... (and)... helps companies to mitigate risk, 
protect corporate brand, and gain competitive advantage... (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, 2002: 2 cited in Brown and Fraser, 2oo6). From a sort of neutral 
stance, it may be better aligned to the language of contemporary capitalism 
than most other perspectives (Amaeshi and Adi, 2007). 
2.2.4.3: Normative perspective 
Stakeholder theory can, to a large extent, be argued to be fundamentally and 
originally rooted in norms and mores. The normative perspective to 
stakeholding is largely prescriptive of `who' ought to be considered as 
stakeholders and what is `right' or `wrong' to do in relation to stakeholders. It 
draws its legitimacy from its inclination towards some moral standards. 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995: 72), "... a normative theory 
attempts to interpret the function of, and offer guidance about, the investor- 
owned corporation on the basis of some underlying moral or philosophical 
principles". Morality in this case might be seen as not merely a matter of 
rules, but also of principles - general standards for evaluating conduct, 
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standards that we apply to all behaviours and rules. According to Freeman 
and Miles (2006: 36), normative can refer to: 
" The norms or standard practices of society as it exists 
" The way one would live in an ideal `good' society 
" What we ought to do, either in order to achieve a good society or 
unconnected with any notion of the `good'. 
At the individual level these principles include that of utility, also, known as 
the principle of the greatest happiness. It tells us to produce the greatest 
balance of happiness over unhappiness, making sure that we give equal 
consideration to the happiness and unhappiness of everyone who stands to 
be affected by our actions. Morality also includes the principle of fairness 
founded on the golden rule that states, "Do unto others as we should have 
them do unto us" and which is, basically founded on the need to respect the 
other person. In addition, there is the ethics of care and virtue ethics views 
that are gaining popularity today (Gilligan, 1977,1982). These principles of 
morality at the individual level are also thought to be applicable to 
institutional and social morality (Olen & Barry, 1992). In relation to firms and 
stakeholders, therefore, it could be argued that firms with high moral 
standards will undertake genuine stakeholder engagement, which is thought 
to be characterised by genuine intentions, dialogue, engagement, trust and 
fairness (Phillips, 1997; Swift, 2001). In other words, "... moralist firms have a 
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genuine concern for stakeholder interests, making legitimacy the primary 
driver of salience for their managers (emphasis, theirs, Jones et al., 2007: 152). 
Firms get involved in it, because they know that doing so is good in itself. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995: 67) argue that the fundamental basis of the 
stakeholder theory is normative and therefore involves acceptance of the 
following ideas: 
a. Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in 
procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity. Stakeholders 
are identified by their interests in the corporation whether the 
corporation has any corresponding functional interest in them. (emphasis 
in original) 
b. The interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value. That is, each group 
of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not merely 
because of its ability to further the interests of some other group, such as 
the shareowners. (emphasis in original) 
Leveraging these ideas, Phillips (2003) makes a distinction between 
normative and derivative stakeholder legitimacy arguing that normative 
stakeholders are those stakeholders to whom the organisation has a moral 
obligation, and the answer to the seminal stakeholder question "for whose 
benefit... should the firm be managed? " (Freeman, 1984); while 
"... [d]erivative stakeholders are those groups whose actions and claims must 
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be accounted for by managers due to their potential effects upon the 
organization and its normative stakeholders" (Phillips, 2003). 
2.2.5: Nesting of Paradigms 
While these stakeholding paradigms have been presented as if they are 
independent of each other, Donaldson and Preston (1995: 66) conclude that 
the three approaches to stakeholder theory - i. e. descriptive, instrumental, 
and normative - "... are mutually supportive and that the normative base 
serves as the critical underpinning for the theory in all its forms" (emphasis in 
original). They argue that the different aspects of the stakeholder theory- i. e. 
normative, instrumental and descriptive - are rather nested. They explain the 
nested nature of these aspects diagrammatically and in the following words: 
... the external shell of the theory is its descriptive aspect; the theory 
presents and explains relationships that are observed in the external 
world. The theory's descriptive accuracy is supported, at the second 
level, by its instrumental and predictive value; if certain practices are 
carried out, then certain results will be obtained. The central core of the 
theory is, however, normative. The descriptive accuracy of the theory 
presumes that managers and other agents act as if all stakeholders' 
interests have intrinsic value. In turn, recognition of these ultimate 
moral values and obligations gives stakeholder management its 
fundamental normative base (p. 74, emphasis in original) 
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Figure 2-o-t: Stakeholder theory - nesting of paradigms schematic 
Three Aspects of Stakeholder Theory 
Donaldson and Preston (1995: 74) 
2.2.6: Other Stakeholding Paradigms 
Andriof and Waddock (2002: 34), further highlighted some rationales for 
adopting the stakeholder approach as shown in the table below. Despite the 
academic rhetoric, in reality, there are a growing number of pressures on 
corporations to effectively manage their stakeholders, even where there are 
no institutional rights on the part of the stakeholders to warrant doing so. As 
such, it is suggested that corporations should consider the interests of their 
stakeholders, whether for ethical reasons (Evan and Freeman, 1998; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995) or for the achievement of strategic and 
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economic objectives (Frooman, 1999; Maignan et al., 1999 - all cited in Crane 
and Livesey, 2003). In this light, Andriof et al (2002: 9) wrote: 
... in today's societies successful companies are those that 
recognise that they have responsibilities to a range of stakeholders 
that go beyond mere compliance with the law or meeting the 
fiduciary responsibility inherent in the phrase `maximising returns 
to shareholders'. If in the past the focus was on enhancing 
shareholder value, now it is on engaging stakeholders for long- 
term value creation. This does not mean that shareholders are not 
important, or that profitability is not vital to business success, but 
that in order to survive and be profitable a company must engage 
with a range of stakeholders whose views on the company's 
success may vary greatly. 
In addition, the world has moved from the `trust me' culture where 
stakeholders placed implicit and explicit faith that corporations would act in 
their best interests, to a `tell me' and `show me' culture in which stakeholders 
wanted to be reassured that organisations will do what is morally right 
(Sustainability/UNEP 1999: 5). Research found that the world is moving 
towards an `involve me' culture in which stakeholders are working in 
partnerships with organisations (Cumming 2001). It is in this partnership 
model that the essence of stakeholder engagement, corporate social 
responsibility and accountability is founded. 
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2.3: Implications of micro and macro level theorisations of 
Corporate Stakeholding Behaviour 
The stakeholder concept lies at the heart of contemporary interests in 
corporate accountability, governance and social responsibility. Stretching the 
moralist bent of the argument further, some authors have argued that the 
stakeholder perspective of corporate social responsibility ought to extend to 
the concept of accountability. However, exposition of the stakeholder theory 
in the literature has mainly been at the micro level - that is, managerialist 
(e. g. Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et al., 1999) and organisational 
level perspectives (e. g. Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Jones et al., 2007). 
Donaldson and Preston's conception of stakeholder theory, for example, is 
heavily managerialistic and they maintain that managers have an essential 
role in the identification of stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 86). 
The literature on managerialist view emphasises the centrality of managers in 
stakeholder related decisions, while the organisational level theorists place 
emphasis on such constructs as stakeholder culture (Jones et al., 2007) and 
organisational life cycle (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001) as drivers of 
corporate stakeholder salience. While the stakeholder theory is evolving in 
management literature, there is parallel stream in the broader domain of 
social sciences - for example, political' economy, politics, international 
relations and economic sociology that studies firm behaviour more from the 
meso and macro levels. An example of such streams of studies will include 
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the national business system literature (Whitley, 1998), Varieties of Capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Crouch, 2005,20o6) and the national system of 
innovation (Lundvall, 1988) to mention but a few. These studies could be 
grouped together under the comparative business system umbrella - i. e. "... 
that institutionalist tradition of research that emphasizes that the way in 
which economic activities are coordinated and controlled (between holders 
of capital and managers, between managers and employees) is crucially 
affected by national institutional contexts.... These contexts (of the financial 
system, the political system, the educational and training system and the 
cultural system) set the rules of the game embedded in specific historically 
emergent social practices such as how capital is made available to 
entrepreneurs and firms, the types of skills and knowledge possessed by 
managers and workers, and the mechanisms of coordination and control 
utilized by managers". (Morgan, 2001: 114). These studies tend to categorise 
firms in relation to their institutional contexts; and one thing they all share in 
common is an interest in the influences institutional contexts exert on firms 
and industries either in relation to stability (i. e. institutional isomorphism) or 
dynamism (i. e. institutional change). Unfortunately, both streams of 
literature have continued to run in parallel with the chances of converging 
ever diverging. 
This section first provides a further review of the stakeholder theory in 
management literature, with emphasis on the implications of its managerial 
and organisational level perspectives. The implications of these micro level 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 57 of 438 
views are reviewed in relation to the growing interest in broad corporate 
social responsibility - and particularly on stakeholder accountability - which is 
currently dominated by managerialist views and in dire need to transcend this 
perspective (Lounsbury, 2007; Gray, 2002). The section then examines this 
interest in stakeholder accountability through the developments in 
comparative corporate governance studies (e. g. Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Aguilera, 2005). The interest in comparative corporate governance studies is 
particularly helpful because these studies have been successful in going 
beyond manager-centric views to incorporate the role of meso and macro 
level variables (i. e. industry and institutional levels, respectively) on corporate 
governance and accountability. Given that the stakeholder theory is a 
precursor to both corporate social responsibility and stakeholder 
accountability, studies in comparative corporate governance, it is anticipated, 
will provide a smooth connection to introduce meso and macro perspectives 
to stakeholder theory in management. It is through this route that corporate 
stakeholder salience will be linked to varieties of capitalism framework, which 
then provides the main research questions of this research study. 
2.4: Micro-level theorisation of corporate stakeholder salience in 
management literature 
Micro-level theorisation of corporate stakeholder salience in this case refers 
to those literatures that have examined stakeholder salience either from the 
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managerialist view or from an organisational (corporate) level perspective. 
Examples of some of these studies are highlighted in the table presenting 
definitions of the term `stakes', above. The managerialist view of stakeholding 
suggests that the firm is a nexus of contracts between stakeholders and 
managers, who are at a central node, where it is the responsibility of 
managers to reconcile divergent interests by making strategic decisions and 
allocating strategic resources in a manner that is most consistent with the 
claims of the other stakeholder groups (Hill and Jones, 1992: 134). Therefore, 
"the stakeholders that receive priority from management will be those whom 
managers - especially CEOs - perceive as highly salient" (Agle et al., 1999: 510). 
The organisational or corporate aspect of the micro-level theorisation of 
stakeholder salience on the other hand, places emphasis on the role of firms 
(as opposed to managers) in shaping stakeholder-related decisions. However, 
in the same approach as the managerialist view, it places the firm at the 
centre of stakeholding, from which the firm exercises power and maintains 
legitimacy. 
2.4.1: Corporate Stakeholder Salience -a managerialist view 
It could be argued that contemporary interest in stakeholder theory in 
management research and practice has been overly managerialist in focus. 
And the same could be said of it right from its earlier conceptualisation 
(Freeman, 1984). The managerialist view is driven by its emphasis and 
dependency on the centrality of manager's perceptions in stakeholder 
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related decisions (as shown in the hub and spoke schematic below). 
According to this school of thought, stakeholder salience is the degree to 
which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims (Mitchell et al., 
1997; Agle et al., 1999). 
Mitchell et al. (1997) and Agle et al. (1999) are amongst the key contributors in 
espousing this managerialist view of stakeholder salience. The stakeholder 
theory of management, according to Mitchell et al., involves identifying and 
prioritising stakeholder issues based on managerial perceptions of 
stakeholder salience. Mitchell et al. identified these stakeholder salience 
variables as: power, legitimacy, and urgency. It could be said that a 
stakeholder has power when it can impose its will on the firm. Legitimacy 
implies that stakeholder demands comply with prevailing norms and beliefs. 
In other words, power accrues to those who control resources needed by the 
firm (Pfeffer, 1981) and legitimacy is achieved if patterns of organisational 
practice are in congruence with the wider social system (Scott and Meyer, 
1983; Scott 1987,1995; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). However, power and 
legitimacy can appear together, giving authority to those who have both, but 
they can also appear independently. Finally, urgency is a concept sustained on 
two elements: (1) the importance stakeholders accord their own demands; 
and (2) their sensitivity to how long it takes managers to deal with their 
demands (Gago and Antolin, 2004). These salient variables according to 
Mitchell et al. will determine how managers respond to stakeholders. 
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Figure i-o-2: Stakeholder Wheel 
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Freeman (1984: 55), managers added to emphasise the 
managerialist view (Hill and Jones, 1992) 
Drawing from social cognition theory (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), Agle et al. 
(1999: 5og) explain that "... as the stakeholder attributes of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency cumulate in the mind of a manager, selectivity is 
enhanced, intensity is increased, and higher salience of the stakeholder 
group is the likely result". Agle et al. (1999) also tested Mitchell et al. (1997)'s 
theoretical model of stakeholder salience and confirm this model. They found 
that in the minds of CEOs, the stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, 
and urgency are individually ... and cumulatively... related to stakeholder 
salience across all groups; (which)... suggests that these stakeholder 
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attributes (of power, legitimacy and urgency) do affect the degree to which 
top managers give priority to competing stakeholders" (p. 521). 
While "... the stakeholder approach to management can be considered a 
knowledge structure that determines how a manager selectively perceives, 
evaluates, and interprets attributes of the environment" (Wolfe and Putler, 
2002: 65), some have criticised the stakeholder theory of management on the 
grounds that it provides unscrupulous managers with a ready excuse to act in 
their own self-interest thus resurrecting the agency problem that the 
shareholder wealth maximisation imperative was designed to overcome 
(Phillips et al, 2003). Opportunistic managers can more easily act in their own 
self-interest by claiming that the action actually benefits some stakeholder 
group or other (Jensen 2000); Marcoux 2000, Sternberg, 2000). In this regard, 
Marcoux (2000: 97), wrote: "All but the most egregious self-serving 
managerial behavior will doubtless serve the interests of some stakeholder 
constituencies and work against the interests of others". In the same trend, 
Sternberg (2000: 51f) argues that stakeholder theory, "effectively destroys 
business accountability ... because a business that is accountable to all, is 
actually accountable to none". 
In response to this criticism of opportunistic self-interest on the part of 
managers, Phillips et al (2003) argue that no small measure of managerial 
opportunism has occurred in the name of shareholder wealth maximisation, 
as well. While this sounds like a tu quoque (and you too! ) fallacy, Phillips et al 
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simply describe this criticism as a version of the evil genie argument - "... one 
that is no more (or less) problematic for any one theory or idea than only of 
the extant alternatives" (p. 482). Continuing, they argue that although 
managerial opportunism is a problem, it is no more a problem for stakeholder 
theory than the alternatives. On the criticism of multiple master service (i. e. 
accountability to all), Phillips et al, citing examples from Hill & Jones (1992) 
stakeholder-agency theory, argue that managers' interest in organisational 
growth runs contrary not only to the interests of stockholders, but also 
contrary to the interests of stakeholders. As such, the claims of different 
groups may conflict, however, on a more general level; each group can be 
seen as having a stake in the continued existence of the firm (Hill & Jones, 
1992: 145). Stakeholder theory, therefore, does not advocate the service of 
two masters. Rather, 11 ... managers serve the interest of one master: the 
organisation" (Phillip et al, 2003: 484)" 
However, Phillip et al. 's response does not take away from the fact that 
dominant corporate stakeholder salience theorisation is largely managerialist 
in approach. Although both Mitchell et al. (1997) and Agle et al. (1999) linked 
stakeholder salience to legitimacy, which is an attribute of the wider social 
system (Scott 1987; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) they seem to promote 
managerial perception in such decisions and under-emphasise this 
institutional dimension of stakeholder salience. As a result, they fail to 
account for how the wider social system enables and or constrains corporate 
stakeholder salience decisions. In summary then, it could be said that the 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 63 of 438 
managerialist view of corporate stakeholder salience championed by such 
dominant views as those of Mitchell et al. (1997) and Agle et al. (1999) exhibit 
the following characteristics in common: 
1. Managers are placed at the centre of stakeholding: The starting point of 
the stakeholder theory was around managers: "... the impetus behind 
stakeholder management was to try and build a framework that was 
responsive to the concerns of managers who were being buffeted by 
unprecedented levels of environmental turbulence and change. 
Traditional strategy frameworks were neither helping managers to 
develop new strategic directions nor were they helping them to 
understand how to create new opportunities in the midst of so much 
change" (Freeman and McVea, 2005: 189) 
2. Managers are framed and positioned as autonomous independent actors: 
"A stakeholder approach emphasizes active management of the business 
environment, relationships and the promotion of shared interests" 
(Freeman and McVea, 2005: 192 - emphasis in original). 
3. Managerial perceptions are emphasised more than institutional 
influences: The influence of wider social system on stakeholder salience 
(i. e. the institutional context in which stakeholder salience is embedded 
and enacted) is under-emphasised. On the contrary, stakeholders and 
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stakeholder salience are theorised as subject to managerial perceptions, 
constructions and choices 
2.4.2: Corporate Stakeholder Salience - an organisational level view 
Firm level theorization of stakeholder salience goes beyond the managerialist 
perspective to emphasise the role of organisational context on stakeholder- 
related decisions. In this section, we review two major contributions to this 
perspective. One is Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) who proposed that 
decisions on stakeholder salience are influenced by where a firm is on its 
organisational life-cycle and the other is Jones et al. (2007) who argue that 
organisational stakeholder culture influences stakeholder salience decisions. 
2.4.2.1: Organisational life cycle - (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001) 
In opposition to the managerialist perspective of stakeholder salience and 
drawing from resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), 
Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001: 401) argue that 11 ... managers do not have 
unbridled strategic choice... but must make strategic choices within 
constraints". One of these constraints include where the organisation is in its 
life-cycle development - i. e. where it is in one of the four overlapping phases 
comprising of start-up, emerging growth, maturity and revival (p. 404) . The 
organisation strives to survive and as such is very likely to naturally gravitate 
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towards those stakeholders that provide essential resources to its survival 
and sustenance. 
... organizations in start-up or decline/revival stages are likely to 
favor certain stakeholders..., depending on the extent to which 
they are dependent on those stakeholders for resources critical to 
organizational survival. 
Organizations are unlikely to fulfil all the responsibilities they have 
toward each primary stakeholder group. Instead, they are likely to 
fulfil economic and all noneconomic responsibilities of some primary 
stakeholders but not others and, over time, to fulfil responsibilities 
relative to each stakeholder to varying extents. This variation is how 
organizations deal with different stakeholders, simultaneously and 
over time (i. e., across life cycle stages)... (p. 397) 
This dependency on specific resourceful stakeholders is the source of power 
over the firm on the part of the stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Continuing, Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001: 405) in their study confirm that: 
1. at any given organisational life cycle stage, certain stakeholders, 
because of their potential to satisfy critical organisational needs, will 
be more important than others 
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2. specific stakeholders are likely to become more or less important as 
an organisation evolves from one stage to the next 
3. the strategy an organisation uses to deal with each stakeholder will 
depend on the importance of that stakeholder to the organisation 
relative to other stakeholders 
Start-up phase: in this phase, the organisation is desperate to survive and as 
such requires access to finance and market. Given these required resources, 
the organisation is likely to be inclined to such stakeholder groups as 
shareholders and creditors for finance and to customers for market share. 
Jawahar and McLaughlin argue that the other stakeholder groups (e. g. 
government, employees, and suppliers) would only be considered if they 
were thought to be critical to the survival of the organisation at this stage. 
Emerging growth stage: this stage is mainly characterised by the need to 
build quality brand, workforce and products and to obtain resources to 
accommodate rapid growth in expansion (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 
2001: 408). Employees and suppliers are considered very important at this 
stage because they provide the quality of workforce and material inputs to 
production development, respectively, needed to sustain the organisation. 
Mature stage: this stage is often characterised by `tempered overconfidence' 
of success and attended by strong cash flows, without particularly attractive 
investment opportunities (p. 4o8). The organisation is likely to deal with all 
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primary stakeholders in a proactive manner at this stage. Jahawar and 
McLaughlin (2001) in this case borrow Clarkson's articulation of primary 
stakeholders as groups typically comprised of shareholders and investors, 
employees, customers, and suppliers, together with what is defined as the 
public stakeholder group: the government and communities that provide 
infrastructures and markers, whose laws and regulations must be obeyed, 
and to whom taxes and other obligations may be due (Clarkson, 1995: 106). 
Decline/transition stage: at this stage, the organisation is likely to experience 
dwindling patronage, loss of market share, and or make efforts to build new 
markets or rebuild existing market share. Main stakeholder focus will be 
customers and creditors. Unless government, community, trade associations 
et cetera are essential for survival, the organisation is very likely to adopt 
defensive strategies towards these latter groups. 
Table 2-3: Stakeholder salience and organisational life cycle 
Phases Pressing needs Important stakeholders 
Start-up Access to finance, market Shareholders, creditors, 
share customers 
Emerging growth Need to build a quality Suppliers, employees 
workforce and products 
and to obtain resources to 
accommodate rapid 
growth and expansion (p. 
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Phases Pressing needs Important stakeholders 
408) 
Mature stage Often characterised by Likely to deal with all 
`tempered primary stakeholders in a 
overconfidence' of proactive manner 
success and attended by 
strong cash flows, without 
particularly attractive 
investment opportunities 
(P"4o8) 
Decline/transition stage Dwindling patronage, loss Main stakeholder focus 
of market share, and or will be customers and 
efforts to build a new creditors. Unless 
market or rebuild market government, community, 
share trade associations etc are 
essential for survival, the 
organisation is very likely 
to adopt defensive 
strategies towards these 
latter groups. 
One of the limitations of this framework, amongst others, is that it does not 
explicitly address differences in stakeholder salience arising from industry of 
the organisation. For instance, most firms in such sectors as the chemical and 
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or oil/gas might be constrained by government policies or environmental 
pressures to take on environmental and community issues earlier in their life 
cycle (for details on industry driven differences in corporate stakeholding, 
see Jones, 1999; Beliveau et al., 1994; Greening and Gray, 1994; Baucus and 
Near, 1991). However, several scholars have suggested that an organisation 
can adopt different approaches to deal with its stakeholders, including 
proaction, accommodation, defense, and reaction (Carroll, 1979; Clarkson, 
1995; Gatewood & Carroll, 1981; Wartick & Cochran, 1985). 
2.4.2.2: Organisational Stakeholder Culture (Jones et al., 2007) 
Jones et al. (2007) started from the point that "... whereas the focus of 
attention in stakeholder theory mainly has been on top managers, 
understood as relatively autonomous decision makers, these managers are 
often profoundly influenced by the organisational context in which they are 
embedded" and suggests a need to "... identify organization-level factors that 
could help us predict how firms manage stakeholder relationships" (p. 137, 
emphasis in original). This is a radical departure from the view that 
stakeholder related decisions are functions of managerial choice. They 
recognise that stakeholder relationships are often fraught with tensions and 
note that managers often feel these tensions between meeting narrow 
demands of stakeholding based on self interest and the broad demands 
based on "a concern for the interests of others" (p. 137). These tensions are 
further exacerbated by the continuous pull on managers between what 
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Hendry (2004) regards as traditional morality (obligation and duty, honesty 
and respect, fairness and equity, care and assistance) and market morality 
(self-interest). To resolve these tensions, Jones et al. introduce stakeholder 
culture as an organisational level construct that helps managers go through 
stakeholder related decisions with less stress. Emphasising the mediating 
role of stakeholder culture on managerial stakeholding decisions, Jones et al. 
posit that: 11 ... stakeholder culture is a potent organizational factor, 
profoundly influencing the way in which managers understand, prioritize, and 
respond to stakeholder issues and, as an example, how they establish 
stakeholder salience" (pp. 140-141). 
Jones et al. (2007) define the stakeholder culture as 11 ... the beliefs, values, 
and practices that have evolved for solving stakeholder-related problems and 
otherwise managing relationships with stakeholders" (p. 142). It is articulated 
as a central facet of organizational culture as well as an organisational 
memory of how moral tensions between self-interest and other-regarding 
interests were resolved in the past. It is as well a simultaneous outcome of 
"... employee sentiments and reified `social facts' that have an independent 
effect on managerial decisions making" (p. 143). According to Jones et al. 
(2007), the stakeholder culture influences managerial stakeholder-related 
decisions in two related ways: "(1) by constituting a common interpretive 
frame on the basis of which information about stakeholder attributes and 
issues is collected, screened, and evaluated and (2) by motivating behaviours 
and practices - and, by extension, organizational routines - that preserve, 
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enhance, or otherwise support the organization's culture" (p. 143). However, 
this stakeholder culture is "grounded in ethics and based on a continuum of 
concern for others that runs from self-regarding to other-regarding" (143). In 
other words, the beginning part of the continuum has a narrow stakeholder 
orientation while the latter stages are broadly oriented. Based on this 
continuum and combination of narrow and broad stakeholder orientations, 
respectively, Jones et al. (2007) come up with five categories of corporate 
stakeholder cultures, which are further subdivided into three typologies: 
amoral (i. e. agency culture or managerial egoism), limited morality (i. e. 
corporate egoism and instrumentalism), and broad morality (i. e. morality and 
altruism). 
1. Agency Culture: This is characterised by managerial egoism, and is "... the 
pursuit of self-interest at the individual level, even if the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, for whom managers nominally work, 
must be sacrificed" (p. 144). This culture is dominated by self-centredness 
among the managers of the firm. In other words, managers work entirely 
for their self-interests. This sort of culture lies at the heart of the old 
`agency problem' between managers and shareholders. 
2. Corporate Egoist: In firms characterised by corporate egoism, the 
predominant culture is pursuit of short-term profit maximization. This 
kind of culture is primarily geared towards shareholders' wealth 
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maximization. Adherence to law is only done when the costs of law 
breaking is considered to out-weigh the gains. 
3. Instrumentalist: Managers in instrumentalist cultures recognise that 
moral behaviour could be beneficial to the firm, and practice morality as a 
strategic device for increasing profitability (Lantos, 2001). Behaviour of 
managers appears morally to people, but the underlying motive of 
managers is to advance economic interests of shareholders. In this case, 
stakeholders are seen more as means or impediments to the goals of the 
firm (p. 146) 
4. Moralis : This is a broadly moral culture where the focus is to adhere to 
principles irrespective of economic pressures. Moral standards are only 
violated if there is a threat to the survival of the firm (p. 149). 
5. Altruistic: In altruistic cultures, the concern for others dominates. 
Adherence to rules irrespective of the implications to the firm dominates 
and there is also emphasis in treating all the stakeholders fairly and with 
respect. 
A summary of these stakeholder cultures and their orientations are 
presented in the schematic below. 
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Figure 2-0-3: Varieties of corporate stakeholder cultures and orientations 
Agency I r------ Corporate Instrumentalist Moralist Ii Altruist 
ýý Egoist I 
k-4 r 
---- 
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descriptions management profit self-interest concern for morality 
" Management maximization " Instrumental welfare of " Moral purism 
egoism " Short-term or strategic normative 
self-interest of morality stakeholders 
the corporate " Moral 
level pragmatism 
Moral " Pure egoism " Regard for " Same as " Morally based " Morally based 
orientation; " Purely self- others extends corporate regard for regard for 
self- versus regarding to egoist normative normative 
other- shareholders; stakeholders stakeholders 
regarding belief in only 
efficiency of 
the market 
Relevant " None " Shareholders " Shareholders " All normative " Normative 
stakeholders only only, but other and derivative stakeholders 
stakeholders stakeholders only 
as means to 
shareholder 
ends 
Adapted from Jones et al. (2007: 145) 
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2.4.2.3: Summary of Organisational level view of corporate stakeholder 
salience 
Drawing from accounts of corporate stakeholding of Jawahar and 
McLaughlin, (2001) - organisational lifecycle approach - and Jones et al., 
(2007) - organisational stakeholder culture view - presented above, it could 
be said that the organisational level view of corporate stakeholder salience 
also shares some characteristics in common with the managerialist view - 
albeit from non-atomised actor perspective. In this case, in stead of placing 
managers at the centre of corporate stakeholding, the organisational level 
view places the firm at the centre. It fundamentally shifts from the individual 
cognition central to the managerialist view to a form of organisational 
collective cognition and action, whilst still theorising the firm as powerful and 
legitimate, and under-emphasising the influence of the wider social system in 
corporate stakeholding process. 
2.5: Influences of micro-level theorisation of stakeholding on 
corporate social responsibility literature 
In the sections below we draw from insights from the micro-level 
theorisations of stakeholding presented in previous sections to x-ray the 
different paradigms underpinning the contemporary stakeholder approach to 
corporate social responsibility - where firms and managers are encouraged to 
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prioritise other stakeholders in addition to shareholders. However, this 
prioritisation of corporate social responsibility agenda is still largely assumed 
to be solely dependent on managerial discretion and organisational strategic 
choices (Child, 1972,1997). In such cases, the institutional influences on both 
managerial and organisational choices are under-emphasised. 
2.5.1: Micro-level theorisations of Corporate Social Responsibility 
The stakeholder theory of the firm is central to the current corporate social 
responsibility movement. Without the stakeholder theory, corporate social 
responsibility loses its fundamental structure and crumbles. As a precursor to 
corporate social responsibility, the micro-level theorisation of corporate 
stakeholding also finds an expression through contemporary corporate social 
responsibility discourse. In this case, however, managers assume central 
positions in shaping and setting corporate social responsibility agenda. In 
their work on 'Managers' Personal Values as Drivers of Corporate Social 
Responsibility', Hemingway and Maclagan (2004: 34) propose two key 
dimensions for the analysis of corporate social responsibility in practice, as 
shown in the diagram below. The motivational basis of the framework, which 
lies on the vertical axis, asks if the corporate social responsibility practice 
analyzed is driven primarily by commercial interests or is it just idealistic, even 
altruistic. In this case, one can see some similarities between commercial 
interests and instrumental dimension of stakeholding, and idealistic/altruistic 
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interests as related to normative dimensions of stakeholding proposed by 
Donaldson and Preston (1995)" 
Figure 2-o-4: CSR analysis framework 
MOTIVE 
Idealistic/ altruistic 
Corporate 
LOCUS OF 
Individual RESPONSI- 
BILITY 
A framework for analyzing CSR (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004: 34) 
The second aspect of the framework is what Hemingway and Maclagan 
(2004: 34) call the "locus of responsibility". And by this, they mean if the 
corporate social responsibility practice in question could be said to be 
primarily driven by corporate or individual interests - that is whether they 
reflect organisational level and managerialist views of stakeholding, 
respectively. This thesis adopts these theoretical dimensions, which the 
authors conclude "... point towards a framework for analysis of corporate 
social responsibility" (p. 34). Given that stakeholder theory has for a long time 
focused on micro-level theorising, a large number of the literature on 
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Strategic 
corporate social responsibility has also been at this micro-level8. A couple of 
examples are highlighted below as typical of this literature. 
2.5.1.1: Managerialist views of corporate social responsibility 
The corporate social responsibility literature is dotted with accounts 
emphasising the role of individual actors in promoting (or inhibiting) 
corporate social responsibility practices in organisations. These cases tend to 
draw inspiration from Giddens (1984)'s structuration theory that attributes 
equivalent importance to both agency and structure in understanding social 
change - which could be extended to understanding firm behaviour. In such 
instances, powerful personalities within organisations are constructed as 
moral change agents who leverage their legitimacy and personal values to 
sway organisation level agenda and actions (Visser, 2007). CEOs and business 
leaders are often considered to be such personalities (Agle, et al., 1999), 
although Hemmingway (2005) has argued that this form of 'corporate social 
entrepreneurship' could "... operate at a variety of levels within the 
organization: from manual workers or clerical staff to junior management 
through to directors. They may not necessarily be the most senior executives 
at the top of the organizational hierarchy setting the moral tone of the 
corporation" (p. 236, emphasis in original). This exhibition of managerial or 
8 It is only recently that corporate social responsibility theorisation is attempting to 
incorporate macro-theorisation - e. g. Matten and Moon (2007), Maignan and Ferrell 
(2001), which this thesis will cover in subsequent sections. 
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employee heroism is well documented in the corporate greening (e. g. Harris 
and Crane, 2002; Fineman and Clarke, 1996; Walley and Stubbs, 1999; Crane, 
20ooa, b, zoos) and ethical leadership literatures (e. g. Dukerich et al., 1990; 
Sivanathan and Fekken, 2002; Sims and Brinkman, 2002). And a key theme 
central to these is the emphasis they place on the centrality of the `manager' 
in shaping firm behaviour, often at the expense (under-emphasis) of the 
institutional influences. 
2.5.1.2: Organisational views of corporate social responsibility 
Carroll, through his numerous works, is one of the major figures that have 
contributed significantly to shaping the organisational level corporate social 
responsibility agenda since the late last century. Standing out amongst his 
works is his classic on the pyramid metaphor of corporate social responsibility 
(Carroll, 1991), which he orchestrated recently (Carroll, 2004). In these works, 
Carroll argued that corporate social responsibility is made up of the following 
components in a bottom-up order: (1) economic responsibility - `be profitable' 
(2) legal responsibility - `obey the law' (3) ethical responsibility - `be ethical' 
(4) philanthropic responsibility -'be a good global corporate citizen'. Much of 
the corporate social responsibility literature and practices have been greatly 
influenced by Carroll's typology of corporate social responsibility. 
In line with this organisational level theorising, Lantos (zoos) identified the 
following strands of corporate social responsibility: (a) ethical corporate 
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social responsibility, (b) altruistic corporate social responsibility and (c) 
strategic corporate social responsibility. According to him, ethical corporate 
social responsibility is a firm's mandatory fulfilment of economic, legal and 
ethical responsibilities. It is akin to the first three components of Carroll's 
typology. Altruistic corporate social responsibility is the same as 
philanthropic responsibility of Carroll's typology but differed from it in the 
sense that Lantos (zoos) argued that it would only be possible for private 
firms to be philanthropic and irresponsibility on the part of public 
corporations, since public corporations do not have the rights to use the 
funds of shareholders (who might also be involved in private philanthropy) 
for public philanthropy. Non-instrumental corporate social responsibility 
practices transcend (and often defy) rational economic principles underlying 
most organisational decisions (Korhonen, 2002) and are, thus, informed and 
governed by trans-material ratio of emotion (Fineman, 1996, zoos). Finally, 
strategic corporate social responsibility is '... good works that are also good 
for the business'. Lantos (2001), therefore, proposes that ethical corporate 
social responsibility, grounded in the concept of ethical duties and 
responsibilities, is mandatory, concludes that strategic corporate social 
responsibility is good for business and society; and advises that marketing 
take a lead role in strategic corporate social responsibility activities. 
This is not an entirely new venture. A number of scholars (e. g. Burke and 
Logsdon, 1996; Zairi and Peters, 2002; Greening and Turban, 2000; Moir, 2001; 
Maignan and Ferrell, zoos) have advocated for corporate social responsibility 
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to be solely used to support business objectives, but they are still in the 
minority camp. Drawing from concepts and practices within strategy, as a 
management domain, Burke and Logsdon (1996), for instance, argued that 
the probable contributions of corporate social responsibility activities to 
value creation could be assessed from the following dimensions (pp. 496- 
499): 
" Centrality -a measure of the closeness of fit between a corporate social 
responsibility policy or programme and the firm's mission and objectives 
" Specificity - the firm's ability to capture or internalize the benefits of a 
corporate social responsibility programme, rather than simply creating 
collective goods which can be shared by others in the industry, 
community or society at large 
9 Proactivity - the degree to which corporate social responsibility activities 
are planned in anticipation of emerging economic, technological, social or 
political trends and in the absence of crisis conditions9 
9 Voluntarism - the scope of discretionary decision-making by the firm and 
the absence of externally imposed compliance requirements 
9 Visibility - the observability of a business activity and the firm's ability to 
gain recognition from internal and external stakeholders. 
9 An example of proactivity in the CSR context, according to Burke and Logdson 
(1996), is a manufacturer monitoring emerging social trends and regulatory 
initiatives regarding pollution control (p. 498) 
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The visibility dimension of value creation through corporate social 
responsibility lends credence to the importance of pursuit of positive 
corporate reputation, which has been acknowledged in both theory and 
practice (Swift, zool. According to Roberts and Dowling (2002) good 
corporate reputations are critical not only because of their potential for value 
creation, but also because their intangible character makes replication by 
competing firms considerably more difficult. In a similar vein, good corporate 
reputation has been argued to attract good job applicants (Greening and 
Turban, 2000; Maignan and Ferrell, 2001). 
In what has become a classic, Baron (1995) proposed that robust corporate 
strategies should incorporate elements of the market and non-market 
environments, respectively. According to Baron (1995: 47), "... the market 
environment includes those interactions between the firm and other parties 
that are intermediated by markers or private agreements. These interactions 
typically are voluntary and involve economic transactions and the exchange 
of property". On the other hand, the non-market environment is 
characterised by interactions that are "... intermediated by the public, 
stakeholders, government, the media, and public institutions"; and these 
interactions may be voluntary, such as when the firm adopts a policy of 
developing relationships with government officials, or involuntary when 
government regulates an activity or activist groups organise a boycott of a 
firm's product. Going further, Baron (1995: 48) outlined the following as the 
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major components of the non-market environment: issues, institutions, 
interests, and information. The non-market strategies address issues, by 
seeking to influence institutions (such as regulatory bodies) and interests 
(e. g. activists, individuals and groups) that drive these issues. The non-market 
strategies, also, seek to ascertain the information available to these different 
drivers through environmental scanning. 
2.6: Influences of micro-level theorisation of stakeholding on 
corporate accountability 
The stakeholder perspective to organising and managing firms is one of 
the major management paradigm shifts in the late last century. The 
theory, in its present form traceable to Freeman (1984: 246), broadly 
and loosely defines stakeholders as "... those groups and individuals 
who can affect, or are affected by the achievement of an 
organization's purpose" - for example shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, government, competitors, local communities and the 
environment. One of the popular propositions of the stakeholder theory 
is the view that firms exist at the nexus of series of interdependent 
relationships with groups that can affect or are affected by them 
(Crane and Livesey, 2003). Given the infinite network of relationships a 
firm could be entangled in, this proposition, however, poses some 
fundamental managerial challenges such as defining the boundaries of 
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stakeholder-ship and effectively managing these relationships that often 
come with conflicting interests and goals. This challenge tends to 
polarise views on stakeholder approach to management, into three 
broad camps: descriptive, normative and instrumental (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). The descriptive paradigm explains who a stakeholder is, 
the normative view prescribes who a stakeholder ought to be, while 
the instrumental view highlights the consequences of considering a 
stakeholder or not and suggests that stakeholders could be prioritised 
based on their salience (importance) (Freeman, 1999: 233). 
Freeman (1999) acknowledged that his 1984 stakeholder theory is 
instrumental and pragmatic. As such, he suggested that: "... If 
organizations want to be effective, they will pay attention to all and 
only those relationships that can affect or be affected by the 
achievement of the organization's purposes" (234). In addition, it is 
necessary for an effective firm to manage the relationships that are 
important, irrespective of the purpose of the firm. Extending the 
instrumental view, Mitchell et al. (1997) theorised that stakeholder salience 
is a combination of the following factors: power, legitimacy and 
urgency. A stakeholder group has power when it can impose its will on 
the firm, especially when it controls resources needed by the firm 
(Pfeffer, 1981); while legitimacy implies that stakeholder demands 
comply with prevailing norms and beliefs. Legitimacy is achieved if 
patterns of organisational practice are in congruence with the wider 
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social system (Scott 1987; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). However, power 
and legitimacy can appear together, giving authority to those who have 
both (Weber, 1947), but they can also appear independently. Finally, 
urgency is a concept sustained on two elements: (1) the importance 
stakeholders accord their own demands; and (2) their sensitivity to how 
long it takes managers to deal with their demands (Gago and Antolin, 
2004). These salient variables according to Mitchell et al. will determine how 
a firm responds to its stakeholders. Optimal strategic stakeholder 
management is, therefore, dependent on the ability of firms to identify 
and be responsive to salient stakeholders within their business 
environment. 
Stakeholder salience is a precursor to stakeholder accountability and 
both are interdependent. Roberts and Scapens (1985: 447) define 
accountability as "the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct". It 
is an art of 11 ... making the invisible visible" (Munro, 1996: 5) through 
the "... provision of information ... where the one accountable, explains 
or justifies actions to the one to whom the account is owed" (Gray et 
al., 1997). Traditionally, under the principal-agent dispensation, firms 
have limited their accountability to shareholders as economic and legal 
owners of the firm. Friedman (1962) reinforced this form of 
accountability when he argued that the primary responsibility of firms is 
to pursue profits within the limits of the law. The economic logic of 
accountability leans heavily on what Korhonen (2002) called the 
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`dominant social paradigm' (DSP) of profit maximization for the owners 
of the firm. The DSP emphasizes such issues as competitive advantage, 
cost minimization, equilibrium, market efficiency, optimal returns on 
investments (including labour) and market dominance. Shareholder 
accountability is the bedrock of modern capitalism. Adherence to this 
culture of capitalism often comes with its rewards in terms of increase 
in shareholders wealth and firm growth; although it sometimes leads to 
market failures (i. e. monopolies, pollutions, et cetera). Stakeholder 
accountability has emerged, towards the end of the last century, as 
complement to shareholder accountability (Gray et al., 1988; Gray, 2002; 
Owen et al., 2000). 
Drawing from the works of other academics (e. g. Gray et al. 1987; Williams 
1987; Roberts and Scapens, 1985), Swift (2001: 17) broadly describes 
accountability as "... the requirement or duty to provide an account or 
justification for one's actions to whomever one is answerable" and narrowly 
as "... being pertinent to contractual arrangements only,... where 
accountability is not contractually bound there can be no act of 
accountability". Borrowing from a later work of Gray et al (1997), Swift notes 
that "... essentially accountability is about the provision of information 
between two parties where the one is accountable, explains or justifies 
actions to the one to whom the account is owed". This form of accountability 
can easily be glimpsed from that characteristic of principal-agent relationship, 
which is central to the firm as an economic and legal entity. But no matter the 
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side taken, and however defined, one factor that is central to the notion of 
accountability is the duty to account, which connotes institution of rights and 
as such, should hurt (Owen et al., 2000). In the same line of thought, Gray et 
al. (1988) sought to explain the firm's accountability to the wider society as 
inherent in a social contract between the society and the business - the idea 
that business derives its existence from the society. This accountability 
inherent in the form of social contract is enforced through the market forces 
that punish or reward corporate behaviour (Swift, zoos; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). Korten (2004) argues that the market by necessity needs 
information to be effective - as such, corporations should be demanded to 
produce the necessary and complete information required by the market to 
punish or reward - this will constitute accountability to the market, which 
can not be achieved through self regulation. Accountability, therefore, in 
turn connotes some level of transparency; and transparency carries with 
it some risks of disclosure that could hurt (Gray, 2002; Owen et al., 
2000). 
This perspective of stakeholder accountability seems to be driving the 
current surge of interests in social reports. Interest in and demand for 
stakeholder accountability has been on the increase. The 1970s enjoyed 
a boom in social accounting which disappeared in the 198os and has 
reappeared since the 199os. In addition, the accounting and governance 
travesties of such firms as Enron and WorldCom in the USA and 
Parmalat in Italy, to mention but a few have made such demands for 
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corporate accountability and social reports even more pertinent. Within 
these social reports, firms aim to signal accountability towards, and 
willingness to be held accountable by, their different stakeholder 
groups on such issues as their environmental footprints, poverty 
reduction, labour and employment conditions, gender and equality, 
community and consumer welfare, corporate governance and ethics. It 
is also argued that firms use corporate social reports as subtle 
strategies to re-affirm their legitimacy (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Neu 
et al., 1998), and appeal to salient stakeholders (Gray, 2002; 
Hooghiemstra, 2000). 
Unfortunately, the target of social reports has been one of the vexed 
issues about these reports in recent times. Unlike corporate annual 
reports that are specifically addressed to shareholders, corporate social 
reports often start with such diffused salutations as "Dear Readers" or 
"Dear Stakeholders". This diffused and non-specific addressee approach 
tends to demean social reports as mere 'talks to all, but to none'. 
Some critics have even gone as far as describing social reports as 
artefacts of managerial capture (Owen et al., 2002) "... used by a 
privileged part of the socio-economic-political system (capitalist elites) to 
protect and advance their sectional interests" (Unerman, 2003: 429). This 
line of argument, which has dominated stakeholder accountability 
thinking for a long time now, tends to assume that managerial actions 
are largely rational and thus discretional. It is within this discretional 
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rationality, it is argued, that managers as representatives of firms 
exercise power and dominion over different stakeholder groups. 
Over the years, stakeholder management discourse and practice has also 
been anchored on managerial discretion. In other words, stakeholders 
that receive priority from management will be those whom managers 
perceive as highly salient (Agle et al., 1999). This managerial elitism has, 
in the main, continued to dominate stakeholder management discourse, 
with little or no emphasis placed on the contextual embeddedness of 
managerial thoughts and actions in stakeholder management practice 
and discourse. This situation, which is arguably a manifestation of the 
rational choice school of thought, could be, borrowing from 
Granovetter (1985), described as an under-socialised account of 
stakeholder management practice. Theorists have recently begun to 
challenge this managerialist view and to interpret firms' interactions 
with their stakeholder from a much broader perspective that 
incorporates institutional, cultural and societal contexts, into the debate. 
2.7: Summary of micro-level theorisations of corporate 
stakeholding practice 
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All the examples presented above tend to suggest that corporate social 
responsibility agenda and actions are largely subject to firms' strategic 
choices. This suggestion rubs-off from organisational level theorisation of 
corporate stakeholding practice. Notwithstanding, the view that firms exist 
at the nexus of series of interdependent relationships with groups that can 
affect or are affected by them (Crane and Livesey, 2003; Freeman, 1984) 
poses some fundamental managerial challenges such as defining the 
boundaries of stakeholder-ship and effectively managing these relationships 
that often come with conflicting interests and goals. However, central to this 
stakeholder approach is the principle of who or what really counts (Freeman, 
1994). That is, who (or what) are the stakeholders of the firm? And to whom 
(or what) do managers pay attention? (Mitchell et al., 1997). These come 
with a burden of defining the boundaries of stakeholder-ship, and 
establishing appropriate mechanisms for stakeholder consultation and 
involvement in strategic development. They, as well, constitute great 
challenges for managers and decision-makers, which ultimately impact on 
corporate social responsibility agenda setting and actions - both at the 
managerial and organisational levels. It is the argument of this research study 
that in addition to managerial and organisational level influences, corporate 
stakeholding practice, as a precursor to corporate social responsibility, 
governance and accountability, is equally constrained and enabled by the 
institutional contexts in which it is enacted. Unfortunately, this institutional 
dimension to accounting for corporate stakeholding practices is marginalised 
(or under-emphasised) in the extant corporate social responsibility literature. 
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2.8: Towards a `new paradigm': theorising corporate stakeholder 
salience from an institutionalist perspective 
Despite the under-emphasis of institutional embeddedness of corporate 
stakeholding practices, there is an emerging literature on variations of 
corporate social responsibility and governance across national institutional 
contexts (e. g. Chapple and Moon, 2004; Amaeshi et al., 20o6; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). Following its normative underpinnings, for instance, it is 
expected that stakeholder salience will differ according to industry and 
country since ethics have been found to differ along those lines, as well. In 
their large-scale survey among senior executives in the U. S., the U. K., 
Germany and Austria, Schlegelmilch and Robertson (1995), found that both 
country and industry have strong influence on perception of ethical issues 
(and that firm size does not). In another study, Thelen and Zhuplev (2001) 
present a comparative analysis of attitudes between Russian and U. S. 
undergraduate students on ethical issues in managing Russian small firms 
engaged in business transactions with U. S. firms. Based on the real life 
situations, Russian and American respondents were asked to select decision 
alternatives dealing with ethical dilemmas. Significant differences were found 
between the two groups. Russians do not recognize significant differences 
between various alternatives, despite the disparity in the severity of these 
alternatives for resolving business problems. Russians, compared to 
Americans, tend to prefer more forceful decision alternatives resorting to 
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business practices that would be considered unethical in the U. S. This is 
attributable to differences in the countries' history, political, legal, and 
cultural environment. The transitional nature of the Russian economy affects 
decision-making and business ethics. 
Robertson et al (2002) also queried 210 financial services managers from 
Australia, Chile, Ecuador and the United States about their ethical beliefs 
when faced with four diverse dilemmas. In addition, the situational context 
was altered so the respondent viewed each dilemma from a top 
management position and from a position of economic hardship. Results 
suggest a complex interaction of situation, culture and issue when individuals 
make ethical judgments. Specifically, Chileans were found to have different 
beliefs about sex discrimination and child labour dilemmas when compared 
to their colleagues from the other three nations. Chileans and Australians 
also disagreed on the bribery dilemma. Anglo managers were more likely 
than Latin American managers to change their ethical responses when the 
situation was altered. In a situation like this where interpretations and 
manifestations of ethical beliefs are determined by cultural differences, what 
should be the criteria for making ethical decisions? Robertson et al (2002) 
suggested that multinational firms interested in maintaining healthy ethical 
climates, should consider adapting culturally contingent ethical guidelines, or 
policies to the local customs. If this suggestion should be adhered to, what 
happens in a situation where board members from different cultures and 
beliefs need to take ethical decisions that are not location specific? 
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Hooghiemstra and van Manen's (2002) research among 2500 of the largest 
companies in The Netherlands reveals the growing importance of social and 
ethical issues in the corporate governance debate. Such issues can place non- 
executive directors in a dilemma when his point of view is neither shared by 
the management board nor by the other supervisory board members: Should 
he resign or should he try to influence the others of his opinion? That is, in 
terms of Hirschman's (1970) classical work, should he 'exit' or 'voice'. The 
paper reports the findings regarding non-executive directors' choice based 
upon a qualitative and a quantitative study conducted among almost 300 
Dutch supervisory directors. Regarding bribing civil servants, non-executives 
seem to make a distinction based upon location. While a bribe in a third world 
country seemed acceptable to approximately half of the responding outside 
directors, it was considered unacceptable (and would lead to repercussions) 
in the case where the bribe involved either a Dutch civil servant or another 
company's employee. Indeed, in the qualitative study many of the non- 
executive directors remarked that bribing people is sometimes necessary to 
do business, although it is not a good thing to do. Furthermore, they also 
commented that ethical behaviour is a dependent variable and has its limits. 
For example, whereas bribing was considered unacceptable only in the 
Netherlands, non-executive directors did not make a distinction based upon 
location in case of environmental pollution - the same rules applied 
irrespective of whether it concerned a third world country or The 
Netherlands. 
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Institutionalists (e. g. Scott and Meyer, 1983, and Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, 
Whitley, 1992,1998) argue that organisations are products of their external 
environments, which '... are characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to 
receive support and legitimacy... ' (Scott and Meyer 1983: 149). In this case, 
Kondra and Hinings (1998) state that conformity to norms is facilitated by 
normative, coercive, and mimetic processes (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and 
compliance may be for pragmatic reasons or due to paradigm stasis (Oliver 
1991). Continuing, Kondra and Hinings argue that organisations within an 
organisational field may conform to these rules and requirements, not 
necessarily for reasons of efficiency, but rather for increasing their 
legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977); and these organisations that conform to 
institutional norms become 'optimal', if not efficient, in the sense that they 
increase their survival capabilities by conforming to those norms, thereby 
minimising the risk of organizational death (Baum and Oliver 1991). As a 
result, values and beliefs external to the organisation play a significant role in 
determining organisational norms. 
The same line of thought is shared by culturalists; necessitating Carroll and 
Gannon (1997) to argue that the ethical orientation of a particular culture 
may have a significant impact on internal organisational activities such as 
human resource management. Similarly, cultures may not extend their beliefs 
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concerning ethical conduct to individuals deemed members of an out-group 
(Katzenstein, 1989; Pratt, 1991). However, whether or not ethics are 
"relative" or contingent on national culture is indeed controversial. 
Donaldson and Dunfee (1994), for example, present a convincing argument 
for a super-ordinate set of normative ethical principles. Yet, multinational 
organisations often confront serious human resource management issues 
when operating in cultures with values different from their own (Carroll & 
Gannon, 1997). Firms that fail to consider the values and ethics of their host 
culture by appropriately aligning their human resource management policies 
may be perceived of as opportunistic and potentially unethical. Given this 
scenario, it is possible for firms to display different ethical orientations in 
relation to different target audiences (external and internal). 
2.8.1: Research Gaps in the Literature 
In summary, then, if stakeholder salience, as a matter of managerial 
perceptions, is a reality constructed over time rather than an objective reality 
(Agle et al., 1999: 508-509), then it could be argued that these constructions 
are likely to draw from (or are functions of) the sedimented broader social 
constructions within the institutional contexts in which the managerial 
perceptions are crafted and enacted. Moreover, legitimacy is a function of 
social context (Suchman, 1995) and "... bounded by cultural norms and 
behaviour" (Agle et al., 1999: 509). Therefore, following discussions so far, it 
could be argued that corporate stakeholder salience patterns are not only 
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shaped by managerial influences but are also implicated in series of multilevel 
influences varying between micro and macro variables as schematically 
shown in Figure 2.5 below. 
Figure i-o-5: Multi-level influences on corporate stakeholder salience 
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These influences, which could be bottom-up - e. g. through some form of 
institutional entrepreneurship'° (Suddaby and Lawrence, 2007; Crouch, 2005) 
or top-down - e. g. through government/trans-national influences (Djelic and 
'° Institutional entrepreneurs are "... organized actors who skilfully use institutional 
logics to create or change institutions, in order to realize an interest that they value 
highly" (Leca and Naccache, 2006: 634). Further discussions on institutional 
entrepreneurship and the link between micro and macro institutionalisation are 
presented later on in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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Quack, 20o8) interact to shape corporate stakeholder salience practices. In 
this regard, these interactions could either enable or constrain corporate 
stakeholding activities. In line with Jones (1999), the intention here is neither 
to imply that each of these levels exerts equal influences on determining 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns nor is it to unpack the intensity of 
each of these influences, but to "... stress the inter-relatedness of these 
levels, particularly with their most proximate counterparts, and their 
combined impact on determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the practice of stakeholder management" (p. 165). 
Following this line of thinking, Jones and Fleming (2003) criticise 
conventional theory of stakeholding for its failure "... to consider the 
underlying structural linkages that may exist between various stakeholders 
along with complex and deeply embedded (institutionalized) processes that 
constitute stakeholders' materiality, identity, and even forms of rationality" 
(p"433)" The literature in the main, surprisingly, takes these interactions for 
granted and assumes that managers and firms can easily select or deselect 
stakeholders. Contrary to this common view are situations where these 
interactions constrain corporate stakeholding and ultimately, corporate 
social responsibility agenda. A good example of the latter is the current 
European Union (EU) regulation on procurement, which constrains the EU 
Utilities from enforcing green procurement policies and practices across their 
supply-chain (see Arrowsmith, 2000,20o6 for details). This leaves a gap in the 
literature, which needs to be filled. The table below helps to summarise 
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where the literature on stakeholding is and show where the gaps are (the 
shades). 
Figure 2-6: Multi-level dimensions of studying corporate stakeholder 
salience 
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This thesis will focus on contributing to the literature on the meso and macro 
level influences on stakeholder salience. It is recognised that such disciplines 
as politics, economics and sociology have robust theories that deal with firm 
behaviours at these levels. Some of these include, but not limited to, the 
following: systems theory (Ackoff and Churchman, 1947; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), organizational theory (Katz and Kahn, 1966), national business 
systems, neo-institutionalism, varieties of capitalism, political economies, 
corporate governance frameworks and recently the explicit-implicit models 
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(Matten and Moon, 2007). These approaches emphasize the external 
environment as a significant explanatory factor of the organization of the 
firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
To make the study manageable within available resources to the researcher, 
the study will adopt a descriptive paradigmatic approach to corporate 
stakeholder salience. It does not attempt to address either the instrumental 
or normative paradigms associated with stakeholding along these 
dimensions and levels (see Aguilera et al., 2007 for discussions on 
instrumental and normative paradigms of stakeholding across institutional 
levels). It acknowledges that possible limitations of this approach could be 
that: "... the collectivist nature of the approach makes it difficult to 
incorporate the autonomy of the firm". "If firms have no autonomy", it is 
argued, "... then it is difficult to understand either the meaning of corporate 
strategy or the role of management" (Freeman and McVea, 2005: 191). 
Second, "... there was little attempt to deal with the choices and decisions 
that managers make, nor with prescriptive attempts to set new directions for 
the organization" (Freeman and McVea, 2005: 191). While recognising these 
possible limitations, this study does not also claim to attempt to unpack the 
social processes involved in the interactions across the multilevel influences 
on corporate stakeholding. Although this could be interesting, it lies outside 
the scope of this research project. It is also thought that such theories as the 
structurationism (Giddens, ßg84), where the agency-structure duality 
becomes a useful lens to understand the interaction between micro and 
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macro levels could be of help in understanding corporate stakeholder 
salience as a product of the interactions between contexts (i. e. 
organisational, sector and country levels) and managerial choices. The thesis 
primarily focuses on identifying possible patterns of corporate stakeholder 
salience differences or similarities that could arise at both the sector and 
country levels; and leverages comparative business system theories of new 
institutionalism in doing this. 
2.9: Chapter Summary 
The chapter has explored the concept and practice of corporate 
stakeholding, together with its micro and macro level theorisations. It 
problematises corporate stakeholding practices and theorisations as a 
precursor to contemporary pursuits of corporate social responsibility, 
governance and accountability. It also highlights the predominance of the 
managerialist view on the practice and theorisation of corporate 
stakeholding, which appears to under-emphasise the institutional influences 
on corporate stakeholding practice. Drawing insights from emergent 
comparative studies of business practices (particularly those on business 
ethics, corporate social responsibility and corporate governance) across 
national borders, the chapter identifies possible research gaps in the 
literature - albeit at the macro level - that could complement the micro-level 
managerialist accounts of corporate stakeholding practices. The goal of this 
chapter is to re-introduce the institutionalist perspective to the 
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understanding and interpretation of firms' behaviours; and, more so, to 
emphasise the relevance of this perspective to the practice of corporate 
stakeholding, which is hereby theorised as a corporate practice. The next 
chapter presents the core research agenda of this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROBLEMATIQUE: UNCOVERING THE 
INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF CORPORATE STAKEHOLDING 
3.1: Tone Setting 
Following from the previous chapter, this thesis attempts to advance the 
literature on corporate stakeholder salience pattern beyond managerial and 
organisational capture, by examining how corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns interact with and reflect the characteristics of the institutional 
contexts in which they are embedded and enacted. Following the 
theorisation of corporate stakeholder salience as a precursor to corporate 
social responsibility, corporate governance and accountability, amongst 
others, it is anticipated that an understanding of the interaction between 
institutional contexts and corporate stakeholder salience patterns will help in 
better understanding variations and stability of corporate social 
responsibility, corporate governance and accountability practices across 
national business contexts. The chapter starts with discussions on new 
institutionalism, comparative business systems and varieties of capitalism 
analytical frameworks. It leverages globalization theory to query the 
divergence and or convergence of varieties of capitalism typologies using the 
stakeholder salience construct as a proxy. It then articulates and states the 
main research questions of this research study within the above stated 
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analytical frameworks; and finally highlights the role of corporate social 
reports, as series of discourses, in addressing the stated research questions. 
The emphasis on corporate social reporting is especially to position corporate 
social reporting as the mediating artefact at the intersection of corporate 
social responsibility, corporate stakeholding and accountability. 
3.2: Dimensions and meanings of `institutions' - new 
institutionalist perspectives 
Contrary to the under-socialized view of managerial discretional 
rationality that has dominated the broad management and business 
literature, new waves of interpreting corporate governance and 
stake-holding, which have been on the increase, have drawn insights 
from neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) and comparative business systems (e. g. Varieties of 
Capitalism [Hall and Soskice, 2001] and National Business Systems 
[Whitley, 1998]) perspectives. Despite their subtle differences (Tempel 
and Walgenbach, 2007; Geppert et al., 20o6) proponents of 
neo-institutionalism and comparative business systems argue that 
managerial thoughts and actions are not only outcomes of managerial 
rationality, but are both enabled and constrained by the contextual 
attributes of the institutional environments in which they are crafted 
and executed. These contextual attributes could be in form of social 
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norms, beliefs, practices, routines, networks, regulations and other 
institutional characteristics and influences. In other words, managerial 
actions and decisions are socially embedded (Granovetter, 1985). Following 
this understanding, corporate stakeholder accountability becomes a 
negotiated outcome of interactions between managerial discretion and 
institutional contexts; albeit the institutional dimension appears to be 
under-emphasised in the extant social accounting and corporate social 
responsibility literatures. 
Institutions have been 'objects' of academic debates since the late 196os 
primarily as a re-visitation to the understanding of the contextual 
embeddedness of social activities (Granovetter, 1985). Broadly speaking, 
Douglass North describes institutions as `the rules of the game' (North, 1990, 
1991)" in a much more detailed fashion, Scott (1995: 48/49) defines 
institutions as "... multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of 
symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources... [which are] ... 
composed of cultured-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and 
meaning to social life.... transmitted by various types of carriers, including 
symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts ... [and].... 
operating at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localised 
interpersonal relationships". In other words, institutions can be conceived of 
as coordinating and or governance mechanisms (Grandori, 1997; 1996) with 
the capacity to constrain and or enable actions at multiple levels (Grandori 
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and Soda, 1995; Crouch, zoos; Crouch et al., forthcoming; Djelic and Quack, 
20o8; Deeg and Jackson, 2006,2007). Whilst both views of institutions could 
be said to be very broad in their descriptions, an interesting point raised by 
Scott (1995) is the manifestations and operations of institutions at multiple 
levels of jurisdiction. It is this layering of institutions and their interactions 
that have continued to polarise the academic community of practice on the 
study of institutions. 
At the organisational field level, studies of institutionalization, de- 
institutionalization and re-institutionalization (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2oo1; 
Oliver, 1991,1992) are regularly featured in contemporary management 
studies and organisational theory. The last couple of decades, for instance, 
have witnessed the blossoming of neo-institutionalism and structurationism, 
in particular. Neo-institutionalism, places emphasis on the study of 
organisational isomorphism, persistence and stability (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 
1997; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and seeks to demonstrate these across 
contexts and time, while structurationism attempts to restore the 
equivalence in significance attributed to both structure and agency in 
influencing either the stasis or dynamics of an organisational field (Giddens, 
1984; Lounsbury, 2002; Kaplan and Henderson, 2005). Major examples of this 
research orientation, in which firms and industry variables, are primary 
objects of study are mainly North American tradition and include such works 
as; DiMaggio and Powell, (1983); Granovetter, (1985); Scott (1987); Powell 
and DiMaggio (1991); etc. At this level, the interest is mainly to account for 
Kenneth Amaeshl, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 105 of 438 
institutional isomorphism and recently on institutional change. It also focuses 
attention on intra-organisational inertia and dynamics (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003) as well as changes in practices both at the firm and sectoral 
levels (Holm, 1995; Hoffman and Ventresca, 1999; Hoffman, 2001; Suddaby, 
Cooper and Greenwood, 2007; Munir and Phillips, 2005). 
Deriving mainly from the influence of European political economy and 
economic sociology is another stream of literature that goes beyond the 
organisational field level to account for national differences and 
embeddedness of economic actors. This stream of literature pays more 
attention to variations in national governance of economic activities and the 
level of integration of national systems to foster effectiveness at both the 
organisational field and firm levels. Such researches include those on 
varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, Zooi); national business systems 
(Whitley, 1998) and national systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993). However, this stream of research emphasises the role of private actors 
over and above the State, which is a marked departure from the traditional 
view that the State is a major actor in the distribution and re-distribution of 
economic gains and welfare in the national contexts (Schmidt, 2002,2003). 
Herein, the level of State participation in management of the economy could 
be placed on a continuum running from high involvement (co-ordinated 
markets) to passive involvement (liberal economies). It is assumed that 
where the State is passive, the market system is strong and therefore has 
higher potential of yielding prosperous outcomes. However, there have been 
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calls for the comeback of the State in economic coordination. The argument 
being that the State should not continue to play a passive role but should be 
active in setting the rules of the game. With the growth in strength of trans- 
national corporations (TNCs) and the tendency towards misuse of such 
powers and resources, the thinking nowadays is that market governance 
through self-governance of TNCs may not be completely adequate to address 
negative externalities arising from over dependence on the market system 
(Crouch, 2006). The State, it is argued plays a major role in internalisation of 
social costs (in the form of externalities) arising from market transactions. 
This line of argument de-emphasises the traditional divide between the roles 
of the state and the market in economic governance, and suggests a form of 
complementarity between the two, instead. With the ever expanding 
governance space spurred by globalisation, it is becoming obvious that 
nation States are unable to unilaterally ensure appropriate governance of 
economic activities, especially those driven by trans-national actors (Aguilera 
et al., 2007). Therefore, different nation states are continuously forging 
alliances and collaborations to ensure effective governance and sustained 
economic growth. A clear example of such trans-national governance entities 
include the World Trade Organisation (WTO), NAFTA, United Nations, the 
World Bank, the European Union and other multinational institutions. Some 
of these governance infrastructures are championed by the nation States 
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while others are driven by private interests (e. g. Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiatives"). 
This section highlights some of the multiple dimensions and meanings 
brought to the concept of institution by the new institutionalism movement. 
However, the interactions between the different layers of institutions, on 
one hand, and the influences of globalisation on national institutions, on the 
other, are still major issues of debate in both academic and professional 
literatures. In addition, opinions tend to converge and or diverge on these 
issues depending on schools of thought and background narratives 
supporting these opinions (Phillips et al., 2004) - which lie beyond the scope 
of this study. The next section will discuss the varieties of capitalism, as an 
aspect of new institutionalism, and highlight the ongoing debates on the 
impacts of globalisation on national institutional contexts. These discussions 
are necessary as they constitute building blocks to the research 
problematique of this study. 
" The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) supports improved 
governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full publication of 
company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining. The 
Initiative works to build multi-stakeholder partnerships in developing countries in 
order to increase the accountability of governments 
(hUp! www. eitran5parency, QTgl1ectio abouteiti) 
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3.2.1: Varieties of Capitalism and Globalisation 
As an offshoot of institutional theory, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
model (Hall and Soskice, 2001) of comparative business systems, for 
instance, offers an analytical framework towards understanding the 
political economy of firm behaviour and performance. It explains 
variations and change within capitalist systems through its broad 
dichotomization of institutional contexts into Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs). This line of 
thinking Is championed by such scholars as Hall and Soskice (2001), Vitols 
(20o1), Hancke et al. (2007), Amable (2004), Whitley (1998), Hollingsworth 
and Boyer (1997) and others. The central theme common to these 
scholars' works is their emphasis on the distinctiveness of national 
institutional contexts in which firms operate, based on such indices as 
legal and governance system, sources of finance and skills, training 
systems and the influences of other social agents like unions and 
regulatory authorities. 
However, it is not uncommon in comparative capitalism literature to 
stylise coordinated market economies as stakeholder oriented and 
liberal market economies as shareholder oriented (Dore, 2000). The 
CME is theorised to be society oriented and firms within it thus focus on 
meeting broad range of stakeholders' needs (e. g. employees, suppliers, 
shareholders, etc), whereas the LME is market oriented and focuses 
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more on meeting shareholders needs than those of any other 
stakeholder groups (Dore, 20oo; Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Hancke et at., 2007; Vitols, 2001). Japan and Germany are usually typified 
as examples of CME whereas UK and the USA are examples of LME 
(Whitley, 1998). In this regard, it is argued that different national and 
institutional contexts provide some sort of comparative advantages to 
firms within them. And "[T]he architecture of `comparative advantage' is 
portrayed in terms of key institutional complementarities - between labour 
relations and corporate governance, labour relations and the national 
training system, and corporate governance and inter-firm relations. These 
relationships determine the degree to which a political economy is, or is not, 
`coordinated"' (Hancke et at, 2007: 5). For example, the power, legitimacy 
and urgency of a unionised work group to impact on the activities of a 
firm would, for instance, depend on the complementarity between 
the legal institutions and societal expectations in which such unions are 
embedded in. Following this line of thinking, for example, corporate 
governance systems could be therefore considered as complementary 
`coalitions between investors, employees and management' (Jackson, 
2005). Furthering their distinction of CMEs from LMEs, Hancke et at. (2007: 5) 
state that: "The `coordinated market economy' (CME) is characterized by 
non-market relations, collaboration, credible commitments, and the 
`deliberative calculation' of firms. The essence of its `liberal market economy' 
(LME) antithesis is one of arm's length, competitive relations, formal 
contracting, and supply-and-demand prince signalling". 
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Although the varieties of capitalism model is not a `unified theory of 
everything' (Hancke et al., 2007: 8) it has been used as a theoretical lens to 
study such themes as innovation (Crouch et at., forthcoming), corporate 
governance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Goyer, 2007; Borsch, 2007), flows of 
financial investments (Goyer, 20o6), macroeconomics (Soskice, 2007), 
corporate strategy (Lehrer, 2001), social protection and the formation of 
skills (Estevez-Abe et al., toot), patterns of labour market (Wood, zoos) and 
standardization (Tate, zool), globalisation (Crouch and Farrell, 2004; Martin, 
2005; Panitch and Gindin, 2005; Pontusson, 2005) and recently on corporate 
social responsibility (Matten and Moon, forthcoming). There is also an 
ongoing attempt to apply the framework to understanding corporate 
stakeholder salience (Chapple and Gond, 2oo6), to mention but a few. 
Notwithstanding, the varieties of capitalism model is in competition with 
other explanations of firm behaviour and performance, especially those 
anchored on the arguable convergent pressures of institutional isomorphism 
induced by globalisation - albeit with some resistance. As such, this research 
study draws tangentially from the globalisation debate to unpack the 
influences of national institutional contexts, on one hand as predicted by 
varieties of capitalism, and the trans-national pressures of globalisation on 
the other, on corporate stakeholding practices. 
Globalisation Is one of such terminologies that appear `easily and commonly' 
understood, but difficult to encapsulate in a definition - thereby plunging the 
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concept into a `definitional void' (Clark and Knowles, 2003). According to van 
Der Bly (2005: 875), the difficulty in defining the concept of globalization is 
rooted in three dialectics: globalization-as-a-process vs. globalization-as-a- 
condition; globalization-as-reality vs. globalization-as-futurology and one- 
dimensional globalization vs. multi-dimensional globalization. For example, 
Held et al. (1999: 16) define globalization as `a process, which embodies a 
transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions 
... generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of 
activity', while Clark and Knowles (2003: 368) define it as "[T]he extent to 
which the economic, political, cultural, social, and other relevant systems of 
nations are actually integrated into World Systems". A critical view of 
globalisation suggests that it 11 ... has become part of a powerful political- 
economic ideology through which capital-labour relationships and relative 
class power positions are shifted in profound ways" (Swyngedouw, 2004: 28). 
One of the major assumptions of globalisation is that the world is being run- 
over by a super-ideologue that seeks to harmonise practices across national 
borders. And this harmonisation permeates all facets of life and the society - 
including behaviours and performances of firms. Notwithstanding, the 
literature on globalisation is simultaneously bombarded and punctuated by 
contradictory pressures of exclusion and inclusion, divergence and 
convergence, localisation and transnationalisation - or centralisation and 
decentralisation - (Jones and Fleming, 2003). Some also see it as a fusion of 
the global and the local in form of glocalisation without one running over the 
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other, so to speak - what Swyngedouw has described as a "... twin process 
whereby, firstly, institutional/regulatory arrangements shift from the national 
scale both upwards to supra-national or global scales and downwards to the 
scale of the individual body or to local, urban or regional configurations and, 
secondly, economic activities and inter-firm networks are becoming 
simultaneously more localised/regionalised and transnational" 
(Swyngedouw, 2004: 25). 
Whilst recognising that the broad globalisation research project lies far 
beyond the scope of this study, one of the major criticisms of the varieties of 
capitalism model is that it appears not to account for the interactions 
between global influences and national models (Crouch et al., forthcoming; 
Crouch and Farrell, 2004; Crouch, 2005; Crouch et al., 2004; Deeg and 
Jackson, 20o6,2007). In particular, the varieties of capitalism analytical 
framework has been under strong criticism for its seeming `simplistic' 
labelling of national economies. This broad-brush approach has been 
critiqued for being overly stereotypical and deterministic (Hancke et al., 
2007). As such, the varieties of capitalism model, it is argued, is unable to 
account for differences at the sub-institutional level (i. e. organisational field 
level), or at best takes such differences for granted. According to these 
critics, the varieties of capitalism model 11 ... treats nation-states as 
`hermetically sealed' and neglects the linkages between them and the forces 
of convergence and globalization" (Hancke et al, 2007: 7). Responding to this 
criticism, proponents of varieties of capitalism analytical framework offer an 
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alternative explanation that argues that national institutions, adapt to global 
influences rather than being consumed by them (Whitley, 1999; Hancke et al., 
2007; Hall, 2007; Hall and Gingerich, 2004); thereby leading to some form of 
heterogeneity manifested through local adaptations of world cultural forms 
(Van Der Bly, 2007: 234). One thing that stands out from these iterations of 
arguments is that the interaction between local and global influences still 
remains a black-box to be further explored. Extrapolating from these 
accounts of the influence of global and local institutions, therefore, this 
research study seeks to explore if and how corporate stakeholding practices 
are implicated in global-local (i. e. glocal) interactions. In other words, the 
theorisation of local adaptations of global influences enables this research 
study to examine to what extent UK and German corporate stakeholding 
patterns converge based on global influences and or diverge as a result of 
their different local institutional contexts. And also further examines how 
these patterns are manifested in different organisational fields across the 
two national economies. 
3.3: Varieties of Capitalism and Globalisation: Any implications for 
Corporate Stakeholding Practices? 
The literature is beginning to emphasise the variations of corporate social 
responsibility, governance and accountability across national contexts. In 
line with the socio-economic differences inherent in capitalist systems, 
for instance, Maignan (zoos) conducted a survey comparing French, 
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German, and North American consumers' evaluations of economic, legal, 
ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities of firms. The study finds that 
while U. S. consumers value highly corporate economic responsibilities, 
French and German consumers are most concerned about businesses 
conforming to legal and ethical standards. As such, Maignan suggests 
that these findings provide useful guidance for the efficient 
management of social responsibility initiatives across borders and for 
further academic inquiries. In a similar study, Langlois and Schlegelmilch 
(1990) analyse the usage and contents of corporate codes of ethics. 
Comparison of a sample of 600 large European companies contrasted 
with findings reported for similar U. S. firms reveals that significantly 
fewer European than U. S. firms adopted codes of ethics. In addition, the 
study found that there are striking differences in content between U. S. 
and European codes of ethics pointing to the existence of a distinctly 
European approach to codifying ethics. In a much more recent study, 
through a cross-cultural analysis of communication of corporate social 
responsibility activities in some US and European firms, Hartman et al. (2007) 
find that European firms do not value sustainability to the exclusion of 
financial elements, but instead project sustainability commitments in addition 
to financial commitments; while US-based firms focus more heavily on 
financial justifications for their corporate social responsibility activities. In a 
similar effort, Agle et al. (1999) in their study of USA firms found that 
different stakeholder groups exhibited different salience based on their 
perceived power, legitimacy and urgency. 
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Donaldson and Preston (1995: 69) point out that it is worth noting that the 
extent to which the stakeholder theory is understood to represent a 
controversial or challenging approach to conventional views varies greatly 
among market capitalist economies. Furthering this point, they make 
reference to The Economist (1993: 52)'s comment that: 
In America, for instance, shareholders have a comparatively big 
say in the running of the enterprises they own; workers ... have 
much less influence. In many European countries, shareholders 
have less say and workers more ... [I]n Japan ... managers have 
been left alone to run their companies as they see fit - namely for 
the benefit of employees and of allied companies, as much as for 
shareholders. 
New waves of interpreting corporate governance and social 
responsibility, which have been on the increase, have also drawn 
insights from comparative business systems perspectives. Matten and 
Moon (2007), for instance, use their 'explicit' and `implicit' model to 
explain the difference between Continental European and North 
American versions of corporate social responsibility practice. They 
suggest that whilst the `explicit' style characteristic of North American 
firms' corporate social responsibility is vociferous about its contribution 
to the society - for example in provision of healthcare, education, 
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employee welfare and other social amenities, the `implicit' style 
characteristic of Continental Europe finds it less attractive to report 
such social provisions as contributions to the society, since these 
provisions are already taken care of by the national institutions in which 
they operate in. The UK government's national health care service (the 
NHS) has been providing free healthcare service to its citizenry since 
the 194os and the German system has ensured that employees' welfare 
gets top priority in organisations through its co-determination approach 
to corporate governance - albeit, the principle of co-determination has 
continued to undergo series of modifications and adaptations (Borsch, 
2004). Aguilera and Jackson (2003) presented a comparative corporate 
governance model which suggests that the LME differs markedly from 
the CME in terms of stakeholder salience. They emphasised the need to 
incorporate institutional dimensions to corporate governance discourse 
(Jackson, 2005; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
Table 3-o-1: Corporate governance institutions and firm strategies in the UK 
and Germany 
UK Germany 
Dominant ownership 
structure 
Small shareholdings by 
portfolio 
Large shareholdings by 
strategic investors 
Employee representation 
institutions 
Voluntarist Corporatist (board-level 
co-determination) 
Top management Single board dominated Dual board 
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UK Germany 
institutions by CEO Multiple power centers 
Primary corporate goal Profitability Multiple goals: 
profitability, market 
share, and employment 
security 
Competitive strategy Radical innovation in new Non-price competition 
sectors through incremental 
Price competition in innovation 
established sectors 
(Vitols, 2001: 339) 
However, firms are always confronted by myriads of stakeholders; and an 
issue that is still debated in this field of enquiry is the order of 
importance (salience) the different business systems attach to the 
different stakeholders - i. e. their `relevant publics' (Lindblom, 1994). 
Kochan and Rubinstein (2000: 369) suggest that in coordinated market 
economies, there exist more than one stakeholder with sufficient power 
and legitimacy to achieve "definitive" status in governance processes of 
firms. But, they do not suggest any order to the stakeholder salience in 
coordinated market economies. In a study of corporate social reporting 
in Germany, Brockhoff (1975) (cited in Schreuder, 1979) found that 
German firms prioritised employees first (about 50% of the corporate 
social responsibility report content), followed by investment in R&D (15%) 
and philanthropy (2%). A reinterpretation of Agle et al. (1999) USA study 
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shows a different order of stakeholder salience wherein shareholders/ 
customers/ community came first followed by the government and 
employees, respectively. In a recent study on varieties of capitalism and 
variation of corporate social responsibility, Chapple and Gond (20o6) 
suggest that the order of stakeholder salience in both coordinated 
market economies and liberal market economies could be as presented 
below: 
Table 3-0-2: Corporate Stakeholder Salience Profile across institutional 
contexts 
Coordinated market Liberal market economies 
economies 
Relative (i) Employees 
importance of (2) Customers I Suppliers 
stakeholders in (3) Environment 
the institutional (4) Shareholders 
(1) Shareholders 
(2) Customers / Suppliers / Employees 
(3) Community 
(4) Environment 
environment (5) Community 
Chapple and Gond (2oo6) 
This is partly in consonance with both Brockhoff (1975) and Agle et al. 
(1999), respectively. However, Chapple and Gond (20o6) point out that 
this suggested order of stakeholder salience in the two business 
systems needs to be further empirically validated. Griffin and Weber 
(2oo6: 436) also suggest that additional research is necessary to examine, 
amongst others, the country of origin and the role of institutional pressures 
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on firms' stakeholding behaviour. Following these suggestions and in order 
to provide some insights and clarifications into divergent findings in this 
field of enquiry, this study offers a comparative analysis of stakeholder 
salience patterns between UK and German national institutional contexts. 
Following the varieties of capitalism model, this research study proposes 
that UK and German firms would differ in their stakeholder orientations 
and thus would reflect different dominant stakeholder images; especially 
as ".... identities and interests of stakeholders vary cross-nationally' 
(Matten and Moon, 2005: 14). And the main questions guiding this 
exploratory research, therefore, are: 
" Are there identifiable national and organisational field patterns of 
corporate stakeholding in both UK and German institutional contexts? 
How and why do these patterns differ at the national and organisational 
field levels, respectively? 
" How does stakeholder salience differ between UK and German firms, over 
time and why? 
" Is there any evidence for convergence in UK and German capitalist 
systems? 
9 How does the varieties of capitalism model account for variations in 
industries (or organizational fields) and country stakeholding practices? 
" Is stakeholder salience already embedded in institutions that managers 
respond to? If that should be the case, then firms in a particular variety of 
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capitalism would be expected to display similar stakeholder salience. The 
same line of thinking could be stretched to cover organisational fields. 
This research is focused on mapping the meso and macro level characteristics 
of stakeholder salience, unlike most studies that have focused on micro 
dimensions and managerial agency (e. g. Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et al., 
1999). 
3.4: Chapter Summary 
One of the issues raised in the previous chapter is the limited literature on 
accounting for corporate stakeholder salience from either an organisational 
field or national level perspectives. This chapter, therefore, sets out to 
provide a research problematique that complements the research gap 
identified in the previous chapter. In order to do this, this chapter has 
problematised corporate stakeholder salience from new institutionalist view 
drawing largely from such comparative business systems analytical 
frameworks as varieties of capitalism, and globalisation. The primary goal of 
the chapter is to raise research questions that would help to explore the 
interactions between institutional contexts and stakeholder salience with the 
intention of examining how these converge or diverge across sectors and 
national economies. And corporate stakeholder salience is posited as a 
possible proxy to examine the influences of globalization on national 
business contexts. 
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CHAPTER 4: MODELLING CORPORATE STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE IN 
GERMAN AND UK INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS THROUGH CORPORATE 
SOCIAL REPORTS 
4.1: Tone Setting 
Having argued in the chapters of the literature review section that corporate 
stakeholding patterns could be complementary reflections of national 
institutional and sectoral contexts, on one hand, and managerial and 
strategic choices, on the other, this chapter focuses mainly on setting the 
stage for providing some empirical evidence to evaluate these lines of 
argument. It builds on the inter-related questions at the core of this research 
study, which are stated in the preceding chapter. The questions are meant to 
help uncover (any) relationships between and amongst the following: 
institutional contexts, sector differences and corporate stakeholding 
practices. Ultimately, the evidence provided will be further evaluated in the 
light of ongoing debates on the convergence and or divergence of the 
globalised world economy. But before delving deeper into these questions 
and generating corresponding propositions, the chapter makes a case for (a) 
the data source chosen and (b) the choice of stakeholder groups used in this 
study. 
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4.2: Corporate Social Reports, Stakeholder Salience and 
Discursive Institutionalism: Justifications for the research data 
source chosen 
The primary research data source chosen for this research study is 
documents - i. e. corporate social reports. The reasons for this choice are not 
unconnected to the growing interests in deconstructing corporate social 
responsibility and accountability practices through documentary analyses 
(for example see: Unerman, 1999,2000; Jose and Lee, 2007; Cormier et al., 
2005; David, 2oo1; Belal, 2002; Ball et al., zooo; Gray et al., 1995a, b) - albeit, 
the reasons for this choice are also not limited to this trend. In the first 
instance, corporate social reports have become essential features of the 
contemporary business landscape, mainly as signals for `good' corporate 
citizenship (Matten and Crane, 2005) and stakeholder orientation (Crane et 
al., 2004). It is estimated that about 80% of Fortune Global 500 firms now 
produce one type of report or the other on their social and environmental 
impacts (Kolk, 2003). At the same time, social reporting has attracted 
significant academic interests in terms of corporate stakeholder 
accountability artefacts, especially on what firms disclose in their social 
reports and the manner they present these disclosures - e. g. in terms of 
narratives, visuals, graphs and quantities - (Gray, 2002; Gray et al., 1995a, b; 
Unerman, 2000). Increase in corporate social reporting is also linked to social 
pressures on firms since the 1970s to be socially responsible (Gray, 2002). 
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However, firms are not just passive recipients of institutional norms and 
practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) - they are also institutional actors 
(Giddens, 1984; Borsch, 2004) and entrepreneurs (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2007; Dahan et al., 20o6; Crouch, 2005) capable of setting 'hegemonic and 
pragmatic agenda' (Gray, 2002) through corporate communication and 
impression management, which are essential to corporate social reporting 
(Hooghiemstra, zooo). 
In addition, corporate stakeholder salience has been theorised as an 
antecedent to corporate social responsibility practices, in general, and 
corporate social reporting, in particular; and both have been received with 
mixed feelings of optimism - because there is a warming up to corporate 
social responsibility as something good for sustainable business and society; 
and cynicism - because corporate social reporting is often seen as an art of 
corporate spin and managerial exercise of power (Owen et al., 2o0o; Gray, 
zoos; Dando and Swift, 2003). From a critical management studies' point of 
view, the production and consumption of corporate social reports could 
be argued to present an arena for contestation of interests and exercise 
of power (Gray, 2001). Continuing, Gray argued that: 
This process must produce conflict. Not only will there be 
conflict between stakeholders - for example, environmental 
responsibility may be seen as reducing shareholder or 
employee earnings - but there is bound to be conflict in the 
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mind of the reporting organisation. This will initially be most 
apparent in the organisation's unwillingness to address the 
rights of certain stakeholders but will quickly extend to the 
information that organisations are willing to disclose. It seems 
highly implausible that many organisations - if any - would 
voluntarily produce a full and transparent social account 
(Gray, 2001: 14). 
Following Gray's line of thought, social reports are susceptible to 
'managerial capture' (Owen et at., 2000) and therefore could become 
`maps of social reality which have a whole range of social meanings, 
practices and usages, power and interest "written into them" (Hall, 
1980: 134). Although, like most social phenomena, research data on 
corporate stakeholder salience can be generated from multiple conventional 
sources typical of social science and management research studies - e. g. 
interviews, ethnography, surveys (Agle et al., 1999), and documents 
(Unerman, 1999), to mention but a few; it is also argued that documents are 
more reliable repertoire of `declarative organisational memory' (Moorman 
and Miner, 1998) than most other data sources of social and management 
sciences. Moreover, corporate social reports - like corporate annual reports 
- 11 ... are regarded as important documents ... due to the high degree of 
credibility they lend to information reported within them" (Unerman, 
20oo: 669). And from a pragmatic perspective, documents - including 
corporate social reports - enable researchers to 11 ... gain access to 
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communicators who may be unwilling or unable to be examined directly" 
(Riffe et al., 2005: 38) by other enquiry methods such as interviews, 
ethnography, surveys, et cetera. This is even more so, given that corporate 
stakeholding and social responsibility both present reputation risks and 
opportunities in measures that easily blur the boundary between the two; 
and thus makes it difficult for researchers to easily ascertain the corporate 
view and practices on some issues, through much more direct research 
approaches. For example it was easier for firms to send the researcher their 
corporate social reports, where they were available, than respond to surveys 
when approached. 
It is within this understanding of power relations, managerial capture 
and interest contestation that the significance of corporate social 
reports in contemporary business landscape could further be explored 
and advanced. A key point of this study, therefore, is that firms use 
corporate social reports to signal their stakeholder salience. But what we 
do not know is how the institutional context interacts with managerial 
discretion to influence corporate stakeholder salience patterns reflected 
through these corporate social reports over time. Given the prominence 
corporate social reports have gained in the business world, one would at 
least, expect them - as written documents - to have some consumption 
consequences either in form of shaping discourses and or initiating actions 
(Phillips et al., 2004; Burgess, 1990). And following this understanding, 
corporate social reports, therefore, provide useful, pragmatic and novel 
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empirical sites to study corporate stakeholder salience patterns and practices 
over time. 
However, it is worthwhile to make it clear at this stage of the research that 
this study is not strictly about what firms actually do in practice, but rather 
about what they say (or signal that) they do (Chapple and Moon, 2005). 
Reframing the central problematique of this research study will, then, be: 
"who do German and UK firms say (or signal that) are important to them, 
respectively, through their social reports and why? " In other words, "how do 
UK and German firms reflect their stakeholder salience patterns and orientation 
through social and environmental reports? " In this regard, it could be argued 
that contents of corporate social reports are not necessarily what firms 
actually do (i. e. not a practice dimension), but series of discourses that could 
inform actions (Phillips et al., 2004). Whilst this distinction is analytically 
necessary, there is latitude of probability that what firms say (or signal that) 
they do in their social reports are actually what they do in practice - but it still 
remains more of a probability than factuality. Taking this position in relation 
to corporate social reports is sensible, since the use of external auditors for 
verification of social reports is currently more of a fashion (good practice) 
than mandatory (Owen et al., zooo; Owen, 2003). In addition, different firms 
use different verifiers, which could include consulting firms, NGOs and 
auditing firms (see Owen et al., 2000; Owen, 2003,2005 for details for major 
characteristics of these different verifier groups). This leeway also gives firms 
the opportunity to express their identities over time and simultaneously 
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contribute to the discursive repertoire of their institutional contexts through 
self-regulated discourses (i. e. corporate social reports) - which is a form of 
institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2007). 
The role of discourses in institutional work has featured heavily in broader 
social sciences - especially political science and sociology of social 
movements, as well as in language and communication sciences. Social 
movements and social coalitions, for example, are to a large argued to be 
built on sophisticated discourses that mirror the rhetoric and frames of their 
time (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986; Benford and Snow, 2ooo). 
Discourses could be in form of texts, speeches, and conversations (Taylor et 
al., 1996). Discourses aim at creating, maintaining or disrupting institutional 
logic - i. e. "the underlying assumptions, deeply held, often unexamined, 
which form a framework within which reasoning takes place" (Horn, 1983: 1). 
Frames and logics are essential components of the discourse repertoire of 
tools. Frame denotes "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals 
"to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space 
and the world at large (Goffman, 1974: 21 cited in Snow et al., 1986), while 
"Logics enable actors to make sense of their ambiguous world by prescribing 
and proscribing actions. Action re-enacts institutional logics, making them 
durable" (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005: 38). 
Vivien Schmidt is one of the major authors that have contributed to the 
understanding of institutions from a discursive perspective - in what she calls 
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discursive institutionalism. According to her, "To gain a full understanding of 
the political dynamics of change", which is a form of institutional 
transformation, there is need to go beyond what she describes as "politics as 
usual" - "that is, beyond an understanding of the interplay of interests, 
institutions, and cultures that represent the background conditions to 
change, to examine what ideas and values are contained in a policy program, 
how policy elites construct their policy program, and how they convey it to 
the general public. All of this I consider under the rubric of policy discourse" 
(Schmidt, 2002: 5). However, she acknowledges that: 
Showing that discourse exerts causal influence is not simple, since 
the ideas articulated by a discourse cannot easily be separated from 
the interests which find expression through them, from the 
institutional interactions which shape their expression, or from the 
cultural norms that frame them. And because of this discourse 
cannot in any case be seen as the case, or the independent variable, 
given that it rests, as it were, on top of the other variables. But it 
could be seen as one of a number of multiple causes or influences - 
and it may even be the very variable or added influence that makes 
the difference, by serving to overcome entrenched interests, 
institutional blockages, or cultural blinders to change. This is likely to 
do through the re-conceptualization of long-standing notions of self- 
interests, the reframing of institutional rules and cultural norms, and 
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through the appeal to general interests over narrow self-interest (pp 
5- 6). 
Despite the hesitation expressed by Schmidt in establishing casual links 
between discourses and institutions, Philips et al. (2004) is one of the major 
step changes in management literature linking discourses directly to 
institutions. Social reality, it is argued, is constitutive of discourses. Without 
discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we 
cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves" (Phillips and 
Hardy, 2002). Drawing from Parker (1992), Phillips and Hardy (2002: 3) define 
discourse "... as an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their 
production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being". 
In other words, the goal of discourse analysis is to ascertain the constructive 
effects of discourse through the structured and systematic study of texts 
(Hardy, 2oo1; Phillips and Hardy, 2002). In this regard, language becomes 
fundamental to institutionalization and institutionalization occurs as actors 
interact and come to accept shared definitions of reality (Phillips et al., 2004). 
As such, it is through linguistic processes that definitions of reality are 
constituted (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Continuing, Phillips et al., state that 
11 ... institutions, therefore, can be understood as products of the discursive 
activity that influences actions (p. 635)". 
According to Phillips et al., actions inform the formative processes of 
institutionalisation and resultant institutions in turn inform, enable and 
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constrain actions. This interactive process is mediated by texts and 
discourses. Actions generate corresponding texts; but not every action is 
capable of generating texts that are widely disseminated and consumed. 
Phillips et al. theorise that only actions that require organisational 
sensemaking and that affect perceptions of organization's legitimacy are 
more likely to result in the production of texts that are widely disseminated 
and consumed than actions that do not (p. 642). The texts in turn inform 
discourses which in turn inform institutions. However, not every text is 
capable of becoming embedded in discourses, except those "... that are 
produced by actors who are understood to have a legitimate right to speak, 
who have resource power or formal authority, or who are centrally located in 
a field" (644). In addition, "... texts that take the form of genres, which are 
recognizable, interpretable, and usable in other organizations and texts that 
draw on other texts within the discourse and on other well-established 
discourses are more likely to become embedded in discourse than texts that 
do not" (644). In the same vein, they argue, not every discourse gives rise to 
institutions. Discourses that give rise to institutions are "coherent, structured 
and... supported by broader discourses and are not highly contested by 
competing discourses" (p. 645). 
Corporate social reports are discursive artefacts with the capacity to 
contribute to institution building. The discursive attribute of corporate social 
reports also suggests that they are implicated in the practice of corporate 
communication (Hooghiemstra, 2000). Van Riel (1995: 26) defines corporate 
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communication as: "an instrument of management by means of which all 
consciously used forms of internal and external communication are 
harmonised as effectively and efficiently as possible, so as to create a 
favourable basis for relationships with groups upon which the company is 
dependent". This definition highlights the significance of corporate 
communication in the organisational repertoire of practices and the 
centrality of stakeholders in the corporate communicative process and 
practice. Given its recognised importance in the organisational scheme of 
things, corporate communication is becoming an established field of study in 
its own right. It draws from arrays of disciplines such as communication 
studies, public relations, marketing, and advertising, to mention but a few, 
and encompasses such intertwined aspects as branding, reputation, and 
identity management. One of the key corner stones of corporate 
communication is that it embodies how a firm wants to be seen and 
understood in the public space in comparison to other actors (e. g. 
competitors, regulators, consumers etc) within this public space. As such, 
firms are very careful in what they present to the world. Following this, this 
thesis argues that corporate social reports are fundamentally discursive and 
corporate communication artefacts. It conceptualises social reports as a 
'multiplex corporate communication artefact', which could be used for 
communicating the following: accountability, brand, reputation, products 
and services, stakeholder salience, et cetera. 
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This understanding carries with it some basic implications. One implication is 
that it broadens the current conceptions of social reports in the extant social 
accounting literature as a normative instrument of accountability, in order to 
highlight the multiple uses and significance of corporate social reports as 
corporate communication artefacts. This latter view has been under- 
emphasised in the literature. For example, Gray (2002) claims that corporate 
social reports fall under the broad category of social accounts, which he 
further describes as "... a generic term for convenience to cover all forms of 
`accounts which go beyond the economic' and for all the different labels 
under which it appears - social responsibility accounting, social audits, 
corporate social reporting, employee and employment reporting, 
stakeholder dialogue reporting as well as environmental accounting and 
reporting" (Gray, 2002: 687). Irrespective of Ullmann (i979: 132)'s warning, 
almost 30 years ago, that "... the emphasis on the technical and 
methodological aspects has diverted our attention from the normative and 
political aspects of (corporate social reporting)", the broadness of these 
descriptions of social reports offered by Gray (2002) tend to over represent a 
normative view of social reports and appear to ignore the instrumental (and 
strategic) dimensions of such reports. 
Corporate social and environmental reports have a unique history strongly 
linked to corporate accountability. They have over time been regarded as 
corporate expressions of commitments to responsible citizenship. This 
association to corporate social responsibility tends to give social reports 
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some sort of normative connotations that make it difficult to construct them 
in instrumental or strategic frames. Social and critical accounting has been 
dominated by this understanding of social reports, that there is limited study 
on how corporate social reports foster discourses and engender actions 
amongst the different stakeholder groups they purport to address - e. g. 
investors, employees, consumers, suppliers, and local communities - thereby 
leaving the area still largely under-explored in the extant literature 
[exceptions to this, though dated, include: Buzby and Falk, 1978,1979; 
Cooper and Essex, 1977]. The nearest one gets to in the literature are the 
occasional reactions from pressure groups, like the NGOs, to these corporate 
social and environmental reports - either challenging them or providing 
alternative accounts to those contained in these reports'2. The environment, 
for instance, dropped-off social reporting lists in the 198os and re-surfaced in 
the 199os (Gray, 2002,2001). This sort of cyclical changes in social reporting 
over the decades have been attributed to the subjection of social accounting 
and its associated activities (e. g. social audits) to the political whims of 
corporations (Gray, zool), especially as corporate reporting is a "... 
mechanism used by a privileged part of the socio-economic political system 
(capitalist elites) to protect and advance their sectional interests" (Unerman, 
2003: 429). In the same vein Ullmann (1979: 124) argues that: 
12 See footnote 5, earlier on page 26. 
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... corporate social accounting is an attempt to represent more 
adequately the effects of corporate behavior, including non- 
market effects... shaped according to management's self-interest. 
Conflicts over CSR (corporate social reporting) arise as a result of 
the constituencies' varying interests with regard to the 
information published as well as the corporate strategies 
themselves. Hence management's interests in publishing 
corporate social reports and the reactions of the constituencies 
have to be discussed in terms of their preference structure in order 
to reveal the political content of CSR.... From the point of view of 
management, CSR can serve as an instrument with which to try to 
pacify the soclo-political demands made of the business whilst at 
the same time playing a role in helping to safeguard support from 
other constituencies. 
This research study aims to go beyond the narrow view of corporate social 
reports. In order to do this, corporate social reports are primarily 
conceptualised as part and parcel of corporate communications repertoire - 
which means that corporate social reports could as well have strategic 
(instrumental) purposes in addition to the normative demands of corporate 
accountability. It positions corporate social reports as artefacts of corporate 
accountability, branding, reputation and marketing of products and services 
(as shown in the figure below). The research study does not draw boundaries 
between and amongst these corporate activities, but problematises social 
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reports as an arena in which these activities are simultaneously enacted, 
produced, consumed and reproduced. And more so, it is an arena for 
stakeholders' contestations and salience (Gray, 2002). In other words, by 
evaluating the language of corporate social reports, as objects of public 
communication, "... one is able to determine the audience the firm may be 
trying to impact and the means by which it hopes to do so" (Hartman, Rubin 
and Dhanda, 2007). 
Figure 4-o-1: Multiple dimensions of corporate social reports 
Accountability 
artefact 
Legitimacy Promotional 
artefact artefact 
4.3: Justifications for stakeholders selected for the study 
As discussed in the literature review chapters, stakeholder groups come in 
various shades and fashions. The concept of stakeholding is in itself a 
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multiplex and complex one, with many definitions and descriptions as there 
are writers (see table on pages 42-45 for different definitions and 
descriptions offered). Stakeholders could be grouped on normative, 
instrumental and or descriptive parameters (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
They could also be categorised on some primary and or secondary 
characteristics (Friedman and Miles, 20o6). They could as well be legitimate 
and or derived (Phillips, 1997; Phillips et al., 2003). In essence, it is not 
possible to address all possible stakeholder groups that could be. For the 
purpose of this research study, certain stakeholder groups have been 
selected to explore the line of arguments advanced by the study. These 
stakeholder groups include: (i) employees, (2) networks (including suppliers, 
alliances and partnerships, (3) the natural environment (including ecology), 
(4) shareholders (including other investor groups), (5) the society (including 
local communities), (6) consumers and (7) management. Other stakeholders 
might be represented directly or indirectly (e. g. consumers, directly or 
indirectly, through consumer groups; local communities directly or indirectly 
through civil societies; the environment indirectly through consumer groups, 
governments, and or civil societies, etc). These stakeholder groups will 
include their associated non-for-profit organisations. For instance, 
environmental and consumer-related non-for-profit organisations will be 
classified as representing corporate recognition of the natural environment 
and consumer groups, respectively. 
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However, the choice of these stakeholder groups is not completely random 
and arbitrary. In the first instance, these stakeholder groups are very popular 
in the extant stakeholder literature. According to Freeman and Miles 
(2006: 13-14), "The most common groups of stakeholders considered are: 
shareholders, customers, suppliers and distributors, employees, local 
communities, and managers". in the same vein, Agle et al. (1999: 521) write: 
"... accountability to stockholders, customers, and communities prompts 
values that give rise to salience" while Donaldson and Preston opine that: 
"[M]anagers are, themselves, stakeholders - and, indeed, a very privileged 
class of stakeholders - in the enterprise" (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 86). 
These stakeholder groups are also often referred to in practice. For example, 
E. ON -a German utility firm - wrote on page 4 of its 2005 corporate social 
report: "We behave responsibly towards our colleagues, customers, 
suppliers, the environment, and the communities where we live and work. 
We seek to improve lives everywhere we operate, aiming for a healthy, safe, 
and sustainable environment. " From a normative perspective, these are 
usually considered legitimate stakeholders who may not necessarily display 
equal levels of power and urgency in their interactions with the firm. 
4.4: Research Problematique and Propositions 
The key research question of this study is as articulated below: 
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Are there identifiable national and organisational field patterns of 
corporate stakeholding in both UK and German institutional 
contexts? And how do these patterns differ at the national and 
organisational field levels, respectively? 
The main objectives of this question include the need to establish from 
empirical data collected that there are clearly identifiable patterns of 
corporate stakeholding salience, along the chosen stakeholder groups of the 
study, within the UK and German institutional contexts, respectively. The 
first part of the question is rather exploratory. It attempts to map any 
emergent national and industry level patterns of corporate stakeholding in 
both UK and Germany. This is to establish, first and foremost, a possible link 
of influence between corporate stakeholding at the managerial and firm 
levels to industry and country level patterns. The second part of the question 
seeks to establish how these patterns (if any) differ at national and 
organisational field levels, respectively. In order to do justice to this 
question, the research study draws from the varieties of capitalism analytical 
framework to hazard some guiding propositions. However, this study is not 
primarily a `test of the varieties of capitalism model'. It is first and foremost a 
`test of corporate stakeholder salience patterns' and an exploration of how 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns manifest in different institutional 
contexts. In other words, it takes the existing characterisations of the 
varieties of capitalism model in the extant literature for granted and will not 
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seek to uncover the underlying causal mechanisms that give rise to unique 
(i. e. stable and dynamic) configurations of different capitalist systems 
beyond what is already known in the relevant literature. As such, it will 
merely take the varieties of capitalism model as a background to benchmark 
and or test-run the findings of this exploratory search, focusing primarily on 
`manifestations of representations of corporate stakeholder salience patterns'. 
The varieties of capitalism model holds that German and UK institutional 
contexts are fundamentally different in their economic coordination 
strategies and mechanisms. It has been argued in the extant literature on 
comparative capitalism that the Coordinated Market Economies (CME) and 
Liberal Market Economies (LME), which German and UK economies 
represent respectively, are fundamentally different in such areas as 
ownership patterns, financial institutions, corporate governance, industrial 
relations and employee representation. Following this line of thinking, Vitols 
(2001) writes: 
In the corporate governance literature Germany is one of the 
foremost examples of the stakeholder model, since the different 
firm constituencies enjoy a strong formal `voice' in decision-making 
through representation on company boards. In contrast, in the UK, 
an LME, markets play a much more significant role not only in 
influencing inter-firm relationships but also in regulating the 
interactions between ... actors.... The UK is one of the primary 
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examples of the shareholder model of governance due to the weak 
formalized role of constituencies other than shareholders in firm 
decision-making (Vitols, 2001: 338) 
Following this broad-brush typology of the UK and German institutional 
contexts, respectively, therefore, this research proposes that: 
Proposition 1: Corporate stakeholding patterns, proxied through corporate 
social reports, will differ between German and UK national institutional 
contexts. 
Continuing, Vitols (2001: 341-42) argues that major investors in the UK include 
institutional investors - investment funds, pension funds, and insurance 
companies - who "... take a `portfolio' approach to risk management by 
taking small stakes in a large number of companies" and "... are generally 
solely interested in a high return on their shares (and thus primarily on the 
profitability of the company invested in)". This investment paradigm and 
practice in the UK is quite unlike that of German investors who are rather 
"... characterized by one or more large shareholders with a strategic (rather 
than purely share value maximization) motivation for ownership". These 
shareholders are mainly banks, that the German economy has aptly been 
described as the `bank-based-economy' (Amable, 2003; Fiss and Zajac, 2004). 
It is argued that one of the primary reasons for these banks to have stakes 
(or buy shares) in the firms they support is to protect their loans and not 
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necessarily to earn income from them (Vitols, 2001). The table below, though 
now dated, showcases the pattern of investments in the UK and German 
economies, respectively: 
Table 4-o-1: Pattern of investments in the UK and German economies 
Germany United Kingdom 
Households 14.6 29.6 
Enterprises 42.1 4.1 
Public sector 4.3 0.2 
Banks 10.3 2.3 
Insurance enterprises and pension funds 12.4 39.7 
Investment funds and other financial 
institutions 
7.6 10.4 
Rest of world 8.7 13.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1997: 29 - cited in Vitols, 2001: 342) 
In addition to the different investment profiles of shareholders in the two 
economies, shareholding in the UK is known to be rather dispersed while 
share ownership in Germany is concentrated. It is based on this combination 
of shareholders' profiles and the degree of dispersion and or concentration 
that it has been argued that German investors and shareholders are more 
prone to providing `patient capital' (Schröder and Schrader 1998; Jürgens, 
Naumann and Rupp 2000) than would obtain in most liberal market 
economies, which the UK economy aptly represents, driven by short term 
profits. Where and when such expected profits do not arise and or are not 
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forthcoming, shareholders in liberal market economies are known to quickly 
exit. This ability and propensity for quick exit, then pushes managers to solely 
aim towards profitable returns in order to keep shareholders attracted to the 
firms they manage. Given the divergent attention and emphasis placed on 
shareholders in the two economies, this research study proposes that: 
Proposition 2a: German and UK firms will differ on the emphasis they 
respectively place on shareholder salience in corporate social reports 
Proposition 2b: UK firms will place more emphasis on shareholder salience in 
corporate social reports than German firms 
A second major institutional difference identified in the literature between 
German and UK firms is the relevance given to employees in corporate 
governance. In the German context, employees exercise strong `voice' 
through corporatist bargaining and co-determination, which ascribes to them 
11 ... the right to negotiate key issues with management, including the hiring of 
new employees, introduction of new technology, use of overtime and short- 
working time, and in the case of mass redundancies, the negotiation of social 
plans (Sozialplane) covering redeployment, severance payments, and early 
retirement" (Vitols, 2001: 343). This right derives from the German Works 
Constitution Act of 1972 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) to elect works councils. 
In addition to the works councils, employee representatives are also included 
on German supervisory boards under the 1976 Co-Determination Act 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz), which applies to almost all companies with 2,000 or 
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more employees (Vitols, 2001: 343). However, "A second, stronger form of 
co-determination applies only to companies mainly involved in steel and coal 
mining (Montanmitbestimmung). A third, weaker form of co-determination 
under the Works Constitution Act of 1952, as amended in 1972, applies to 
most companies with between 50o and 2,000 employees" (Vitols, 2001: 343). 
Continuing, Vitols states that this law has the following key provisions: 
" Employee representatives are to comprise half of supervisory board 
representatives and shareholder representatives the other half. 
Shareholders, however, elect the chairperson, who may cast a tie- 
breaking vote in case of a `deadlock' between shareholder and employee 
blocks. 
" The number of supervisory board seats are to total 12 in the case of 
companies with between 2, ooo and 1o, ooo employees, 16 in the case of 
companies with between 1o, ooo and 2o, ooo employees, and 20 in the 
case of companies with above 20,000 employees. 
" In the case of companies with between 2, ooo and 20, ooo employees, two 
employee representatives can be union functionaries (i. e. non- 
employees); in the case of companies with more than zo, ooo employees, 
three may be union functionaries. 
Contrary to the rights and privileges employees are bestowed upon in the 
German context, employees do not enjoy the same rights in most liberal 
market economies (the UK inclusive). In the UK, labour is primarily seen as an 
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input in the production process that should be maximised efficiently and 
profitably. Accordingly, Vitols, again, notes that: 
This shareholder interest is supported by flexible external labor 
markets and internal promotion and remuneration practices. Due 
to the weak attachment of employees to firms, British companies 
can quickly hire and reward (through strong performance 
incentives) `top talent' in new areas (Vitols, 2001: 351) 
The UK institutional context, therefore, makes it easy for firms to hire and 
fire employees, which in turn induces employees to go for broad skills as 
safety nets whereas the German system encourages specialization of skills 
amongst employees (Whitley, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Vitols, 2001). As a 
result, this research study proposes that: 
Proposition 3a: German and UK firms will differ on the emphasis they 
respectively place on employee groups in corporate social reports 
Proposition 3b: German firms will place more emphasis on employee groups in 
corporate social reports than UK firms 
The roles, rights and powers of management in German and UK firms are also 
seen as another major source of difference between the two economies. In 
the liberal market economy, the functions of management are primarily a 
fiduciary one that requires them to maximise shareholders wealth (Berle and 
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Means, 1932; Friedman, 1962). As such, they represent the most powerful 
entity between the firms and their owners and exercise strong `voice' in 
organisational decisions. This is typical of the `shareholder' model of 
corporate governance. The stakeholder model of corporate governance, 
which is typical of the German system, on the other hand gives voice to 
multiple stakeholders - especially employee groups as already noted above - 
in how the firm is run (Kelly et al., 1997). Vitols (2001: 344-5) eloquently gives 
an apt description of the difference in roles, powers and functions of 
management in both German and UK contexts, respectively, below: 
The clearest manifestation of pluralism in large German 
companies is the dual company board system. Strategic decisions such 
as major investments, mergers and acquisitions, dividend policy, 
changes in capital structure, and appointment of top managers are 
made by the supervisory board (Aufsichtstrat). The day-to-day running 
of the company in contrast is the responsibility of the management 
board (Vorstand), which generally meets once a week and includes 
between five and ten top managers in the company. The board is 
clearly separated from the supervisory board. No individual is allowed 
to be simultaneously a member of both the supervisory and 
management board. While the management board has a chair or 
`speaker', his or her role is generally the case of `first among equals. ' 
Top managers have a great deal of autonomy in their individual areas 
of responsibility (generally defined by function such as finance, 
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production, personnel and social policy, etc. ). Major decisions or 
proposals to the supervisory board are reached through consensus. 
The separate appointment of managers by the supervisory board 
reduces the dependency of individual members on the chair/speaker. 
Large British companies in contrast are generally run by a CEO- 
dominated single boar. This CEO is often also the chair of the board 
and either hand-picks or plays a major role in choosing the other 
members of the board. The typical leadership style is for the CEO, 
after a period of consultation with other managers, to make major 
decisions alone and to take responsibility for these decisions. 
The dichotomy between the roles of management in corporate governance 
in German and the UK respectively, is further re-enforced by prevailing social 
understanding and expectations of firms in both institutional contexts - in 
Germany, for instance, firms are seen as having social obligations in addition 
to wealth creation, while in the UK firms are primarily instruments to 
maximise shareholders wealth and as such, social obligations are rather 
secondary. This has recently been emphasised in the `implicit and explicit' 
corporate social responsibility model advanced by Matten and Moon 
(forthcoming). In this regard, this research study, also, proposes that: 
Proposition 4a: German and UK firms will differ on the emphasis they 
respectively place on management in corporate social reports 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 147 of 438 
Proposition 4b: UK firms will place more emphasis on management in corporate 
social reports than German firms 
Following from and complementary to the shareholder and stakeholder 
orientations of UK and German firms, respectively, the varieties of capitalism 
analytical framework argues that economic coordination in coordinated 
market economies (CME) relies heavily on non-market institutions, 11 ... which 
not only allow for inter-firm coordination, but also regulate the interaction 
between owners and mangers, between employees and firms, and among 
top managers" (Vitols, 2001: 338), while liberal market economies rely heavily 
on market institutions and contracts (Williamson, 1985,2002). In the neo 
liberal capitalist philosophy, for instance, firms are not mainly considered as 
moral entities but market artefacts with the primary responsibility of 
providing decent returns to shareholders within the `rules of the game' 
(Friedman, 1962). This liberal market orientation is largely characteristic of 
the Anglo-American business model but less characteristic of the co- 
ordinated markets of Western Europe and South East Asia where business 
concerns traditionally go beyond shareholders to include other stakeholders - 
e. g. employees and suppliers - (Whitley, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Jones 
(1999: 166) refers to these as property right capitalism and stakeholder 
capitalism, respectively''. In the former, firms are constructed as private 
13 In a similar line of thought, Fannon (2003) argued that these perspectives on the 
nature and functions of firms derive from two different schools of thought - 
contractarian and communitarian schools, respectively. 
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actors, with private rights mainly embedded in contracts (license of 
operation), while in the latter, firms are construed as fabrics of the society 
with the purpose of providing some social benefits (i. e. employment, 
productivity, economic growth, sustainability, etc) (Fannon, 2003). Although 
firms in coordinated markets operate on some contracts, they are expected 
to adhere more to the spirit than the letters of contracts (Amaeshi et al., 
2006). 
Non-market institutions are largely anchored on institutional trust and social 
norms (Mollering, 2oo6; Beckert, 2005; Zucker, 1986). One of the outstanding 
contributions to the institutionalist trust literature is Zucker (1986). Building 
on previous works (e. g. Blau 1964; Luhmann, 1979; Giddens, 1984) Zucker, in 
her seminal work, traced the production of trust to three main sources: (a) 
process-based (b) characteristic-based and (c) institutional-based. Process- 
based trust is produced through reciprocal or recurring interactions between 
individuals or organisations. It operates on the principle that "... persons and 
firms make investments in process-based trust by creating positive 
`reputations' or name brands" (p. 61). These reputations in turn serve as 
`symbolic representation of past exchange history' (p. 62) to signal trust in 
the present. Characteristic-based trust on the other hand is produced 
through social similarities - for example, family background, gender or 
nationality. As such, characteristic-based trust implies that 11 ... the greater the 
number of social similarities (dissimilarities), the more interactants assume 
that common background expectations do (do not) exist, hence trust can 
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(cannot) be relied upon" (Zucker 1986, p. 63). Finally, institutional-based trust 
is produced from formal mechanisms that are not dependent on personal 
characteristics or on exchange history. They are rather driven, as the name 
suggests, by societal institutions - i. e. expectations embedded in societal 
norms and structures (e. g. the educational system, systems of innovation, 
legal institutions, etc) and could be signalled through institutionalised 
professions (e. g. medical doctors, lawyers, accountants) and intermediary 
mechanisms (e. g. bank supervision of escrow accounts). As such, Zucker 
argues that institutional-based trust "... is a commodity, albeit a social one 
... that at least some types of it are purchasable" 
(e. g. the commoditisation 
of intellectual property rights, professional and financial services). 
Mechanisms of non-market institutions will include inter-firm collaborations, 
supplier relationships, alliances, partnerships, et cetera. This study uses 
networks as an umbrella term to accommodate these non-market 
institutional mechanisms and therefore proposes that: 
Proposition 5a: German and UK firms will differ on the emphasis they 
respectively place on networks in corporate social reports 
Proposition 5b: German firms will place more emphasis on networks in 
corporate social reports than UK firms 
In addition to these core and fundamental differences identified in the 
literature between coordinated and liberal market economies, this research 
incorporates other stakeholder groups typically mentioned in the corporate 
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social responsibility and accountability literatures but sometimes missing in 
the varieties of capitalism debates - and they are: customers, the 
environment and the society. While these are not primary distinguishing 
factors in the varieties of capitalism analytical framework, they are core and 
fundamental to the corporate social responsibility and accountability 
movement. And corporate social reports serve as communicative and 
discursive artefacts to represent these stakeholder groups. Interest in the 
environment and local communities, in particular, is not arbitrary. The natural 
environment has been traditionally kept away from strategic business issues 
of the classical and neoclassical economics of firms. On one hand, the 
classical model denies that business has any direct environmental 
responsibility; and rather sees business as cooperating with society in 
attaining the environmental goals freely chosen by consumers in the 
marketplace. From this perspective business, therefore, serves these 
environmental goals not by taking on any special environmental 
responsibility, but by fulfilling its function within a free market economic 
system (DesJardins, 1998: 827). The neoclassical economics model, on the 
other hand, suggests that firms ought to seek profits while nevertheless 
maintaining a "moral minimum" (Bowie, 1991). According to DesJardins 
(1998), this moral minimum is interpreted in different ways by different 
versions of the neoclassical model. However, Bowie favours "avoiding harm" 
as the moral minimum. Continuing, DesJardins states that this neoclassical 
approach has the decided advantage over the classical model since it 
provides a genuine moral limit on the pursuit of profit. A moral minimum is 
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incorporated into the `rules of the game' and becomes part of standard 
business practice (p. 828). From an environmental perspective, this model, 
therefore, seems capable of offering significant protection of the natural 
environment in the face of market failures and negative externalities 
associated with all free market economic models. 
In the context of this neoclassical economic perspective, environmental 
concerns need only be integrated within the moral minimum to become part 
of business' social responsibility. The challenge, then, is to develop an 
account of environmental responsibilities that is sensitive to a wide enough 
range of environmental and ecological concerns yet plausibly within a `moral 
minimum' that can still motivate business compliance. Accordingly, 
DesJardins (1998) proposes the sustainability alternative. Having argued that 
all markets operate within constraints (physical, legal and moral), the 
sustainability alternative seeks to combine the natural constraints 
established by ecological laws with minimal moral constraints placed upon 
business activity. In this regard, DesJardins argues that: 
... the sustainability alternative can provide ecologically sound and 
practical guidance. Business remains free to pursue profits within 
the rules of the game; but the rules must be changed to include the 
obligation to leave natural ecosystems no worse off in the 
process.... In the light of the poverty-population-environmental 
destruction dilemma, the rules of the game must be adjusted to 
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insure that the economic system (and the firms and industries that 
operate within it), fulfils its social function. Since humanity still 
requires significant economic activity to provide for the basic needs 
of an increasing population, the rules must be changed to transform 
this activity from unrestricted growth to development (p. 831 - 
emphasis in original). 
In a nutshell, DesJardins proposes that an adequate account of corporate 
environmental responsibility should do two things: (1) address the entire 
range of environmental and ecological issues affected by business decisions 
in a way that might actually turn the tide of environmental and ecological 
deterioration; and (2) be capable of influencing business policy. 
It is worthwhile to note that DesJardins propositions are driven by an effort 
to orchestrate the natural environment as a legitimate stakeholder worthy of 
managers' considerations, especially as some research has shown that when 
firms make trade-offs among stakeholders, the natural environment is often 
placed low on the list (Bendheim et al., 1998; Nasi et al. 1997). Other scholars 
suggest that firms merely overlook strategic environmental considerations, 
believing that the global economic system is somehow independent of the 
Earth's ecological system (Gladwin et al., 1995; Jennings and Zandbergen, 
1995; Stead and Stead, 2000). DesJardin is not alone in this quest and has 
been recently supported by other scholars (Gago and Antolin, 2004; Phillips 
and Reichart, 2000; Driscoll and Starik, 2004; Starik, 1994,1995). However, 
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with issues like climate change and global warming becoming more 
disturbing than ever, the call for environmental sustainability seems to be on 
the forefront of the quest for sustainability. According to Gago and Antolin 
(2004), increasing environmental awareness has led to the development of 
international standards (ISO 14000, EMAS), along with complex 
environmental regulations that have changed firms' competitive 
environments (Rugman and Verbeke, 1998) and persuaded them to place 
more importance on environmental factors when designing their strategies 
(Aragon, 1998). Given that environmental discourses are internationally 
driven, and not bound to any specific institutional context, this research 
study proposes that: 
Proposition 6: German and UK firms will adopt similar direction of emphasis on 
the environment in their corporate social reports 
In addition to environmental discourses, current trends in corporate social 
responsibility tend to often tout the ascendance of local communities on 
corporate agendas; and this is one of the drivers of the current wave of 
corporate social and environmental reporting. The community or society is 
being taken from the previous position of taken-for-granted in business 
decisions to one where it is taking a centre stage and influencing decisions. 
This ascendance of the society on corporate agenda may not be unconnected 
to the increasing voice against corporate scandals and social externalities 
arising from corporate activities. With the emergence of Transnational 
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Corporations (TNCs) and the seemingly unlimited power they wield, the 
influences of firms on societies through their products and services are 
attracting global interests. This is more so, given the `inadvertent' 
devastating effects of capitalism equally on rich and poor countries alike. 
The community or society is today one of the main reported drivers of 
corporate social responsibility (Amaeshi et al., 2oo6). Because the varieties of 
capitalism model focuses mainly on private economic actors, it appears not 
to take into reasonable considerations the social model of governance which 
has dominated European policy for a long time now. So, while the varieties of 
capitalism model associates the UK with Anglo-Saxon mode of capitalism, it 
tends to miss out on the social characteristics of the UK capitalist system, 
which is picked by the `explicit and implicit' corporate social responsibility 
model of Matten and Moon (forthcoming). Matten and Moon suggest that 
whilst the `explicit' style characteristic of North American firms' corporate 
social responsibility is vociferous about its contribution to the society - for 
example in provision of healthcare, education, employee welfare and other 
social amenities, the `implicit' style characteristic of Continental Europe finds 
it less attractive to report such social provisions as contributions to the 
society, since these provisions are already taken care of by the national 
institutions in which they operate in. The UK government's national health 
care service (the NHS) has been providing free healthcare service to its 
citizenry since the 194os and the German system has ensured that 
employees' welfare gets top priority in organisations through its co- 
determination approach to corporate governance. The social model of 
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governance has been recently reinforced in the UK in the last 1o to 15 years 
prior to and in the course of the current Labour government. Tony Blair, for 
instance, will remain important in the corporate social responsibility debate 
for introducing the stakeholder concept into contemporary political 
discourse following his Singaporean speech in 1996 (Blair, 1996; Nuti, 1997). 
In line with this stakeholder thinking and social model of governance, the UK 
government is the first to appoint a Minister for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Given common and prevalent European interests in the 
sustenance of the social model of governance, this research study proposes 
that: 
Proposition 7: German and UK firms will adopt similar direction of emphasis on 
local communities or society at large in their corporate social reports if exposed 
to similar international influences 
The growing emphasis on consumerism and consumer welfare and 
orientation is not restricted to any capitalist system. It has in itself assumed a 
global dimension, which highlights a postmodern expression of consumer 
sovereignty and a 'de-traditionalized' consumer society (Sturdy, 1998: 27). The 
`customer is king' philosophy has become one of those marketing fads and 
fashions that have continued to trail the growth and expansion of the service 
economy (Egan and Shipley, 1995; Sturdy and Fleming, 2oo3; Jones and 
Fleming, 2003). Although there is an implicit assumption of an inherent 
positive (normative) orientation towards consumers in coordinated market 
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economies, the liberal market economies in their sole quest for profit have 
also turned to the consumers, albeit, in an instrumental fashion. Attention to 
customer needs has been identified as a key survival strategy in 
contemporary globalised economy (Deshpande et al, 1993), and the diffusion 
of this ideology has been sustained through organisational practices of 
Transnational Corporations (Abrahamson, 1991; Siu and Darby, 1995), 
management consultants and the international media (Bloomfield and 
Danieli, 1995; Jackson, 2001). Given the globalised nature of customer service 
discourse and pervasive international influences on different institutional 
contexts, structures and governance mechanisms, this research study 
proposes that: 
Proposition 8: German and UK firms will adopt similar direction of emphasis on 
customers in their corporate social reports if exposed to similar international 
influences 
Another trend that has been hanging over recent debates in comparative 
business systems is the idea that the different systems are converging under 
the powerful influence of globalization. There have been an increasing 
number of voices suggesting convergence of global corporate governance 
systems (see Drezner, 2001 for some examples of this literature). As such, on 
one hand, it is argued that national business systems succumb to the 
globalised world order. For instance it has been argued that both Japan and 
German, which have been widely conceptualised in the extant literature 
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following the stakeholder model, are gradually opening up and adapting to 
the Anglo-Saxon shareholder governance model, albeit with some frictions 
(Jackson, 2005; Dore, 2000; et cetera). On the other hand, the argument is 
that national business systems do not disappear, but rather find new and 
innovative ways of internalising influences coming from globalisation while 
retaining their distinctiveness (Whitley, 2002; Hall, 2007; Hancke et al., 2007). 
According to Hancke et al. (2007: 9 & 12), the varieties of capitalism analytical 
model "... argues that globalization will confirm rather than subvert the 
comparative institutional advantage of nations. Competition and the spread 
of global production networks will reward difference and drive divergence 
... while in theory there are multiple responses available to 
firms when 
confronted with external stimuli or shocks, in reality the range of responses 
available is limited by their institutional context". Therefore, comparative 
study of UK and German systems provides a fertile ground to explore this 
proposition of convergence and or distinctiveness. It will be worthwhile to 
explore if these changes at the practice level are also being reflected in how 
firms in these varieties of capitalism would want themselves to be perceived. 
Given its longitudinal dimension, the study will also explore the presence or 
absence of the divergence-convergence argument current in comparative 
capitalism debate. Following from propositions 1 to 8 above, this research 
study proposes that: 
Proposition 9: German and UK firms will remain distinct in those fundamental 
areas characteristic to their respective mode of economic governance (e. g. 
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labour relations) and converge on those indices that are driven by global 
discourses (e. g. customer relations) 
Tied to these propositions is also the need to understand how patterns of 
corporate stakeholding salience (if any) are made manifest on the sector 
levels. Most of these institutionalist accounts tend to adopt a macro (national 
level) characteristic, which appears to suggest some kind of organisational 
field homogeneity within national institutional contexts. Whilst the 
introduction of comparative institutionalism perspective to the CSR literature 
is innovative and worthwhile, at least in wrestling CSR from the domineering 
grips of managerialist theorisations (Owen et al., zooo; Gray; 2002; O'Dwyer, 
2002,2003), it appears to under-emphasis possible heterogeneities that 
could exist within national institutional boundaries. These heterogeneities 
have been picked up by a related stream of literature that emphasises 
sectoral differences as main sources of variations of CSR practices (Gray et 
al., 1995a; Kolk, 2003; Griffin and Weber, 2oo6). The significance of sectors in 
accounting for corporate actions is also gradually permeating and unsettling 
the core tenets and foundations of national business systems and 
comparative capitalism, which are in orientation largely macro-centric. 
Scholars promoting the sector-based perspective argue that national 
business systems are not necessarily homogenous but are most of the time 
concatenations of heterogeneities, or at best `models within models' (Deeg 
and Jackson, 2007: 154), which "... may allow differential adoption of 'old' and 
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'new' business practices according to sectoral and firm-specific 
characteristics. " (Deeg and Jackson, 2006: 14). 
An anchor for the sector-based argument is that some sectors are 
constitutively and uniquely trans-national social spaces14. As such, their 
practices cannot be fully accounted for by national institutional boundaries. 
In some instances, these transnational social spaces could be either more 
influential on corporate practices than national institutional contexts and vice 
versa. The oil and gas sector in Nigeria, for instance, is heavily driven more by 
global than local practices (Ite, 2004,2005; Frynas et al., 20o6; Frynas, 1999), 
since the major actors in the sector are MNCs who tend to retain their home 
country influences, albeit with slight modifications (Whitley, 1999a, b). In 
addition, sectoral differences could be as a result of degree of transnational 
competition (liberalisation) within a sector and or degree of State influence 
on a sector. The German and UK economies are different in relation to State 
involvement in the market and the sectors within them exhibit different 
14Borrowing from Morgan (zoos): "I take `transnational space' to refer to an arena of 
social action distinct from that of the `national' context. It is an arena of social 
interaction where the main modes of connection between groups cross national 
boundaries.... Transnational social space implies a more open-ended set of cross- 
border connections between multiple nodes in which the forms of interaction 
become more than simply the sum of interactions between different `national' units; 
it constitutes an arena in which new social actors may emerge, which may be 
labelled `transnational communities' (p. 115). 
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transnational influences. While the UK runs on liberal market economy, 
Germany runs on coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2000). It is 
argued that the State is much more predisposed to intervene in coordinated 
market economies than in liberal market economies where the private actors 
take leading roles. However, the broad brush application of the typology 
could distract from industry level typologies that could cut across varieties of 
capitalism framework. For instance, there are some industries that attract 
significant national interests given their strategic positioning in the economy 
and or their likely impacts on the citizenry. Some of these industries include 
those in defence and the utility sectors - energy, electricity, post, 
telecommunication, water, transportation, et cetera. There are also sectors 
that are more transnational in nature than others (e. g. financial services 
sector). Following these distinctions, this research study proposes that: 
Proposition boa: Irrespective of national institutional characteristics, the higher 
the degree of liberalisation of a sector, the more a sector exhibits the core 
characteristics of the Liberal Market Economy (e. g. emphasis on shareholders 
and management stakeholder groups) 
Proposition iob: Irrespective of national institutional characteristics, the higher 
the degree of State influence on a sector, the more a sector exhibits the core 
characteristics of the Coordinated Market Economy (e. g. emphasis on 
employees and networks stakeholder groups) 
Proposition 1oc: Irrespective of national institutional characteristics, sectors 
with mixed degree of State influence and degree of competition, also exhibit 
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mixed characteristics of both Coordinated Market Economy and Liberal Market 
Economy 
However, the two streams of literature on the influences of national 
institutional boundaries and trans-national social spaces, respectively, on 
corporate actions, therefore, appear to be in constant contestation in 
accounting for variations of CSR practices, albeit with inconclusive outcomes 
- thereby suggesting some kind of interaction effects between 
characteristics of sector and national institutional contexts. It is expected 
that the unpacking of these configurations and interrelations will throw some 
light on understanding how stakeholder salience is not only a function of 
managerial discretion and rationality, but also is a factor implicated in the 
dynamics of both industry and institutional contexts. 
4.6: Chapter Summary 
The chapter makes a case for the data source and stakeholder groups chosen 
for this study. Given its choice of corporate social reports as its main source 
of data, the emphasis would be on what firms say they do through their social 
reports as opposed to what they actually do in practice. In this regard, the 
study problematises corporate social reports as discursive and 
communicative artefacts - with instrumental and strategic dimensions and 
objectives - from which corporate actions could be examined. It is 
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anticipated that drawing attention to corporate social reports as primarily 
corporate communication artefacts will help in showcasing the relevance of 
using corporate social reports as a primary data source for this research 
study. Having established the relevance of corporate social reports for the 
study, research propositions are formulated along the lines of the varieties of 
capitalism analytical framework. The next couple of chapters will focus on 
both the theoretical and practical sides of the empirical methodology chosen 
to explore the outlined research propositions. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY I: PLACING CONTENT ANALYSIS WITHIN 
ITS THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
5.1: Tone Setting 
A key point of this study is that firms use corporate social reports to signal 
their stakeholder salience. As such it makes sense to study corporate social 
reports, not only as corporate social accountability artefacts -a 
characterisation that has become synonymous with corporate social reports 
- but also as corporate communication artefacts. One way of deconstructing 
communication (or media) artefacts, recognised in the extant literature, is 
through content analysis (Bell, 20o6). Content analysis is, in the main, 
positivist in orientation and works from the perspective that social reality can 
be measured, quantified and subjected to systematic calculations for some 
insights that could contribute to body of knowledge. The use of content 
analytical method has become widespread in the social and management 
sciences, particularly in such areas as communications, marketing, visual 
sociology, anthropology, psychology and accounting studies. In this line of 
thought and practice, this research study, anchored on positivism, leverages 
content analytical methodology to arrive at its findings and conclusions. The 
reason for choosing content analysis is that it affords the researcher an 
opportunity to systematically abstract from the contents of the reports in a 
way that allows for the identification of manifest patterns in these reports (in 
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this case patterns of stakeholder salience) through statistical analysis. 
Moreover, one of the key philosophies behind the use of quantitative 
content analysis as an empirical research tool is that volume and or frequency 
of disclosure signifies the importance of a disclosure (Deegan and Rankin, 
1996; Gray et al., 1995; Krippendorff, 1980; Neu et al., 1998; Unerman, 2000; 
Bell, 2oo6). The research epistemology and ontology behind content 
analytical framework are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
5.2: Research Epistemology and Ontology of Content Analytical 
Method 
5.2.1: Content Analysis: Underpinning Research Epistemology 
Krippendorf (2004: 18) defines content analysis as "... a research technique 
for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful 
matter) to the contexts of their use". In similar direction of thinking, Bell 
(2oo6: 13) defines content analysis as "... an empirical (observational) and 
objective procedure for quantifying recorded `audio-visual' (including verbal) 
representation using reliable, explicitly defined categories ('values' on 
independent `variables'). Content analysis has a long history that dates back 
to the early days of philosophical enquiries in Greece. Although not in the 
scientific form it currently appears, it has been said to be prominent in the 
16oos as a method of examining texts deemed to threaten the authority of 
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the Church (Krippendorff, 2004). It was in the early 19oos that it entered 
mainstream scientific domain as a method of studying social phenomena. 
Although it was not directly associated to Max Weber, he was one of the 
early heralds of the method in contemporary times (Krippendorff, 2004). 
Content analysis is now widely used in such fields as psychology, sociology, 
literary studies, management, marketing, accounting and communication 
studies. 
One of the fundamental philosophies of content analysis is that `reality' is 
composed of interdependent but yet independent components that could be 
systematically studied to understand the whole. It also assumes that `reality' 
is housed in language (expressed as texts, talks, images, signs and symbols, 
artefacts, etc) and manifests through language. As such, it pushes the 
perspective that the `real' could be understood through lingual analysis. It 
therefore makes language its primary and focal point of analysis, and tends 
to emphasise the network structure or interconnectedness of reality. In the 
process, it assumes some structural equivalence within the network structure 
that enables it to abstract from the individualised properties of the structure 
to give a holistic account of the uber-structure. Commenting on this, Riffe et 
al (2005: 67-68) write: 
... content analysis is reductionist in approach. The content under 
study is divided into smaller elements and then analysed to draw 
conclusions about the whole. Therefore, no matter what content 
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form an analyst selects to study, content must be reduced to units 
to measure it.... A unit of content is a discretely defined element of 
content. It can be a word, sentence, paragraph, image, article, 
television program, or any other content elements with a 
definable physical or temporal boundary or symbolic meaning 
(emphasis in original). 
It has been advanced that to be of pragmatic research value, content analysis 
needs to begin with some precise `expectations' (e. g. propositions and 
hypotheses), which are usually comparative in nature (Bell, 2006). In other 
words, it is argued that "content analysis is used to test explicitly 
comparative hypotheses by means of quantification of categories of manifest 
content" (Bell, 2006: 13). According to Bell (2006: 14), typical research 
questions which may be addressed using content analysis include: 
1. Questions of priority/salience of media content: how visible (how 
frequently, how large, in what order in a programme) different kinds 
of images, stories, events are represented? 
i. Questions of `bias': comparative questions about the duration, 
frequency, priority or salience of representations of, say, political 
personalities, issues, policies, or of 'positive' versus `negative' features 
of representation. 
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3. Historical changes in modes of representation of, for example, 
gender, occupational, class, or ethically codified images in particular 
types of publications or television genres. 
Content analysis has continued to gain currency in management and 
organisational research studies in the last couple of decades. Citing Kassarjian 
(2001: 9), Hardy et al. (2004: 19) state that content analysis as a mode of 
textual analysis is characterised by a concern with being objective, 
systematic, and quantitative. Continuing they explain that content analysis is 
said to be objective in the sense that the analytic categories are defined so 
precisely that different coders may apply them and obtain the same results; 
systematic in the sense that clear rules are used to include or exclude content 
or analytic categories; and quantified in the sense that the results of content 
analysis are amenable to statistical analysis. 
Content analysis is not the only analytical method that has language as its 
focal point of analysis. The same could be said of discourse analysis, for 
instance. Hardy et al. (2004: 19) describes discourse analysis broadly as 11 ... a 
methodology for analyzing social phenomena that is qualitative, interpretive, 
and constructionist. It explores how the socially produced ideas and objects 
that populate the world were created and are held in place. It not only 
embodies a set of techniques for conducting structured, qualitative 
investigations of texts, but also a set of assumptions concerning the 
constructive effects of language". However, major differences between the 
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two include their underlying assumptions, ontology and epistemology. While 
discourse analysis largely draws from interpretivism and social 
constructivism, content analysis often assumes that subjective views and 
interpretations of language could be significantly minimised through some 
objective criteria. In essence, discourse analysis comes from the view that 
reality is socially constructed while content analysis takes it that there is a 
reality out there to be understood. This significant approach to knowledge 
suggests that both discourse and content analyses would be significantly 
different in their relation to meaning, texts and contexts. For instance, 
content analysis has been criticised as "... the study of the text itself and not 
of its relation to its context, to the intentions of the producer of the text, or 
of the reaction of the intended audience" (Hardy et al., 2004: 20). It has also 
been suggested that while discourse analysis assumes that meanings shift in 
relation to contexts and individuals, content analysis seems to assume some 
level of stability of meaning across contexts and individuals. These 
differences, however, do not imply that both could not be complementary. 
The differences and complementarities between the two approaches are 
further eloquently presented by Hardly et al. (2004) in the tables below. 
Table 5-o-i: Differences between Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis 
(Hardy et at., 2004: 21) 
Discourse Analysis Content Analysis 
Ontology Constructionist - assumes 
that reality is socially 
Realist - assumes that an 
independent reality exits 
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Discourse Analysis Content Analysis 
constructed 
Epistemology Meaning is fluid and Meaning is fixed and 
constructs reality in ways reflects reality in ways that 
that can be posited through can be ascertained through 
the use of interpretive the use of scientific 
methods methods 
Data Source Textual meaning, usually in Textual content in 
relation to other texts, as comparison to other texts, 
well as practices of for example overtime 
production, dissemination, 
and consumption 
Method Qualitative (although can Quantitative 
involve counting) 
Categories Exploration of how Analytical categories taken 
participants actively for granted and data 
construct categories allocated to them 
Inductive/Deductive Inductive Deductive 
Subjectivity/Objectivity Subjective Objective 
Role of context Can only understand texts in Does not necessarily link 
discursive context text to context 
Reliability Formal measures of Formal measures of 
reliability are not a factor intercoder reliability are 
although coding is still crucial for measurement 
justified according to purposes; differences in 
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Discourse Analysis Content Analysis 
academic norms; interpretation are 
differences in interpretation problematic and risk 
are not a problem and may, nullifying any results 
in fact, be a source of data 
Validity Validity in the form of Validity is in the form of 
"performativity" i. e., accuracy and precision i. e., 
demonstrating a plausible demonstrating that 
case that patterns in the patterns in the content of 
meaning of texts are texts are accurately 
constitutive of reality in measured and reflect reality 
some way 
Reflexivity Necessarily high - author is Not necessarily high - 
part of the process whereby author simply reports on 
meaning is constructed objective findings. 
Table 5-0-2: Using Content Analysis within a Discourse Analytic Approach 
(Hardy et al., 2004: 21) 
Dealing with There is no inherent meaning in the text; meanings are 
Meaning constructed in a particular context; and the author, 
consumer, and researcher all play a role. There is no way to 
separate meaning from context and any attempt to count 
must deal with the precarious nature of meaning. 
Dealing with Categories emerge from the data. However, existing 
Categories empirical research and theoretical work provide ideas for 
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what to look for and the research question provides an initial 
simple [in original] frame. 
Dealing with The categories that emerge from the data allow for coding 
Technique schemes involving counting occurrences of meanings in the 
text. Analysis is an interactive process of working back and 
forth between the texts and the categories. 
Dealing with Context The analysis must locate the meaning of the text in relation 
to a social context and to other texts and discourses. 
Dealing with The results are reliable to the degree that they are 
Reliability understandable and plausible to others i. e. does the 
researcher explain how s/he came up with the analysis in a 
way that the reader can make sense of? 
Dealing with Validity The results are valid to the degree that they show how 
patterns in the meaning of texts are constitutive of reality. 
Dealing with To what extent does the analysis take into account the role 
Reflexivity that the author plays in making meaning? Does the analysis 
show different ways in which this meaning might be 
consumed? Is the analysis sensitive to the way the patterns 
are identified and explained? 
The distinction between content analysis and discourse analysis is also akin to 
that sometimes made between qualitative content analysis and quantitative 
content analysis in the literature. While definitions of qualitative content 
analysis share similarities with discourse analysis, Riffe et al. (2005: 3) defines 
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quantitative content analysis as "... the systematic assignment of 
communication content to categories according to rules, and the analysis of 
relationships involving those categories using statistical methods". The 
emphasis here is on the use of statistical methods of analysis. It is also in 
relation to the manifest and latent aspects of content analysis. According to 
Riffe et al, quantitative content analysis deals with manifest content, by 
definition, and makes no claims beyond that (p. 38). However, Krippendorff 
(2004), one of the leading figures in the field, criticises this seeming 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis in very 
strong words: 
I question the validity and usefulness of the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative content analyses. Ultimately, all reading 
of texts is qualitative, even when certain characteristics of a text are 
later converted into numbers. The fact that computers process great 
volumes of text in a very short time does not take away from the 
qualitative nature of their algorithms: On the most basic level, they 
recognize zeros and ones and change them, proceeding one step at a 
time. Nevertheless, what... proponents call qualitative approaches to 
content analysis offer some alternative protocols for exploring texts 
systematically (p. 16). 
Krippendorff is not alone in this concern for the dichotomisation of content 
analytic methodology. Riffe et al. (2005: 10) for instance, argue that "Content 
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is itself the consequence of a variety of other antecedent conditions or 
processes that may have led to or shaped its construction", and as such, "... 
communication content may be viewed as an end product, the assumed 
consequence or evidence of antecedent individual, organizational, social, and 
other contexts. The validity of that assumption depends on how closely the 
content evidence can be linked empirically (through observation) or 
theoretically to that context" (Riffe et al., 2005: 11). Although the two 
domains of text and context might appear logically independent, the 
researcher draws conclusions from one domain (the texts) to the other (the 
context) and vice versa (White and Marsh, 2006: 27). In other words, context 
is also as important to the quantitative approach as it is to the so-called 
qualitative approach. 
It has been argued that "Content analysis is crucial to any theory dealing with 
the impact or antecedents of content" (Riffe et al., 2005: 39) and descriptive 
content analyses sometimes serve as a prelude to other types of research, 
often in domains not previously explored (Riffe et al., 2005: 14). In addition, 
"Armed with a strong theoretical framework, the researcher can draw 
conclusions from content evidence without having to gain access to 
communicators who may be unwilling or unable to be examined directly" 
(Riffe et al., 2005: 38). These are some of the attributes that make content 
analysis in its varied forms attractive to researchers when compared to other 
research methods and techniques. In this regard, Krippendorff (2004), for 
instance, reported that "As of August 2003, an internet search for "content 
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analysis" using the Google search engine found 4,230,000 documents. In 
comparison, "survey research" turned up 3,990,000 hits and "psychological 
test, " 1,050,000". He further concludes that: 
One could say that content analysis has evolved into a repertoire of 
methods of research that promise to yield inferences from all kinds of 
verbal, pictorial, symbolic, and communication data. Beyond the 
technique's initially journalistic roots, the past century has witnessed 
the migration of content analysis into various fields and clarification of 
many methodological issues (p. 17) 
5.2.2: Positivism as the underpinning Ontology of Content Analytical 
Method 
The nineteenth century was the age of positivism borne out of the 
Enlightenment. One distinctive feature of the Enlightenment is its reliance on 
empirics (i. e. sense data) and logic, which became the hallmark of the 
modern scientific method. This was a significant break from preceding 
understanding of knowledge; and was both anthropocentric and anti- 
metaphysical in orientation. This epistemological revolution at the heart of 
the Renaissance project was mainly championed by such philosophers as 
Descartes, Bacon, Locke and Hume. 
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Noe (2001) stated that it was during the Scientific Revolution in the 
seventeenth century that classical positivism emerged and social sciences 
began to introduce the positivistic method. In the twentieth century, the 
Vienna Circle tried to realize the methodological unification between natural 
sciences and social sciences under the slogan of `unified science'. Empirical 
observations and logical deductions came to be seen as the only legitimate 
sources of knowledge. Science and technology appeared to provide rational 
grounds for the establishment of a new social, moral and political order. 
Comte (1853), for example, argued that the development of all sciences 
followed from mathematics, through astronomy, the physical and biological 
sciences, and reaches their apogee in the rise of the social sciences. This 
understanding of the scientific method has persisted into the 21st century. 
In this section, the influence and implications of positivism on and for broad 
management research - which this research study falls under - are examined. 
Emphasis will be more on early generation of positivism (e. g. Bacon, 
Descartes, Locke and Hume) with occasional reference to other generations 
of positivism. It starts by situating positivism in its academic cultural context 
and later examines its strengths and limitations in management research. 
5.2.2.1: Scientific Method: Culture of Positivism 
Positivism is also known as the `natural-science model of social-science 
research' because it proceeds to implement, in social science, an image of 
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how research proceeds in physics, biology, and other natural sciences 
(Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997). Like natural-science theories, social-science 
theories based on this model must conform to the rules of formal logic (of 
which the rules of mathematics are a subset) and the rules of experimental 
and quasi-experimental design. This is the essence of the scientific method. 
Adi, Amaeshi and Nnodim (2007) explain that the scientific method is a 
manner of operation of the rational, ends-oriented subject. Fundamental to 
this scientific epistemology is the Cartesian thinking, "rational", subject that 
stands distinct from external, "social", objects (Schrieber, 2002). The 
cogitative power of the Cartesian subject is a foundational axiom of universal 
validity, and constitutes the necessary precondition for universally, valid 
truths. Thus, the method of science is an epistemology whose objective is to 
render the world intelligible. For this reason, modern science has been 
characterized as the "theory of the real" (Heidegger, 1977b). Adi et al (2007) 
further argue that the distinctive characteristics of the scientific method 
include objectification, mathematization/idealization, and research, as 
summarised below: 
1. Objectification: This is the process by which the real is rendered 
countable, measurable and determinable. It involves representation, 
classification, quantification and measurement of objects of science. 
Representation is the manner in which the external object is 
apprehended by a knowing subject (Heidegger, 1977a). The knower 
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knows that which is present. That which is not "present" and cannot be 
"represented" in the manner of knowledge readily accessible to the 
subject, is not accountable. The consequence of this in the age of the 
scientific epistemology is that all fields of knowledge strive to represent 
reality as object and as data amenable to measurement and calculation. 
i. Mathematization/Idealization: Beginning with Descartes, method, as in 
`rules for the direction of the mind', came to be seen as the distinguishing 
characteristic of true science such that scientific method became in 
Cartesian formulation, the `method of the real'. As a method aiming 
towards precision and exactitude, its major distinctions are measurement 
and calculation, which renders the scientific method mathematical. But 
mathematics, designating the system of logical relations between entities 
that are simple abstractions from concrete, material objects, derives its 
basis on matter that is subject to space and time, and is quantifiable. 
3. Research and Experimentation: The simple, repetitive events of the 
natural and positivist sciences make research possible (Beck, 1949). 
Through the activity of research, science postulates theory which lays 
down rules regarding the manner of obtaining knowledge of reality and 
sets a'priori possibilities for the posing of research questions. Theory 
determines in advance what sort of question is posed for the real. 
Research proceeds by way of observation of reality in order to organise 
the facts so gathered in a schema that is pre-specified by the theory. 
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Conclusions are drawn from observations of interacting objects. 
Consistent results within a laboratory framework are used to provide 
evidence about the way things work. Thus, science is made possible by 
the prior hypothesis that inferences can be drawn from observation of 
particular objects to reveal universal characteristics about the world 
(Heidegger, 1977b). 
5.2.2.2: Positivism: Implications for Management Research 
Management study is, arguably, an applied social science. Since it draws 
heavily from the traditional social sciences of psychology, sociology, 
anthropology and economics, the implications of positivism for social 
sciences could be extended to management studies. However, it is 
worthwhile pointing out that there have been two (somewhat) competing 
commitments to doing management research: positivism and interpretivism. 
These commitments are both epistemological and methodological. While 
interpretivism is highly qualitative in approach, positivist studies generally 
attempt to test theory, in an attempt to increase the predictive 
understanding of phenomena. In the main, American management research 
leans more towards positivism while European management research is more 
driven by interpretivism (Cassell et al., 2005). 
According to Crossan (2003, p. 51), the implications of positivism for social 
research include: 
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» Methodological: research should be quantitative, and only quantitative 
research can be the basis for valid generalisations and laws 
» Value-freedom: choice of what to study, and how to study it, should be 
determined by objective criteria rather than by human beliefs and 
interests 
» Causality: identifying causal explanations and fundamental laws that 
explain human behaviour should be the aim 
» Operationalisation: concepts need to be operationalised in a way that 
enables quantitative measurement of facts 
» Independence: the researcher's role is independent of the subject 
» Reductionism: problems are better understood if they are reduced to the 
simplest possible elements 
These implications occasioned by positivism have merits and demerits in 
relation to management research as presented below. 
5.2.2.3: Merits of Positivism 
The strengths of the positivist approach on management research could be 
appreciated from the following dimensions: a) the research, itself, b) the 
researched and c) the researcher. 
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The Research: Management research, like any other social research, is highly 
complex with interdependent relationships and configurations. This 
complexity of relationships can constitute strong barriers to researching 
management issues. Given that the positivist approach focuses on what is 
verifiable and falsifiable; it helps to set clear and unambiguous boundaries of 
research. It tends to simplify the `world' and sets clear guidelines and 
procedures. In addition, the quantification of the data and statistical analysis 
convey credibility. Accordingly, Cassell et al., 2005 asserted that in a 
management environment, with an organizational emphasis on the "bottom 
line", numbers may be especially convincing. The essence of the formal 
procedure also includes ensuring replicability, which tends to ensure some 
degree of credibility and objectivity (not necessarily what is `true') on 
research outcome. 
The Researched: Unlike the interpretative approach, positivism offers more 
independence to the object of research. The researcher stands aloof from 
the object in a manner of disinterested observation (i. e. value freedom). This 
flows from the assumption that "... reality exists independently of the 
observer, and hence the job of the scientist is merely to identify... this pre- 
existing reality" (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 34), which is one of the 
hallmarks of the scientific method (Shapin, 1995). In dealing with the object 
of science, the subject (i. e. the researcher) is expected to apply only rules and 
procedures validated within the specific domain of scientific practice. These 
rules and procedures are themselves scientific in so far as they are 
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independently verifiable and universally valid (Adi et al, 2007) to ensure 
objectivity and acceptability within the scientific community. 
The Researcher: The positivist scientific method is likely to confer a significant 
degree of confidence on the researcher as long as the stipulated 
methodology of the research practice is rigorously followed. Since 
mathematics has become synonymous with modern sciences, to the extent 
that judgments of scientific rigor and merit is construed in terms of the 
perceived quality of a study's measurement (Heath and Chatterjee, 2004), it 
is an approach that has gained considerable legitimacy in academic practice 
and is much more favoured by most of the `good' journals (Cassell et al., 
2005). No doubt the positivist approach has become both a signalling and 
screening device for `quality' research outputs on which the career 
development of the researcher is anchored. As such, the positivist approach 
is not only a mode of scientific enquiry but also a political tool to legitimate 
'particular' academic practices. An understanding of this political dimension is 
likely to be `the beginning of wisdom' for upcoming researchers in 
management. 
5.2.2.4: The inevitable demerits of positivism - any way out? 
The positivist approach, nevertheless, leaves traces of deficiencies. First and 
foremost, it can limit the scope of what could be investigated. Reality that is 
not reducible to quantifiable and calculable stuff is ignored and treated as 
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irrelevant thus rendering to measurability the criterion for relevance. This 
difference between measurable and non-measurable things draws the line 
between what is regarded as truly "science" and "non-science" in the 
modern and contemporary epoch. Fields of knowledge where the object is 
not easily quantifiable in a calculable manner are dubbed "unscientific" and 
incapable of providing exact, valid and verifiable knowledge. To escape the 
derogation of "non-scientific" various disciplines strive to tune up to the 
"scientific" manner so conceived. Questions of metaphysics are of a different 
order of abstraction not related to objects of sense experience. Questions of 
ethics, justice, love, freedom, values, norms, and beliefs, et cetera. cannot be 
dealt with mathematically and hence, social scientism fares badly in these 
regard (Adi et al, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the positivist's claims on value freedom, Carson et al. state 
that, as researchers, we "... can't detach ourselves due to our past 
experiences and preconceptions (Carson, et al, 2001: 13). The readiness with 
which matter easily gives-in to mathematical analysis confers science its 
ultimate power over reality and realizes the ambition "to render ourselves 
the masters and possessors of nature" (Heidegger, 1977b). Central to 
understanding this principle is the recognition that there is no pure 
observation. Every observation is based on some pre-existing theory or 
understanding. It is almost always possible to choose and select data that will 
support almost any theory if the researcher just looks for confirming 
examples. Unarguably, this has produced tremendous results in the natural 
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and positivist sciences. In the social sciences, however, it does not enjoy 
comparable success since the positivist approach does not provide the 
means to examine social phenomena in an in-depth way (Crossan 2003). 
In this regard, Lee (1991) argued that the difficulties of capturing social reality 
in formal propositions, quantifying it, and subjecting it to experimental 
controls, are said to be the reasons management research, like the rest of 
social science, has not yet reached the same level of scientific maturity that 
characterises natural science. Notwithstanding, it frequently happens that 
researchers in the social sciences, in faithfulness to the dictates of 
mathematization, measure, model, and apply things that are invalid and/or 
non-existent (Heath and Chatterjee, 2004). In order to minimise these 
identified pitfalls of positivism, it is suggested that management and social 
science research methodologies need to be broad and flexible given that 
their `objects and subjects' of study are often imbued with rationality and are 
ever changing. Clinging solely to one side of the methodological divide tends 
to occlude possible insights that could have been provided by the other half. 
Building bridges across these epistemological and ontological divides is one 
of the suggested ways of advancing both management and the social 
sciences (Whitley, 1984a, b; Fuller, 1988; Wagner et al., 1991). 
In relation to the content analytical scientism, in particular, it is important to 
point out that a common underpinning substance of content analytical 
method is its deductive philosophical orientation (Riffe et al., 2005) - 
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whether in its quantitative or qualitative approaches. And its research 
methods and techniques are not completely value-free (Darke et al., 1998; 
Appadurai, 1999; Hardy et at., 20ol; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In addition to its inclination towards deductivism, and 
in order to minimise the demerits of its positivist orientation, it is also 
fundamentally hermeneutic (meaning seeking/giving) in approach - i. e. it 
either gives context-driven meaning (qualitative) or finds reasons to give 
meaning to emerging patterns (quantitative) from empirical data analysed - 
and in so doing, minimises the demerits of positivism outlined above. In other 
words, and for example, how content analytical method is used is, also, to a 
large extent a reflection of the researcher's philosophical paradigm. As such, 
this research study adopts a complementary mixed method that seeks to 
give, as well as draw meanings from emergent patterns within specific 
different institutional contexts - i. e. organisational field (sectors) and country 
level contexts. This choice of method is also a reflection of the nature of the 
research questions and the data sources, as explained below. 
5.3: Rationale for Mixed Methods Approach 
Like most studies on social and environmental reporting (e. g. Jose and Lee, 
2007; Cormier et al., 2005; Belal, 2002; Bali et al., 2000; Unerman, 2000; 
Gray et al., 1995a, b), this study adopts a content analysis research 
methodology. As earlier stated, content analysis "... assumes that 
an independent reality exists (and that) meaning is fixed and reflects reality 
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in ways that can be ascertained through the use of scientific methods" 
(Hardy et al., 2004: 21). One of the main philosophies behind the use of 
quantitative content analysis as an empirical research tool is that volume of 
disclosure signifies the importance of a disclosure (Deegan and Rankin, 
1996; Gray et at., 1995a; Krippendorff, 1980; Neu et aI., 1998; Unerman, 
2000). It is the position of this research that stakeholder salience is a product 
of dynamic interactions between managerial perception and institutional 
structures. In other words, it could be seen as a socially constructed salience. 
At the same time, it could be structurally shaped by the institutional culture 
(i. e. accumulated social norms, values, expectations and regulations) in which 
they occur. While the former could be socially constructed in nature, it could 
equally be a mimesis of its institutions which could be inferred over time from 
dominant social requirements of the institutions in which they exist. It is 
assumed that corporate social reports will make collective latent meanings 
and constructions manifest over a period of time at an aggregate level. This 
assumption has also underpinned similar studies that have examined the 
emergence and patterns of social factors at the macro level, especially those 
rooted in documentary and or archival analysis (e. g. Unerman iooo; Schmidt, 
2002,2003; Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Suddaby 
et al., 2007; Phillips and Hardy, iooi; Phillips et al., 2004). 
In line with Krippendorff (2004)'s position, it is difficult to separate texts 
from their contexts. This is particularly the case in the coding stage, at least. 
This is even more important where data sources comprise: texts, graphics 
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and photographs - as in this study (details on these elements of the data 
sources used in this study are provided in subsequent chapters). Since the 
study is interested in mapping stakeholder salience across industries and 
countries, it is only sensible to code the texts, graphics and photographs in 
relation to the contexts in which they appear in corporate social report 
documents. It is also important to note that these texts, graphics, and 
photographs do not possess absolute meanings, but are interpreted and 
coded in line with the descriptions offered to them by the authors in the 
documents. This concern is reflected in the coding protocol developed for 
this study (see appendix). Commenting on the importance of the coding 
protocol in content analysis, Riffe et al. (2005: 59) write: "The heart of a 
content analysis is the content analysis protocol or codebook that explains 
how the variables in the study are to be measured and recorded on the 
coding sheet or other medium". These meanings derived from the coding 
protocol then form the basis on which the later abstractions of stakeholder 
salience both at the organisational field and institutional levels are derived. 
Commenting on methods used for visual analysis, which include content 
analysis, van Leeuwen and Jewitt (2oo6: 8) wrote: "Anyone who has actually 
tried these methods knows that there is a great deal more room for initiative 
and, indeed, inspiration than is sometimes acknowledged in the way these 
methods are described. These methods remain an art of interpretation, but 
one that follows certain rules of accountability" (emphasis, mine). 
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From the foregoing, it could be deduced that the interests in contextualised 
meanings abstracted from individualised components of social artefact to 
explain a whole (i. e. organisational field and institutional levels) is already 
implicated in the epistemology of deductivism, hermeneutics and discursive 
institutionalism. It also shows the positivist ontology of the study. 
5.4: Chapter Summary 
This chapter has attempted to situate positivism within its historical context, 
highlight some of its major tenets and reflect upon its positive and negative 
implications for management research. The message, therefore, is for 
management researchers to be aware of these implications while 
consolidating the positives and minimising the negatives possibly through 
triangulation (e. g. Lee 1991). Content analysis is also positioned as exhibiting 
interpretivist orientations that complement its positivist bent. However, the 
quest to minimise the negative implications of positivism for management 
research, and the social sciences in general, is one of the major projects of 
the post-positivist school of thought and lies outside the scope of this essay. 
The next chapter concentrates on how content analysis is applied in 
deconstructing the data sources on which this research study is anchored - 
i. e. corporate social reports - as reflectors of both national and sectoral 
institutional characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGY 11 - APPLICATION OF CONTENT 
ANALYSIS TO CORPORATE SOCIAL REPORTS AS SOURCE OF 
EMPIRICAL DATA 
6.1: Tone Setting 
This chapter gives a detailed account of how the empirical data for the study 
are collated, coded and analysed. It creates a link between the previous 
chapter on the theoretical underpinnings of the methodology and the 
research findings and discussions in the next couple of chapters. 
6.2: Corporate social reports as empirical data sources 
The choice of corporate social and environmental reports is not arbitrary. As 
earlier mentioned, one of the reasons for choosing corporate social reports is 
because firms have recently adopted them as viable means of 
communicating to their multiple stakeholders. For instance, evidence of 
social reports as signals of stakeholder salience is a quote from Centrica's 
2003 corporate social report - one of the major UK utility firms - in its 
Chairman's statement that: "What matters to you ... matters to us" (p. 1). 
Corporate social reports have, nowadays, gone beyond mere accountability 
artefacts to become part of the corporate communication repertoire for 
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image making and reputation building (Hooghiemstra, 2000). Even as a tool 
for accountability, it could be argued that it is possible to glimpse through 
such reports the accountability direction and stakeholder orientation of firms 
that use them. Most of these reports are designed to communicate 
messages from the management to the report receivers, who interpret the 
messages and respond in different ways (e. g. by investing in the company, 
pressing for care of the environment (Lotila, 2004: 25), amongst others. In 
other words corporate social reports could be seen as embodiments of 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns of firms that produce them 
(Unerman, 1999/2000). To add more weight to the choice of corporate social 
reports as sources of data for this study, it has been found that both the UK 
and Germany have "... very high levels of sustainability reporting" (Kolk, 
2003: 283). 
However, the study relies only on hardcopies of such corporate social 
reports. Whilst recognising the growing trend and shift in corporate practice 
towards web-based reporting the study avoids using web reports for the 
following reasons: 
" Web-based corporate social reports are significantly different from 
hardcopies and often appear to offer inferior outputs (i. e. in terms of 
quality - e. g. some pictures/graphics are likely to be blurred) compared to 
hardcopies, even when printed. 
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" The hard copies as arranged and packaged by the companies are 
significantly different compared to internet copies 
9 The quality of a photograph and other visual symbols, for instance, is also 
implicated in the type and texture of the material in which they are 
printed. This materiality, which in most cases carry with it the image and 
identity of the producing firm, is usually lost on the internet and when 
printed from the internet; this idea of corporate image and identity 
embedded in the materiality of corporate documents was re-iterated in 
one of the researcher's informal conversations with a senior member of a 
Fortune Global 500 organisation involved in the production of corporate 
social reports. According to this executive, most corporate reports and 
documents - corporate social reports, inclusive - have to meet certain 
specified criteria/ standards set by the corporate communication 
department of the firm, which comes across as a standard corporate 
communication practice to ensure harmonisation of corporate image and 
identity (Melewar and Saunders, 2000; Melewar, 2003; van den Bosch et 
al., 2004; Collin, Lee and Gilmore, 2004) 
" Hardcopies of corporate documents abide longer than internet copies. 
They offer a lot more visual flexibilities than internet copies. For instance, 
they can be easily flipped over, turned, rotated and examined from 
different angles and positions. These functionalities are very much 
reduced on the internet 
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" Hardcopies of corporate social reports are also more easily amenable to 
`manual' content analysis in the absence of any electronic aid, as is the 
case in this research study. 
6.3: Sampling of firms for the research study 
The study draws from corporate social reports produced by UK and German 
firms from 2000 to 2005. The firms chosen for the study are selected 
systematically to minimise bias in the research data. Some of these biases 
include company size, country/ region, listing status and industry, which 
previous studies had sought to control for as well (for example, see: Meek et 
al., 1995; Gamble et al., 1996; Griffin and Weber, 2006). To eliminate bias 
associated with size, profitability and global reach of firms, a list of top UK 
and German firms is drawn from the 2006 edition of Fortune Global 500 
companies list. The use of Fortune Global 500 list and similar lists as selection 
indices and empirical sites is well established in the literature (e. g. Jose and 
Lee, 2007; Kolk, 2003). The Fortune Global 500 is a ranking of the top 500 
corporations worldwide as measured by revenue - which generally includes 
revenues from discontinued operations when revenues are reported on a 
consolidated basis; after-tax profits, assets, stockholders' equity, market 
value, and earnings per share of each company; as well as company's total 
return to investors, which considers the price appreciation and reinvested 
dividends of the most widely held or actively traded class of each company's 
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stock's. The list is compiled and published annually by Fortune magazine. In 
the case of this research study, the list provided a means to set a boundary 
around the population drawn from. 
The list produced thirty eight (38) UK firms and thirty five (35) German 
companies. Seventy three (73) firms were contacted for hardcopies of their 
social, environmental and sustainability reportst6 from 1994 to 20o6, in the 
first instance. This was to enable the research to have a broader historical 
window to capture the possible dynamics of corporate stakeholder salience 
reflected through corporate social reports over time. However, majority of 
the companies, especially the German firms, did not have social reports prior 
to 2000 and where they did, they had run out of copies to send out and all 
attempts (including follow-up emails and phone calls) to secure such 
hardcopies failed. The list was further narrowed down to reports from 2000 
to 2oo6 to increase the number as shown in Table A in the appendix section. 
'Shttp: //www. streetauthority. com/terms/f/fortune-soo. aso and 
h wikipedia org/wiki/Fortune_5oo accessed September 09,2007 
16 The researcher included any other reports (e. g. personnel reports produced by 
some German firms) under the broad category of social reports as earlier defined in 
the introduction section of this paper. German firms have a practice of producing 
personnel reports and social reports separating. In such instances, these reports 
were merged in line with Ullmann's recommendation to focus on the "... reports' 
content... rather than the label put on them" (Ullmann, 1979: 126) 
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Following this, the researcher further narrowed down the selection based on 
industry. This is mainly to reduce biases that could arise from industry 
differences, as it has been argued that corporate social responsibility varies 
from sector to sector (Griff in and Weber, 2oo6). Finally and after a matching 
process of availability of social reports across sectors in UK and Germany, the 
following sectors were randomly chosen in alphabetical order: Aviation, 
Financial Services and Utilities in order to control for extraneous variations as 
much as possible so that identified variations between sectors could be 
pinned down to differences in national institutional contexts. For instance, 
the firms in the aviation sector are in similar business. They are also 
privatised national carriers of UK and Germany, respectively. It could be 
argued that the companies dominate the airline industry in the respective 
countries. They are also listed on the Fortune Global 500 companies in the 
period covered by this study. 
6.4: Data collation and varieties of media disclosures of 
stakeholder salience 
There is a rich literature on what firms disclose in their social reports and the 
manner they represent these disclosures - e. g. in terms of narratives, visuals, 
graphs and quantities - (Gray, 2002; Gray et al., 1995a, b; Unerman, 2000). 
Text and narrative disclosures are prominent in the extant literature 
leveraging content analytical method. The use of words as units of analysis, 
for example, has been employed by a number of studies (see for example 
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Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 
2ooo; Campbell, 2003; Hartman et al., 2007). Some of these work on the 
assumption that "... words are the smallest unit of measurement for analysis 
and can be expected to provide the maximum robustness in assessing the 
quantity of disclosure" (Wilmshurst and Frost, 20oo: 16) and simultaneously 
tend to suggest that "... by counting words, which are the smallest possible 
units of analysis, maximum robustness to error in calculating quantity is 
achieved" (Deegan and Gordon, 1996: 189). These orientations and 
assumptions towards words, as texts, are also extended to other text 
formats such as sentences (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Gray et al., 1995b; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Williams and Pei, 1999; Milne and Adler, 1999) and 
paragraphs (Guthrie, Petty and Yongvanich, 2004) and pages of documents 
(Trotman, 1979; Guthrie, 1982). Whilst these orientations and assumptions 
offer some pragmatic empirical value, the over reliance on texts expressed 
through words, sentences, paragraphs and pages, amongst others, in 
content analysis of documents have been critiqued to often tend to restrict 
attention to these and at the same time distract attention from other useful 
textual formats such as photographs and images. The marginalisation of 
photographs and images, for instance, as units of content analysis has been 
in recent times identified as one of the major drawbacks in the literature 
(Milne and Alder, 1999; Unerman, 2000). Photographs, for instance, and 
other forms of textualisation are claimed to be complements - as opposed to 
alternates - and realise their meanings and messages in conjunction with one 
another (Unerman, 2o0o; Frost and Wilmshurst, 2000; Preston and Young, 
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zooo; Guthrie, Petty and Yongvanich, 2004; Guthey and Jackson, 2005; 
Davison, 2007). 
However, unlike most of these studies which tend to focus exclusively on 
textual or narrative disclosures and structure of the report, this research 
study also includes a focus on pictures and charts contained in these reports, 
which often are marginalised in such studies (Unerman, 2000). Continuing, 
Unerman (20oo) argues: 
A strong argument against measuring CSR in terms of numbers of 
characters, words or sentences is that this will result in any non- 
narrative CSR disclosures (such as photographs or charts) being 
ignored. Any unit of measurement which cannot take account of 
graphs, charts or photographs will omit from the CSR study these 
potentially powerful and highly effective methods of communication 
(Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1994; Preston et al., 1996). It could even be 
argued that photographs are sometimes a more powerful tool in CSR 
than narrative disclosures for stakeholders who do not have either 
the time or inclination to read every word in the annual report and 
just flick through it, looking at the pictures and possibly reading the 
chairman's statement. As one of the main assumptions behind the 
use of quantitative content analysis as an empirical research tool is 
that volume of disclosure signifies the importance of a disclosure 
(Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; Krippendorff, 1980; Neu 
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et al., 1998), it seems incongruous to omit counting the volume of 
disclosure allocated to anything other than words and numbers. 
It is expected that the pictures and charts contained in these reports are not 
used arbitrarily by these firms and as such are intended to communicate to 
some `targeted' audience. This further suggests that it could be deceptive to 
isolate these data sources as each of them could be used towards some 
stakeholders and not all. This thinking could also be inferred from the 
different functions of different parts of annual reports - "the cover of an 
annual report often begins the theme, which will be carried throughout the 
narrative, even in the executive letter to shareholders and CEO photograph. 
With familiar products, the signs used on the cover may tap rich cultural 
meanings. For example, the sign of the traditional Coke bottle is part of the 
theme of past, present, and future used in the Coca-Cola 1996 annual report 
and on the cover of the 1997 annual report and resonates with most 
audiences who recall pleasant interludes of relaxing with a Coke. " (David, 
2001: 2o8). In addition, the shortcomings of each of the data sources is 
minimised and their predictive robustness enhanced when they are 
combined. In a similar understanding of the relevance of photographs in 
corporate reports, Anderson and Imperia wrote: 
"Photography in a firm's annual report serves a number of 
purposes. Pictures are the best way to show stockholders what 
the company's plants, products, employees, customers, and 
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managers look like (Beveridge, 1963: 18o-181). Quality photographs 
help personalize what otherwise might be seen as an impersonal 
entity (Rivelli, 1984) and project images to tell a story far more 
memorable than any text or chart (Hershman and Knecht, 1981)" 
(Anderson and Imperia, 1992: »4) 
Still on the relevance of photographs in corporate communication and from a 
practitioner's perspective, the RWE Group - one of the major utility firms in 
Germany - stated in its 2004 Personnel Report that: "Pictures are the perfect 
way to describe the RWE Group's diversity in people and individual activity" 
(p. 2). In addition, "narratives are giving way to pictorial forms, with an 
increasing emphasis on product-related matters designed to influence 
stakeholders" (Stanton and Stanton, 2002: 479) and according to Sid Cato, 
the annual report is "the ultimate edited statement of how a company 
wishes to be perceived. The annual report is a corporate Rorschach test" 
(quoted in Gallant, 1988: 68) (quoted in Anderson and Imperia, 1992: 114). 
The use of photography and other visual artefacts in social research has 
blossomed in such areas as visual sociology and anthropology as well as in 
social psychology. Although photography as a source of research data has 
been around in the social sciences for more than 5 decades, it is still at the 
periphery in management and organisational studies (Guthey and Jackson, 
2005; Preston and Young, 2000). This seeming lack of attention to 
photography and the visual as sources of research data in management and 
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organisational studies shows the attraction of management and 
organisational studies scholars towards textualised data (Preston et al., 
1996). However, it has been argued and emphasised that photographs offer 
rich perspectives to understanding reality, including organisational practices, 
by providing `a large stock of knowledge about everyday life in organizations' 
(Strati, 2000: 54). 
Photography and the visuals as sources of empirical data are gradually 
penetrating management and organisational studies research. This sort of 
data collection method is beginning to find expressions in such fields as 
accounting and marketing. Goffman (1979), for instance, examined the use of 
photographs in annual reports to reflect gender issues in the workplace. 
Building on Goffman (1979) and using photographs as well, Dougherty and 
Kunda (1991) studied 5 American-based computer firms and how they 
represented their relationships with their customers in visuals. In a similar 
direction, Anderson and Imperia (1992) leveraged photographs to 
comparatively analyse the visual representations of men and women in 
corporate annual reports. The growing trend in the use of photographs, and 
other visual artefacts, in the study of management and organisational studies 
is in emerging recognition of the `centrality of photographs to the project of 
corporate legitimization' (Guthey and Jackson, 2005: 1065). Preston et al. 
(1996) suggest three different `ways of seeing' that could inform analysis of 
organisations and organisational practices in photographs and other visual 
media. According to them, 
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... The first way of seeing... 
is premised upon the notion that 
images are a transparent medium of communication through 
which corporations send messages to investors and the public. 
The second way of seeing is concerned with decoding deeply 
embedded social significances brought to the image by the 
photographer/designer as well as the viewing subject.... A final 
way of seeing recognizes the multiple, contradictory, shifting, and 
equivocal meanings that the designer and viewing subject may 
bring to pictures... (p. 115) 
Drawing from van Leeuwen and Jewitt (zoo6: 4)'s Handbook of Visual 
Analysis, the first way of seeing suggested above by Preston et al., could be 
aptly described as the use of photography as repository of records while the 
other two ways of seeing represent photography as a means of social 
construction. The few instances in which photography has been used in 
management and organisational studies have employed mixed research 
methodologies, which could be either quantitative, qualitative of both in 
some cases. In other words, the `way of seeing' adopted in a case would be 
influenced by the epistemological bent of both the research and the 
researcher. While accepting that the three ways could be used to the 
researchers' methodological inclinations, the first `way of seeing', according 
to Preston et al. (1996), could be argued to have greater tendency of lending 
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itself easily to quantitative methodologies than the other two, which are 
more adaptable to qualitative and interpretative methodologies, in stead. 
Given the interest in pictures and graphics, together with interests in words, 
sentences and paragraphs and pages, as units of analysis, this research study 
ensures that hardcopies of corporate social reports were obtained from the 
firms included in this study. With regards to the textual analysis performed, 
the study focused mainly on the analysis of texts contained in Chairmen 
Statements and or any other Statements from Management and also on 
texts associated with photographs and other graphic symbols included in the 
study. The robustness of this combination of pictures, texts from Chairmen 
Statements and graphs is aptly supported by Unerman (2000) who argued 
that "... photographs are sometimes a more powerful tool in CSR than 
narrative disclosures for stakeholders who do not have either the time or 
inclination to read every word in the annual report and just flick through it, 
looking at the pictures and possibly reading the chairman's statement" 
(p. 675). The firms resulting from the matching process generated a 
cumulative total of three thousand eight hundred and twenty two (3,822) 
pages of corporate social reports, which yielded one hundred and twenty five 
(125) pages of chairman statements, one thousand eight hundred and thirty 
three (1,833) number of graphics and two thousand nine hundred and eighty 
six (2,986) images. Each of these data units, together with their associated 
frequency of disclosure, serves as an index of corporate stakeholder salience 
since like most studies on social and environmental reporting (e. g. Jose and 
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Lee, 2007; Cormier et al., 2005; Belal, 2002; Ball et al., 2000; Unerman, 2000; 
Gray, 1998; Gray et al., 1995a, b), the volume of disclosure signifies the 
importance of a disclosure (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; 
Krippendorff, 1980; Neu et al., 1998) - see previous chapters for details on 
the epistemology and ontology of content analysis and its relevance for this 
study. 
6.5: Development of coding scheme for data collation 
As typical of content analytical method, the research study develops a coding 
guide to drive collation of data. The guide is presented in the appendix (Table 
B). It lists criteria for interpreting the units of analysis including pictures, 
charts and texts. These units of analysis were related to each of the 
stakeholder groups chosen for the study with the criteria presented in the 
appendix. The development of the coding scheme ensured that the two 
following important conditions are met: (1) construct validity and (2) scale 
reliability of the coding scheme. 
6.5.1: Construct Validity of empirical data coding schemes 
The major construct of concern of this research study is `stakeholder 
salience'. The concern here is not with the definition of the stakeholder 
construct - which has been eloquently addressed in the literature (see 
literature review section) - but more to do with operationalising the 
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construct and capturing it through corporate social reports. Here, again, 
corporate social reports are articulated both as communicative and 
accountability arfetacts and as such, they communicate and reflect 
accountability to different constituent stakeholder groups. The key word 
here is the ability of corporate social reports to reflect or signal stakeholder 
salience (and accountability) as opposed to whether that happens in practice 
or not. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that this research study is more 
interested in how the firms represent their stakeholder salience as opposed 
to what they do in practice. Operationally, therefore, in this study, 
stakeholder salience is defined as the importance accorded to each 
stakeholder group by the reporting firms, through their corporate social 
reports. This importance (i. e. salience) is gauged by the frequency of 
representation through the major communication media of a textual report - 
i. e. images, graphics, and texts (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; 
Krippendorff, 198o; Neu et al., 1998; Unerman, zooo). The idea of measuring 
importance through frequency of representation is core to the content 
analytic method (Unerman, 20oo; Bell, 2006). It is primarily based on the 
theory of association of ideas and the principle that the more an artefact is 
presented or mentioned, the more likely that people would associate the 
artefact to the presenting medium. This understanding has gained a 
meaningful currency in such disciplines as marketing, advertising, corporate 
communications as well as psychology and accounting. 
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In their study of environmental reporting practices of a sample of 20 
Australian companies which were subject to successful prosecution by the 
New South Wales, and Victorian Environmental Protection Authorities, during 
the period 1990-1993, for example, Deegan and Rankin (1996: 50) found that 
11 ... the amount of positive environmental information significantly 
outweighed the negative environmental information presented", which 
"... raises issues as to whether information about a proven environmental 
offence is "material" to account users and, if so, whether financial 
statements could be construed as being misleading in the absence of such 
information" (emphasis, mine). In a similar vein, Hyland (1998: 224) explores 
how CEOs attempt to influence readers and project a positive personal and 
corporate image in company annual reports, by comparing the frequency and 
distribution of metadiscourse in CEOs' letters and directors' reports taken 
from the same annual reports. There is also a link between frequency and 
memory recall (Newell and Henderson, 1998; Hyun, 2003). Newell and 
Henderson (1998)'s study, for instance, investigates the effects of length, 
frequency and pod placement on advertising recall in a non-laboratory 
setting and concluded that length and frequency positively and significantly 
influence advertisement recall. Notwithstanding the link between frequency 
and importance can be mediated by other factors including attention 
(Mackenzie, 1986) and cultural differences (Pornpitakpan, 2004). The 
dominant view adopted in this study is that frequency of representations of 
any stakeholder group in corporate social reports is designed to signal 
stakeholder importance (salience); and as such, the validity of the coding 
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scheme is, therefore, implicated in the ability of the coding scheme to 
capture these frequencies of representations of specific stakeholder groups 
as signalled through corporate social reports. 
Cronbach and Meehl (1955) identified four types of validity studies: predictive 
validity, concurrent validity, content validity, and construct validity. On one 
hand, Cronbach and Meehl (1955: 282) consider the first two together as 
criterion-oriented validation procedures where "... the investigator is 
primarily interested in some criterion which he wishes to predict. He 
administers the test, obtains an independent criterion measure on the same 
subjects, and computes a correlation. If the criterion is obtained some time 
after the test is given, he is studying predictive validity. If the test score and 
criterion score are determined at essentially the same time, he is studying 
concurrent validity" (emphasis in original). On the other hand, they argue that 
content validity "... is established by showing that the test items are a sample 
of a universe in which the investigator is interested. Content validity is 
ordinarily to be established deductively, by defining a universe of items and 
sampling systematically within this universe to establish the test". Broadly 
speaking, then, construct validity "pertains to the degree of correspondence 
between constructs and their measures" (Peter, 1981: 133). It is "... the extent 
to which an operationalization measures the construct it is supposed to 
measure" (Pennings and Smidts, 2000: 1338); and it is "... ordinarily studied 
when the tester has no definite criterion measure of the quality with which 
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he is concerned, and must use indirect measures" (Cronbach and Meehl, 
1955: 282)- 
The literature is fraught with so many labels and discussions of validity types 
(Brackett and Mayer, 2003) that lie way beyond the scope of this study. Given 
the nature of the research question of this study and the absence of any prior 
existing scales for measuring stakeholder salience, especially as signalled 
through corporate social reports, the test for construct validity is considered 
to be most appropriate of the four type of validity studies list above for this 
research study. The establishment of construct validity is basically to ensure 
that what would be coded for in corporate social reports truly captures the 
essence of stakeholder salience in these reports. Given that the research 
study is mainly interested in the representation of stakeholder salience in 
corporate social reports, it systematically relied on face validity technique to 
confirm construct validity. In order to ascertain the construct validity of the 
coding scheme, it was written up and sent to 1o leading scholars in social 
accounting, corporate social responsibility and stakeholder management in 
Europe and North America - first, because corporate social reporting and 
research are prominent in these two continents and second, because the 
study focuses on European institutional contexts. It was also informally 
discussed with practitioners in corporate communications functions, and 
specifically where such functions have significant corporate social 
responsibility and or stakeholder engagement activities, at conferences, 
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private meetings and other similar gatherings. This was mainly to test for the 
face-validity of the coding instrument'. 
6.5.2: Reliability (Inter-coder reliability) of empirical data coding schemes 
Reliability is complementary to construct validity in social science studies. It 
basically seeks to ascertain how consistent a scale is in measuring what it 
purports to measure (Watson et al., 1988). In line with the demands of the 
content analysis methodology, the study conducted series of coding 
reliability checks. According to Lombard et al (2002: 589), "Intercoder 
reliability is the widely used term for the extent to which independent coders 
evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same 
conclusion. " This is to ensure that the coding instrument is consistent with 
its measurement objectives. The reliability check was conducted at different 
intervals in the coding process. In the first instance, the researcher engaged 
another graduate research student who has experience of conducting 
content analysis of this nature at the earliest stage of the coding process. The 
° Both scholars and practitioners provided very positive and useful feedback. For 
instance one of the scholars wrote back: "i think it is a neat idea and you should try 
to publish it" (North American Scholar, email) and another wrote: "I have had a 
chance to quickly go through your paper. The methodology looks very interesting 
and innovative" (European Scholar, email). And a practitioner came back with this 
feedback. "Your research sounds very interesting! " (Practitioner, email - June 8, 
2007). 
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research student randomly selected from the data coded by the pilot phase 
of this study. The coded results from this were compared to data from same 
coded social reports for the pilot phase of this research. Although Pi (it) 
coefficient analysis would have been appropriate for inter-coder reliability 
analysis between two coders (Krippendorff, 2004; Krippendorff, 2007 - July 
23,2007 personal email to the author), the comparison was based on 
Krippendorff a and not Pi (tt), given the small sample size involved. This is an 
appropriate measure in this case because according to Krippendorff 
(2004: 419): 
Pi (n) and a differ in one respect: in the factor n/(n-1), which is 
recognizable in a and not in r. Here, n is the total number of 
categories used to describe all units by all coders. This factor corrects 
a for the effects of small sample sizes and few coders. Numerically, a 
exceeds 7t by (1- it)/n. As sample sizes increase, the factor n/(n-1) 
converges to 1, the difference (1- ir)/n disappears, and it and a 
become asymptotically indistinguishable (Krippendorff, 2004: 419). 
In addition, Krippendorff a is much more suited to ratio scales than pi (it). In 
a personal email exchange with the researcher, Krippendorff (2007) wrote: 
I should like to say that the "number of photographs" does not 
constitute a nominal scale. Pi (Tr) would not be powerful enough to 
capture agreements due to what is in fact a ratio scale. The a for the 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 2o8 of 438 
ratio metric would be appropriate in this case (Krippendorff, 2007 - 
July 23,2007 personal email to researcher). 
The inter-coder reliability analysis involved all the thirty-two (32) variables 
coded for (see Data Coding and Analysis section below). The comparison 
yielded inter-coder reliability coefficient indices along the different variables 
as shown in the table below. These indices were computed with the PRAM 
(Program for Reliability Assessment with Multiple Coders) software - version 
0.4.518 - and adjustments made to the Pi (zr) figures to derive Krippendorff 
coefficients. Areas of disagreements in the two coding results were as a 
result of coder oversight and subjective interpretations of photographs, 
which were further resolved by the researcher/graduate student. 
Table 6-o-i: Inter-coder Reliability Table 
Variables 
Coder Pair 
(1,2) Pi (n) (1- zt)/n Alpha (a) 
Year 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Document pages 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Photos (total) 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Graphics (total) 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Logos 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
18 http: lLwww. geocities. com/skymegsoftware/pram. htmi visited July 23,2007 
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Variables 
Coder Pair 
(i, 2) Pi (n) (1- n)/n Alpha (a) 
Logos within o. 81 o. 81 0.01 o. 82 
Signatures 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Chairman Statement -Pages 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Chairman Statement-paragraphs o. 85 0.85 0.01 0.86 
Employee photos o. 86 0.86 0.01 0.87 
Networks photos o. 86 0.86 0.01 0.87 
Shareholders photos o. 81 0.81 0.01 o. 82 
Environment photos o. 88 0.88 0.01 0.89 
Community photos o. 86 0.86 0.01 0.87 
Consumers photos 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Management Photos o. 88 0.88 0.01 0.89 
Employee graphics o. 82 o. 82 0.01 0.83 
Networks graphics 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Shareholders graphics o. 87 0.87 0.01 0.87 
Environment graphics o. 88 0.88 0.01 0.89 
Community graphics 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Consumers graphics 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Management graphics o. 85 0.85 0.01 0.86 
Chairman Statement -employees o. 86 0.86 0.01 0.87 
Chairman Statement -Networks 0.84 0.84 0.01 0.85 
Chairman Statement -shareholders 0.88 0.88 0.01 0.89 
Chairman Statement -environment o. 88 0.88 0.01 0.89 
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Variables 
Coder Pair 
(1,2) Pi (n) (1- n)/n Alpha (a) 
Chairman Statement -community o. 86 0.86 0.01 0.87 
Chairman Statement -consumers o. 85 0.85 0.01 0.85 
Chairman Statement -management o. 88 0.88 0.01 0.89 
Average 0.91 0.91 0.00 
Another inter-coder reliability analysis was conducted at the final phase of 
the coding process. Given the likelihood of the researcher's coding changing 
over time due to new insights from the coding experience (Riffe et al., 2005; 
Lombard et al., 2002), the researcher recoded a randomly selected sample of 
earlier coded reports for some reliability check. The second inter-coder 
reliability analysis and the researcher's self recoding analysis, yielded overall 
reliability coefficient of . 95 and . 94, respectively. Although there are no 
established standards for determining what constitutes an acceptable level 
of reliability (Lombard et al., 2002), "... coefficients of go or greater would 
be acceptable to all, . 80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations, 
and below that, there exists great disagreement" (Neuendorf, 2002: 145). In 
this regard, it is appropriate to conclude that both indices are very high, 
which therefore shows that the coding instrument was consistently 
deployed. 
0.91 
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6.6: Coding and Analyses of Empirical Data 
In all, the corporate social reports of the firms used in this study from 2000 to 
20o6 - which resulted to a total of three thousand eight hundred and twenty 
two pages of report (3,822) - generated a cumulative total of two thousand 
nine hundred and eighty six (2,986) images, one thousand eight hundred and 
thirty three (1,833) graphics, and one hundred and twenty five (125) pages of 
Chairman (management) Statement (CS) and eight hundred and seventy two 
(872) paragraphs of these Chairmen (management) Statements. A country 
breakdown of these figures is presented in table 2. 
Table 6-0-2: Country Breakdown of data sources" 
Report Number of Number of Pages of CS 
Pages Images graphics CS paragraphs 
UK 
Aviation 196 97 226 6 60 
Financial services 618 792 366 26 208 
Utilities 460 329 242 24 192 
Total 1,274 1,218 834 56 460 
Germany 
Aviation 531 691 299 » 86 
Financial Services 1,088 521 316 33 217 
'9 For breakdown of number of observations per firm-year, see appendix (p. 355) 
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Utilities 929 556 384 25 109 
Total 2,548 1,768 999 69 412 
Grand Total 3,822 2,986 1,833 125 872 
The identified corporate social reports were then rigorously coded page to 
page, image to image; graphics to graphics and paragraphs to paragraphs, 
based on the criteria provided in the appendix and along 32 variables (see 
table 6.3 below). In other words, each corporate social report was content 
analysed 32 times for each of the variables below. The coding was done 
manually since the study is based on hardcopies of social reports. Moreover, 
some of the popular qualitative coding computer packages, like the NVivo, 
are not easily compatible with the data coding and collection process chosen 
by this study. And it took approximately 8 month-man-hour for an individual 
researcher to manually code these social reports along the chosen variables. 
Table 6-0-3: 32 Variables coded for in each of the social reports 
1. Company 2. Signatures 3. Consumers 4. Management graphics 
photos 
5. Country 6. Pages of Chairman 7. Management 8. Employees in Chairman 
(management) Photos (management) Statement 
Statement 
9. Year 1o. Paragraphs within 11. Employee 12. Alliances in Chairman 
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Chairman graphics (management) Statement 
(management) 
Statement 
13. Doc-pages 14. Employee photos 15. Alliance 16. Shareholders in Chairman 
graphics (management) Statement 
17. Photos (total) 18. Alliance photos 19. Shareholders 20. Environment in Chairman 
21. Graphics (total) 22. Shareholders 
photos 
25. Standalone 
Logos 
26. Environment 
photos 
graphics (management) Statement 
23. Environment 24. Community in Chairman 
graphics (management) Statement 
27. Community 28. Consumers in Chairman 
graphics (management) Statement 
29. Logos within 30. Community photos 31. Consumers 32. Management in Chairman 
pictures graphics (management) Statement 
Coding the data was just a first step in the series of other analytical steps. 
Due to the complexity involved in unpacking the infinite web of possible 
stakeholders, the research study limited its enquiry to the conventional 
stakeholder groups often mentioned in the literature - employees, suppliers, 
investors (shareholders), local community, the environment and 
management. The research study acknowledges that special attention could 
likely be paid more to the environment and local communities than any other 
stakeholder groups, since these are usually the focus of social and 
environmental reports. The study factors-in this understanding in the data 
analysis. It also recognises that pages of reports, number of pictures and 
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graphics contained in each could be another source of bias to the outcome of 
the study. In order to mitigate this, data generated were harmonised (ratio- 
ed) to ensure comparable analysis (see the next chapter for details of this 
data harmonisation process). The use of data ratios in this format is 
recognised in the literature. Riffe et al. (2005: 84), for instance, explain: 
In some situations, ratio data can be created from a nominal 
classification system when the ratio of units in some category to 
all units is calculated. For example, Beam (2003) studied whether 
content differed between groups of newspapers with strong and 
weak marketing orientation. Beam classified content units (self- 
contained units that could be understood independently of other 
content on the page) into a variety of categories for topic and type 
of item. Beam then calculated the percentage of content units 
within the various categories (e. g., content about government or 
the "public sphere") and compared the percentages for strong 
market-oriented newspapers with the percentages of weak 
market-oriented newspapers. This transformation of nominal data 
to ratio data was used because the number of content units varies 
from newspaper to newspaper, usually based on circulation size. A 
ratio measure allows one to compare relative emphasis regardless 
of number of units. .... One advantage of using ratio-level 
measures with content analysis is that they allow the use of more 
sophisticated statistical procedures. 
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It is also important to note that a single picture can yield more than one 
outcome of a dominant stakeholder theme - for instance a picture could 
both be interpreted as signalling employees and suppliers, respectively. A 
good example of this is the case of a photograph used by Commerbank on 
the cover page of its 2005 report - reproduced below, which could be coded 
for the following stakeholder groups: shareholders (because it uses 
monetary representation), the environment, employees and the society 
(because it symbolises these other stakeholder groups, albeit wrapped in 
monetary representations). Given that photographs could covey multiple 
meanings, these differences were taken into consideration during the coding 
process. Commenting on this approach, Riffe et al. (2005: 67) wrote: 
Because of the shared meaning of so many commonly used 
words, written text may in effect provide within-message cues 
that can serve to reduce ambiguity ... (however)... visual 
communication can create analysis problems because of 
ambiguities that are not easily resolved from within the 
message itself. For instance, a text description of someone can 
easily reveal age with a number: John Smith is 35. A visual 
representation of that same person becomes much more 
vague. 
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In such instances and to overcome the difficulties of data ambiguity, the 
study follows the firm's signals of salience, either as expressed in texts, 
visuals or combination of both (Collier, 2006; Lister and Wells, 2oo6; Bell, 
zoo6). 
Figure 6-0-1: Example of Multiple Stakeholder Representations in 
Photographs 
COMMERZBANK 
W 
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Commerzbank (2005) 
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6.7: Advancing research study validity and reliability through data 
analysis and methodological triangulations 
Triangulation is employed in order to further enhance the validity and 
reliability of the expected outcomes of the research study. Denzin (1978: 291) 
provides a broad definition of triangulation as "... the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon". Triangulation is a 
research methodology metaphor that owes its origin to navigation and 
military science, which depend on multiple reference points to locate an 
object's exact position (Jick, 1979). Its application in the social sciences is 
traceable to Campbell and Fiske (1959) who argued that "... more than one 
method should be used in the validation process to ensure that the variance 
reflected that of the trait and not of the method" (Jick, 1979: 602). In other 
words, the convergence or agreement between two methods "... enhances 
our belief that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact" 
(Bouchard, 1976: 268). 
The research study triangulated on both data collation methods and data 
analysis techniques, which enables the research study to further test for 
internal consistency (reliability of the data sources) and external validity of 
same, respectively (Dick, 1979). The data collation methods triangulated are 
(1) content analysis of social reports (primary data source) and (2) survey of 
firms (secondary data source). And the data analysis techniques triangulated 
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are (1) correspondence analysis, (2) chi-square statistic and (3) multivariate 
analysis of variance, as illustrated in the table below. Although detailed 
descriptions and rationales for each of these techniques are offered in the 
next chapter, it is expected that "... the weakness in each single method will 
be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another" (Jick, 
1979: 604) 
Table 6-0-4: Statistical Methods Triangulated 
Correspondence Chi-square Multivariate 
Analysis statistic Analysis of 
Variance 
Content analysis of 
Fortune Global 500 
Q Q Q 
corporate social reports 
Survey of Fortune Global Q Q Q 
500 firms 
As already stated, the primary data source of this research study is corporate 
social reports. In order to further substantiate the validity of data drawn from 
corporate social reports, the researcher administered an online survey to all 
the 73 firms in the sample frame, which basically asked them to simply rank 
the identified stakeholders used in the study in their order of importance (i. e. 
salience) to the firms - through a forced ranking order. A sample of the 
online survey questionnaire is presented in the appendix section of this 
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thesis. The idea behind this forced ranking order is to identify possible 
patterns of stakeholder salience in the different institutional and sectoral 
contexts and see how they compare to those generated from corporate 
social reports. Similarity in patterns will confirm the validity of both sources 
of data while dissimilarity may either suggest low validity and or suggest 
incongruence between corporate `talk' (survey) and `text' (corporate social 
reports) (Dore, 2000). 
The online survey was emailed to senior executives of all the 73 firms (38 UK 
and 35 German firms) in our sample, who are involved in corporate social 
responsibility, governance and or accountability, to further enhance and 
augment the robustness of the conclusions reached from the corporate 
social report data of the 3 main sectors of the study - Aviation, Finance and 
Utilities. The table below shows the response rate of the online survey. The 
survey recorded a total response rate of 61% (63% and 57% for UK and 
Germany, respectively). Attempts to get Lufthansa and British Airways to 
respond to the survey, unfortunately failed. As a result, there is no 
representation of the Aviation sector in the online survey data. However, this 
lack does not significantly subtract from the aims and objectives of the study 
as data from Other Sectors adequately compensate for those of Aviation 
sector. Moreover, the initial 3 sectors were randomly selected, which - 
following basic statistical principles - suggests that the behavioural 
characteristics of the other sectors should at least be able to reflect the 
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general characteristics of the population they are drawn from (Hair et al., 
2005). 
Table 6-0-5: Online Survey Response Rate 
Finance Utilities Others 
Germany 35 12 
United Kingdom 26 16 
Total 5 11 28 
Total and Response Rate (q) 
20(577-) 
24 (63%) 
44 (61%) 
With regard to triangulation of data analysis techniques, the research study 
first started with correspondence analysis. Once it established possible 
stakeholder salience patterns, it then ran simple chi-square to test for the 
extent of interdependency between emerging stakeholder salience patterns, 
national and sectoral contexts, respectively. After that, it then ran 
multivariate analysis of variance in order to test for directional differences. 
The three data analysis techniques are applied to corporate social report data 
(as primary source of data), while only the correspondence analysis and 
multivariate analysis of variance are applied to online survey data mainly for 
validation purposes. 
6.8: Chapter Summary 
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This chapter is an application of the methodological theory of content 
analysis started in the previous chapter. The chapter has presented the data 
sources and how data were generated for this study. It has also presented 
some justifications for the choices made in both coding and analysis of data 
in line with the philosophical tenets of content analytical method. In the 
same vein it places emphasis on the triangulation of both data collation 
methods and data analysis techniques as one of the ways to enhance the 
validity and reliability of the research study outcomes. The next chapter 
reports on the data analysis and the research findings. 
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CHAPTER 7: WHO MATTERS TO UK AND GERMAN FIRMS? 
DISCERNING CORPORATE STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE PATTERNS IN UK 
AND GERMAN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
7.1: Tone setting 
This chapter mainly focuses on identifying corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns in UK and German institutional contexts. It primarily leverages data 
from corporate social reports, which are then further corroborated by data 
from online comparative stakeholder salience survey. It, first of all, starts by 
highlighting the steps taken in analysing the collated data, as well as 
highlighting the findings arising from empirical data analysis. The data 
analysis follows three major steps: (1) correspondence analysis of corporate 
stakeholder salience pattern representations across national institutions and 
sectors; (2) Pearson's chi-square statistic test of difference between groups; 
and (3) multivariate analysis of corporate stakeholder salience pattern 
variations in different contexts in the study (i. e. national institutions and 
sectors). The three data analysis methods show an interaction between 
sector level and country level data. The empirical data analysis concludes 
with a key finding of this research study that corporate stakeholder salience 
pattern is neither a product of institutional nor sectoral contexts in isolation 
of each other, but is rather an outcome of interactions between institutional 
and sectoral contexts. 
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7.2: Empirical Data Analysis: Process Overview and Findings 
The empirical data analysis is driven by the main research questions of this 
study, which could be, in a way, summarised as follows: (1) Are there 
identifiable national and organisational field patterns of corporate 
stakeholding in both UK and German institutional contexts? And (2) how and 
why do these patterns differ at the national and organisational field levels, 
respectively? A closer unpacking of these questions reinforces the duality of 
meaning embedded in them - the first part addressing the "what" issues, 
while the second part addresses the "how" and "why" issues in the 
questions. In order to provide plausible answers to these questions, the 
empirical data analysis followed a three stage process of triangulating data 
analytic techniques on data collated from two sources - (a) corporate social 
reports (major) and (b) online survey (minor). The triangulation of data 
analysis techniques is to provide more insights to address the research 
questions raised in earlier chapters and to give some robustness to the 
findings of the study. The data analytic techniques triangulated include 
correspondence analysis, descriptive statistics (Pearson's chi-square statistic) 
and multivariate analysis of variance. 
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7.2. u Correspondence Analysis 
The first stage of the data analysis process is to find out if there are any 
identifiable patterns between UK and German firms' representations of 
stakeholder salience primarily through their corporate social reports and 
secondarily through survey data. This is necessary as one of the key 
arguments of this research study is that corporate stakeholding patterns are 
not only susceptible to managerial rationality and discretion, but are also 
influenced and shaped by the attributes of the institutional contexts (meso 
and macro) in which they are embedded and enacted. In other words, this 
first leg of data analysis is expected to provide some insights towards 
establishing and understanding the relationships between institutional 
contexts, on one hand, and representations of corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns, on the other. Given the categorical nature of data collated 
for the study using content analysis of corporate social reports, in the first 
instance, and the interest in examining the relationship between institutional 
contexts and corporate stakeholding patterns, the data analytic technique 
used for this stage of analysis is correspondence analysis. 
According to Hoffman and Franke (1986: 213), correspondence analysis is 
11 ... an exploratory 
data analysis technique for the graphical display of 
contingency tables and multivariate categorical data". It is 11 ... a tool to 
analyze the association between two or more categorical variables by 
representing the categories of the variables as points in a low-dimensional 
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space. Categories with similar distributions (are) represented as points that 
are close in space, and categories that have very dissimilar distributions (are) 
positioned far apart" (Clausen, 1998: 1-2, emphasis in original). 
Correspondence analysis has its origin from the philosophical tradition of 
French social scientists (Greenacre, 1993), and has been particularly advanced 
by Benzecri (1969,1973a, b, 1992) and his colleagues. According to Clausen 
(1998: 6&8) it is mainly a technique for exploratory data analysis (and not 
necessarily a precise science), which has been popularised through the works 
of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu who applied correspondence 
analysis in several of his works - for example Bourdieu (1984,1988)" Although 
correspondence analysis could suggest possible relationships between 
variables, it is not suitable for testing levels of significance of relationships, in 
the strict and precise sense of it. The main advantage of correspondence 
analysis lies in its ability to visually represent any possible relationships 
between entities and variables in a low-dimensional space. In other words, it 
offers a quick, interpretable and insightful visual aid and platform, on which 
one could then leverage to further interrogate the data and conduct much 
more in-depth analysis of these identified possible relationships between 
variables, using other analytical techniques suitable for such analysis. 
Correspondence analysis has been argued to be very much suited for 
decoding and understanding inherent interrelationships in a matrix dataset, 
since it "... maximises the interrelationships between rows and columns of a 
data matrix in order to "reveal the structure and patterns inherent in the 
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data" (Hoffman and Franke, 1986: 213). In this regard, the choice of 
correspondence analysis in this study is not arbitrary, since one of the main 
research questions of the study is to identify possible patterns in and 
structural manifestations of corporate stakeholder salience attributable to 
the institutional contexts in which they are embedded and enacted. 
Moreover, Hoffman and Franke (1986) further make a pragmatic case for the 
use of correspondence analysis in similar analysis by arguing that: 
Much of its value relates to its multivariate treatment of the data 
through the simultaneous consideration of multiple categorical 
variables. The multivariate nature of correspondence analysis can 
reveal relationships that would not be detected in a series of 
pairwise comparisons of variables. Correspondence analysis also 
helps to show how variables are related, not just that a relationship 
exists. The joint graphical display obtained from a correspondence 
analysis can help in detecting structural relationships among the 
variable categories. Finally, correspondence analysis has highly 
flexible data requirements. The only strict data requirement for a 
correspondence analysis is a rectangular data matrix with non- 
negative entries. 
(In addition), "[A] distinct advantage of correspondence 
analysis over other methods yielding joint graphical displays is that it 
produces two dual displays whose row and column geometries have 
similar interpretations, facilitating analysis and detection of 
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relationships. In other multivariate approaches to graphical data 
representation, this duality is not present (p. 213-14) 
To support the execution of correspondence analysis in this study, firm level 
data generated from corporate social reports along the different stakeholder 
groups chosen for the study are summed up per stakeholder group to arrive 
at the industry level data - since the research is primarily interested in 
mapping stakeholder salience patterns at meso (industry) and macro 
(country) levels, respectively. This is an appropriate and acceptable social 
science research practice since there are no previously readily available 
industry level data on the corporate salience of these stakeholder groups, 
and more so in the institutional contexts used in this study (i. e. UK and 
German institutional contexts). In support of this research practice of 
aggregating micro level data to generate meso and or macro level data, 
Bourdieu - one of the foremost contemporary social scientists and a pioneer 
user of correspondence analysis as a research technique - claims that "... the 
notion of field reminds us that the true object of social science is not the 
individual, even though one cannot construct a field if not through individuals 
or institutions. It is the field which is primary and must be the focus of the 
research operations" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 107, cited in Lounsbury, 
forthcoming - emphasis, mine). The industry level data, therefore, are 
generated using the formula below: 
Ivi= E (Fv1.... Fvn) ........ 
(1) 
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Where I is the sector, vi a stakeholder group and Fa firm level data 
This summation readily applies to data extracted from corporate social report 
since these are collated from different data indices within corporate social 
reports (e. g. texts, graphics, and photographs). The combination of the 
frequencies associated with these different data elements within corporate 
social reports is theorised to signify the level of corporate stakeholder 
salience for each of the stakeholder groups in the study (see the following 
for similar theorisation of frequency of data in content analysis as a proxy for 
importance (salience): Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray et al., 1995; 
Krippendorff, 1980; Neu et al., 1998; Unerman, zooo; Bell, 2oo6). However, 
this transposition of data does not readily apply to data from online survey 
questionnaire since the respondents had to provide the rankings themselves 
and these rankings are not products of multiple combinations of data 
elements. With the data arising from firm level aggregation, a 
correspondence analysis matrix was created and the analysis was run using 
SPSS statistical software. Series of graphical representations arising from the 
data sets were generated - some of which are presented and discussed 
below. 
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Figure 7-o-1: Country-sector stakeholder salience patterns in graph 
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Cross-country comparison of representation of stakeholder salience in social reports 
Figure 7.1 above, shows distinct patterns of stakeholder salience 
representations in corporate social reports across different sectors and 
countries in our analysis. Although these patterns of corporate stakeholder 
salience are from different sectors and countries, there exist some similarities 
in the patterns. A visual analysis of the graph, for instance, shows that the 
Environment and Management stakeholder groups stand out, while 
Consumers and Community stakeholder groups appear to be less 
emphasized compared to other stakeholder groups, across industries in both 
the UK and German institutional contexts. On one hand, when arranged in 
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ranks (please see this footnote below)20 and at a surface level analysis, the 
German and UK institutional contexts appear to exhibit some sort of 
directional ranking similarity (43%) of corporate stakeholder salience profile - 
with Management and the Environment being at the top while Consumers 
appear to be the least emphasized in both economies (see table 7.1 below; 
band 6). 
Table 7-o-1: Breakdown of inter-country stakeholder salience rankings 
UK Average Germany Average Inter-country Stakeholder 
sector sector Salience Ranking 
BAND rankings rankings Concordance (%) 
1 Environment 1.7 Environment 1.7 0 
-------------------------------------------------------------- z Management 2.7 Management 2.7 2 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Community 3.7 Employees 3.0 
Networks 3.3 
Shareholders 
4 Employees 4.33 
Networks 4.7 
5 Shareholders 5 
Community 5.7 
20 It is important to note that this ranking does not internalise the intensity or 
degree of emphasis placed on the different stakeholder groups within different 
national contexts and across industries. At the moment, it is mere ordering of 
ordinal data, where differences in values (frequency data) are not strictly important. 
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UK Average Germany Average Inter-country Stakeholder 
sector sector Salience Ranking 
BAND rankings rankings Concordance (%) 
6 Consumers 6.7 Consumers 6.7 
Similarity Dissimilarity 
43 57 
This is rather a surprising outcome in the light of varieties of capitalism 
characterization of the two economies - e. g. the coordinated market 
economy being more oriented to employees than to management, at least. 
At the face level, therefore, this `snap-shot' finding could possibly suggest 
similar patterns of stakeholder salience across both economies, at least as 
reflected through corporate social reports. Following this line of thinking 
could, equally, suggest that recent and ongoing reforms of the German 
economy towards the liberal market economy model in the last 5 to 10 years 
(Bartle, 2002; Cioffi, 2002; Streek and Trampusch, 2005; Steiner and Wrohlich, 
2005) are beginning to reflect in some firm level activities, such as corporate 
social reporting. From this perspective, it is possible to suspect that 
globalization is having some harmonisation effects on German firm level 
practices, albeit at the macro level, or infer some isomorphic propensity in 
diffusion of social reporting and stakeholder salience practices across the 
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varieties of capitalism divide21. On the other hand, it could be seen from table 
7.2 below that this seeming manifestations of similar patterns of stakeholder 
salience at the country level does not equally reflect across all the sectors 
studied. While the aviation sector of both countries showed relatively high 
similarity of ranked stakeholder salience pattern (57%), the financial services 
sector showed relatively moderate stakeholder salience similarity (43%), and 
in both countries the utilities showed highest level of ranked stakeholder 
salience dissimilarity (71%). 
21 It is worthwhile to note that this suggested assertion of possible similarities in 
manifestations of corporate stakeholder salience patterns in UK and German 
institutional contexts does not primarily focus on the movement overtime between 
the two economies with regard to either their convergence or divergence. Rather, 
the emphasis here is that taking, what could be aptly described as, a `static snap- 
shop view' of the two economies (i. e. 2000 - 2005); there appear to be some 
similarities between the two countries in terms of corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns manifested in the different institutional contexts. Whether these 
suggested and possible similarities are as a result of movement overtime 
(particularly with regards to the ongoing debates in the literature on the 
convergence and or divergence of national institution, and the homogenisation of 
varieties of capitalism, mainly through the influences of globalisation) is neither 
strictly implied nor necessarily captured in this suggestion. This research study will 
engage in the dynamics of corporate stakeholder salience patterns over time in the 
two economies much later in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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Table 7-0-2: Stakeholder Salience Concordance across Countries and Sectors 
Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Germany UK 
Environment 
Management 
Shareholders 
Employees 
Networks 
Community 
Consumers 
Management 
Community 
Environment 
Employees 
Networks 
Shareholders 
Consumers 
Employees Environment 
Networks Networks 
Environment Shareholders 
Management Community 
Shareholders Management 
Community Employees 
Consumers Consumers 
Environment Environment 
Management Management 
Sector Stakeholder 
Salience Ranking 
Concordance (%) 
Similarity Dissimilarity 
l1 
0 
E1 
E1 
0 
43 57 
21 
p 
D 
0 
0 
29 71 
0 
0 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 234 of 438 
Networks Employees 
Employees Shareholders 0 
Community Community 
Consumers Consumers 
Shareholders Networks 
57 43 
Inter-country 
Stakeholder 
Salience Ranking 
Concordance(%) 
43 57 
This back of the envelope calculation, at least, shows that there are some 
differences as well as similarities between the two institutional contexts, at 
the inter-country level. Notwithstanding the seeming similarities of corporate 
stakeholder salience amongst some stakeholder groups (e. g. the 
environment, consumers and management) across national institutional 
contexts, emphasis on Shareholder and Employees stakeholder groups, for 
instance, tends to vary significantly. In addition to the Environment, 
Management and Shareholders, UK firms on one hand appear to place 
significant emphasis on Communities, while German firms on the other hand, 
appear to place significant emphasis on Employees and Networks, 
respectively (see table 7.1 on inter-country stakeholder salience ranking, 
above). These distinctive features appear much more visible through a 
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further unpacking of subsequent graphical representations of corporate 
stakeholder salience clustering patterns across sectors and institutional 
contexts, presented below. The clustering patterns on the graphs, at least, 
signal the possibility of corporate stakeholder salience of some stakeholder 
constituencies clustering closer to each other as well as around specific 
institutional contexts and industry segments. For instance, the 
representation below (Figure 7.2) suggests that corporate stakeholder 
salience of Networks and Employee stakeholder groups is likely to correlate 
positively between the pair, on one hand, while stakeholder salience of 
Consumers and Community stakeholder groups, on the other hand, is also 
likely to have some positive correlation, if one keeps institutional and sectoral 
contexts out of the equation for now. By implication, one would then 
wonder if there are institutional and sectoral contexts that would map onto 
the different clusters identified in the correspondence analysis. Any evidence 
to suggest this sort of 'stakeholder-salience-institutional-context' 
configuration would have provided a reasonable platform towards answering 
the first part of the main research question of this study: - "Are there 
identifiable national and organisational field patterns of corporate 
stakeholding in both UK and German institutional contexts? " 
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Figure 7-o-2: Visual Representation of Stakeholder Salience 
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In addition to country level differences and similarities, there are also 
possible industry differences and similarities that could emerge from the data 
represented in Figure 7.1, above. For example, UK and German Utilities show 
some similarities in the emphasis they place on the Environment and 
Networks stakeholder groups, while UK and German Financial sectors differ 
markedly in relation to Consumers and Networks stakeholder groups, 
respectively. Even within countries, there appear to be some similarities and 
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differences amongst sectors. However, when country and sector data on 
stakeholder salience pattern profiles are spatially represented as in Figure 7.3 
below, evidence from our data begin to show that the Financial Services 
sector in Germany appears to differ markedly from both the Utilities and 
Aviation sectors in their stakeholder salience patterns, while the latter are 
closer to each other. In the same vein, the UK aviation seems to differ slightly 
from both financial services and utilities, whilst the latter are closer to each 
other. A cross-country comparison shows that the UK and German financial 
services sectors are rather in opposite directions; while UK Aviation and 
Utilities, and German Aviation and Utilities are along the same axis, albeit 
without any guarantee of similarity. Most importantly, it is evident that 
corporate stakeholder salience profiles are polarised markedly according to 
institutional contexts (in this case UK vs. Germany); which strongly suggests 
that corporate stakeholder salience patterns could be reflections of the 
institutional contexts in which they are embedded and enacted. 
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Figure 7-0-3: Visual Representation of Sector Stakeholder Salience Profiles 
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In summary, then, the data analysis and interpretation so far show that there 
are, at least, identifiable patterns of corporate stakeholder salience between 
and within sectors and national institutional contexts, which are beginning to 
emerge. Amongst others, the `back-of-the-envelop' ranking shows a 
dissimilarity of 57% between corporate stakeholder salience patterns of 
German and UK institutional contexts. Relying on this information, in 
isolation, one could be led to claim that the first proposition of this research 
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study, which postulates that corporate stakeholding patterns will differ 
between German and UK national institutional contexts, is confirmed. At the 
same time too, one is cautious to reach such a conclusion because these 
differences (or dissimilarities) do not reflect uniformly across sectors - 
signalling that country level results could be confounded by sector level data. 
A further insight linked to this signal is, therefore, that there are identifiable 
industry patterns across the two institutional contexts, albeit with some 
mixed results. However, the data so far give bits and pieces of information 
and insights in line with the analytical framework of our study - i. e. the 
varieties of capitalism model. For instance, that the German firms place 
emphasis on employee stakeholder groups is in line with theory. At the same 
time, we do not know yet how these patterns in stakeholder salience could 
be accounted for by either, country level data or sector level data, or both; 
which then leads us to test for independence (or association) of country level 
and sector level data on stakeholder salience pattern seen, using the 
Pearson's chi-square statistic. 
7.2.2: Unpacking country and sector influences on corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns using chi-square statistic data analysis technique 
In addition to anticipated institutional contextualisation of corporate 
stakeholder salience, the varieties of capitalism model, on which this research 
study largely draws its theoretical framework from, postulates that the UK 
and German capitalist systems would differ to the extent that they are 
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fundamentally driven by significantly different orientations of liberal market 
and coordinated market economies, respectively. The next stage in the data 
analysis process is, therefore, to ascertain if these patterns are similar or 
different and also to figure out the strength of these similarities or 
differences, if any. However, these differences and or similarities could be 
either at the country and or sector levels. The statistical data analytic 
technique employed for this purpose is the Pearson's chi-square statistic due 
to its appropriateness for testing (mean) differences between two groups, 
especially those between categorical variables. Chi-square statistic could as 
well be used for test of independence or association between categorical 
variables. in this research, our two categorical variables are country and 
sector levels data. The chi-square statistic does not go beyond stating 
whether there is an association or not between variables, and does not 
attempt to provide any explanations as to the reasons for an association 
between variables or otherwise (Miller and Siegmund, 1982). In a nutshell, 
Chi-square is used to calculate the probability that a relationship 
found in a sample between two variables is due to chance 
(random sampling error). It does this by measuring the difference 
between the actual frequencies in each cell of a table and the 
frequencies one would expect to find if there were no relationship 
between the variables in the population from which the (simple 
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random) sample has been drawn. The larger these differences 
are, the less likely it is that they occurred by chance22. 
The data sets generated from corporate social reports were then subjected 
to Pearson's chi-square statistic test using the same SPSS statistical software. 
And the results of the test are presented in the tables, below. The Pearson 
Chi-Square test is to confirm if there is any interdependency between 
institutional and sectoral contexts data; while the contingency coefficient 
outcome is to find out the strength or degree of interdependency between 
the institutional and sectoral contexts, if any: 
Table 7-0-3: Chi-Square 
Tests Result Table 
ao cells ( o%) have expected 
count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 30.60. 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1956.302(a) 30 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 2027.790 30 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
2.891 1 . o89 Association 
N of Valid Cases 11373 
22 
htt_p_1/www. csupomona. edu/-ilkorey/POWERMUTTlIopicsLcontingency tables html 
visited August 20,2007 
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Table 7-0-4: Symmetric Measures 
Asymp. 
Std. Approx Approx. 
Value Error(a) . T(b) Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency 
"383 . 000 Coefficient 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -. 016 . 009 -1.700 . o89(c) 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -. 022 . 009 -2.341 . 019(c) 
N of Valid Cases 11373 
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c Based on normal approximation. 
As anticipated, the Pearson chi-square test confirms an association between 
sector and country in accounting for identified corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns at a significant level of p<o. ool(or p=o. ooo). In other words, 
corporate stakeholder salience pattern is implicated in the interaction 
between sector and country level characteristics; and therefore cannot be 
easily explained by either country or sector level data alone, but in 
conjunction. To further unpack the strength of this association, the chi- 
square statistic test yielded a contingency coefficient approximately 0.4o at a 
significant level that confirms a strong association between patterns of 
corporate stakeholder salience and country-sector data. Following this 
identified association between corporate stakeholder salience and country- 
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sector influences, the country level data were mapped on to the sector level 
data through correspondence analysis in order to triangulate the data and 
further examine the association visually. The mapping of both data resulted 
in the graphical representation shown in Figure 7.4 below. 
Figure 7-0-4: Visual Representation of Country-Sector-Stakeholder Profile 
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The graphical representation above shows unique clustering of corporate 
D Country-sector 
- Variables 
stakeholder salience profiles along country and sector dimensions, 
respectively. For example UK sectors clustered together in the lower half of 
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the graphic while German sectors clustered together in the upper half of the 
graphic. Not only that; these different clusters of country and sector 
influences are grouped together with specific stakeholder groups; and more 
so, they are symptomatically clustered across the upper and lower divides of 
the graphic - possibly in line with the institutional characteristics predicted by 
the varieties of capitalism model with regards to both the UK and German 
institutional contexts. Notwithstanding, there are notable country and sector 
differences and similarities in corporate stakeholder salience profiles, which 
tend to suggest some interdependent influences of institutional and sectoral 
contexts on corporate stakeholder salience patterns. 
This resultant graphical representation (i. e. Figure 7.4 above) is unique in 
many ways. First, it confirms the clustering of stakeholder salience of German 
firms along those fundamental orientations characteristic of the German 
institutional context as postulated by the Varieties of Capitalism model. 
These orientations include the importance attached to such stakeholder 
groups as employees, networks (including alliances and partnerships) as well 
as to management. The graphical representation also shows that both 
German Utilities and Aviation firms are much closer to these fundamental 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns than the German Financial Services 
sector. Instead, the German Financial Services sector shows greater 
propensity towards much more globalised stakeholder salience - for 
example, the environment. In the same vein, the UK sectors cluster around 
fundamental values of the liberal market economies, which are 
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predominantly shareholder driven. According to Vitols (2001: 343), "[T]he UK 
is characterized by dispersed ownership by share-price-oriented financial 
institutions while Germany is characterized by concentrated ownership by 
actors pursuing a mix of financial and strategic goals". (Vitols, 2001: 343). This 
shareholder orientation appears to be manifested more by the UK aviation 
than any of the other UK sectors - i. e. Utilities and Finance. As typical of the 
service sector, the UK Financial services sector seems to be very much 
associated with consumer salience, while the Utilities sector clusters towards 
Management stakeholder salience and closer to the German side of the 
graph23. The management stakeholder group is very much central to both 
divides. 
However, in order to validate the emergent corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns from corporate social report data, data from online survey were also 
subjected to similar correspondence analysis. The idea being that similarities 
or dissimilarities in corporate stakeholder salience patterns depicted by the 
outcome of online survey data will either strengthen or put to question the 
validity of patterns emergent from corporate social reports. This approach is 
in line with the data triangulation principle enunciated in the previous 
chapter. The only difference - albeit it a minor one - in terms of data 
23 This clustering towards coordinated market economy could be accounted for by 
the infiltration of European utility practices in the UK and the role of utility firms as 
providers of public services, which is discussed in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis. 
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comparability between corporate social reports and online survey in this case 
is the substitution of aviation data by data from other sectors in the online 
survey analysis. It is anticipated that this substitution would not lead to any 
significant difference in outcomes since the main sectors chosen for the 
study were randomly selected and as such should bear some similarities with 
the population they were drawn from, to be representative (Hair et al., 
2005). The online survey data generated the graphical representation of 
corporate stakeholder salience profiles shown in Figure 7.5 below: 
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Figure 7-0-5: Online Survey data representation 
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Coincidentally, both corporate social reports and online survey data, show 
much more similarities than dissimilarities, which goes a long way to validate 
the corporate social report data. In the first instance, the two sources of data 
show intra-country clustering, with German and UK sectors clustered 
distinctively along country parameters and characteristics. In the two 
instances, Employees and Networks stakeholder groups clustered closer to 
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the German side of the divide; while Community and Customers stakeholder 
groups clustered closer to the UK sectors. Management stakeholder group is 
positioned in-between the country divides in both cases. The only sharp but 
minor dissimilarity between the two is that the Shareholder stakeholder 
group is in the German divide in the online survey data and in the UK divide in 
the corporate social reports data. The next less distinctive difference 
between the outcomes of the two data sets is that whilst the UK utility is 
spatially located closer to the German divide in the corporate social reports 
data, it is completely in the German divide in the online survey data. 
However, in all, the two produce much more similar than dissimilar outcomes 
as summarised in the Table 7.5 below: 
Table 7-0-5: Comparisons of Corporate Social Reports and Survey Data 
AREAS OF SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES DATA FROM DATA FROM 
BETWEEN CORPORATE SOCIAL REPORTS AND ONLINE CORPORATE SOCIAL ONLINE 
SURVEY DATA REPORTS SURVEY 
1. Clustering based on country 
2. Management stakeholder group 
positioned in-between the country 
0 0 
divides 
3. Community and Customers stakeholder 
groups clustered in the UK divide of the 
EI 0 
visual presentation 
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AREAS OF SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES DATA FROM DATA I I«)M 
BETWEEN CORPORATE SOCIAL REPORTS AND ONLINE CORPORATE SOCIAL ONLINE 
SURVEY DATA REPORTS SURVEY 
4. Networks and Employees stakeholder 
groups clustered in the German divide of 
Q 0 
the visual presentation 
5. Environment stakeholder group 0 
positioned in the German space 
6. Shareholders stakeholder group 0 
positioned in the UK space 
7. Intra-country clustering of sectors (**only 
UK utility deviating) 
In order to probe deeper into any possible relationships (associations) that 
may exist (or not exist) between country and sector level data, and in order 
to further triangulate on data analytic methods, the third leg of the data 
analysis process finally queries the data in much more details to help in 
understanding any possible interactions arising from the joint influences of 
country and sector characteristics on corporate stakeholding profiles of UK 
and German firms through their social reports. In this regard, the research 
study anticipates some stakeholder salience differences between UK and 
German firms, particularly in those core areas the varieties of capitalism 
model would suggest that they are fundamentally different - i. e. salience of 
employees, shareholders, management and networks, in line with 
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propositions espoused in much detail earlier in this research study (see 
chapter 4, section 4.4). 
7.2.3: Examining country and sector influences on corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) data 
analysis technique 
In order to further explore these propositions, the research uses a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) since the study focuses on two 
independent variables (sector and country) and multiple dependent variables 
(i. e. representations of stakeholder salience of multiple constituencies - i. e. 
employees, shareholders, et cetera - through corporate social reports). 
Multivariate analysis of variance belongs to the broader family of Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) statistical technique24. It is a much tighter and higher level 
of statistical analysis than the Pearson's chi-square statistic. According to Ellis 
and Haase (1987), multivariate models are suitable for analysis of data from 
researches that give rise to more than one dependent variable, as in this 
study with the following dependent variables - Community, Customers, 
Environment, Employees, Management, Networks and Shareholders 
stakeholder groups. Insights from this further analysis will be helpful in 
exploring the guiding propositions of this research study. The data generated 
24 The philosophical and pragmatic underpinnings of ANOVA statistical technique, 
which are presented in most basic texts on Statistical methods, lie beyond the scope 
of this research study. 
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for the study from corporate social reports were further re-arranged to be 
amenable to multivariate analysis of variance. These adjustments are 
presented and explained below. 
Step i: Calculation of Ratios (intensity factors or coefficients) 
This part of the study did not base the data used in the analysis on absolute 
numbers (i. e. the frequencies of photographs, graphs and texts) presented 
by each report, but rather converted these frequencies to an intensity factor 
derived from the ratio of pages of the report to photographs, graphics and 
texts, respectively. For example, a 50 page report with a total of 70 
photographs would first of all yield an intensity factor of 1.4 (i. e. the ratio of 
70 photographs to 50 page report), which was in turn used as a co-eff icient 
for data on each of the stakeholder groups. The introduction of the intensity 
factor (coefficients) created some parity amongst the data and was 
substituted for each of the data from the different reports. According to 
Riffe et al. (2005: 84), "A ratio measure allows one to compare relative 
emphasis regardless of number of units..... One advantage of using ratio- 
level measures with content analysis is that they allow the use of more 
sophisticated statistical procedures". The formulae for deriving the intensity 
factors (coefficients) are presented below: 
E plyd ......................... 
(i) 
Where p is number of photographs and d pages of social reports 
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Eg/2: d ......................... (z) 
Where g is number of graphs and d pages of social reports 
Zcspr/Zcspg 
................. 
(3) 
Where cspr is number of chairman/management statement paragraphs and 
cspg pages of chairman/management statement 
The intensity factor of logos to documents was calculated by first merging 
data collated on logos and management signatures, since corporate logos 
are essential artefacts of corporate identity and there is a prevalent 
understanding of signatures as quintessential mark of identity in "... our 
contemporary sign culture" (Goldman and Papson, 1996: 140). The 
combination of data collated on logos and management signatures was then 
ratio-ed against the total pages of the reports in which they appear, which 
gives rise to this equation: 
1: (1 +lw+sg)/Ed ......... (4) 
Where I is number of standalone logos, Iw non-standalone logos, sg 
management signatures and d pages of social reports 
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Step 2: Application of intensity factor (coefficient) to coded variables 
Having calculated intensity factors, the resulting coefficients were used to 
multiply the frequencies of the coded variables. For instance, assuming that 
out of the 70 photographs, 30 of these photographs referred to employees, 
the 3o employee photographs is multiplied by the intensity factor. In other 
words, the intensity factor becomes a coefficient of the number of employee 
photographs, in this case. The coefficient was applied to all the variables. 
After which, the variables were collated based on their categories. For 
example, all variables relating to employees (i. e. photos, graphics, and texts) 
were averaged to get a single index data for employees. The same was done 
for all the other stakeholder groups. Following its link to management 
identity the logo/signature coefficient was added to the management 
stakeholder group. The stakeholder salience for each of the stakeholder 
groups studied was derived as an average of years 2000 to 20o6. Industry 
stakeholder salience for each stakeholder group was derived as an average 
of firm-level averages and stakeholder salience profile of country derived 
from industry level averages, as shown in equations 5 and 6 below 
n 
Y (Xvl + Xv2 + ......... 
xvn ) 
............... . 
'-n 
" 
(5) 
n 
Where v= firm level variables and n= total number of firms in a sector 
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N 
I (xSv1 +XSv2 +"""XSvn 
I=N ... ............. 
(6) 
N 
Where Sv = sector level variables and N= total number of sectors in a country 
After these adjustments a multivariate statistical analysis of variance was run 
on the data using the SPSS statistical software. And it yielded the result 
tables below, which in a nutshell show that corporate stakeholder patterns 
are significantly (p<o. 0001) shaped by sectoral and institutional influences, 
both in isolation and in conjunction of each other. This finding is in consonant 
with the outcomes of the correspondence analysis and Pearson's Chi-Square 
statistic analytical techniques previously deployed. 
Table 7-0-6: Multivariate Tests (c) Result of data from Corporate Social 
Reports 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai's Trace . 774 27.329(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
Wilks' Lambda . 226 27.329(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
Hotelling's Trace 3.416 27.329(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root 3.416 27.329(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
Sector Pillai's Trace . 647 3.895 14.000 114.000 . 000 
Wilks' Lambda . 455 3.86o(a) 14.000 112.000 . 000 
Hotelling's Trace "973 3.823 14.000 110.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root . 597 4.864(b) 7.000 57.000 . 000 
Country Pillai's Trace . 416 5.695(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
Wilks' Lambda . 584 5.695(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
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Effect Value F Hypothesis cif Error df Sig. 
Hotelling's Trace . 712 5.695(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root . 712 5.695(a) 7.000 56.000 . 000 
Sector * Country Pillai's Trace . 540 3.010 14.000 114.000 . 001 
Wilks' Lambda . 529 3.003(a) 14.000 112.000 . 001 
Hotelling's Trace . 762 2.994 14.000 110.000 . 001 
Roy's Largest Root . 507 4.130(b) 7.000 57.000 . 001 
a Exact statistic b The statistic is an upper bouna on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
c Design: Intercept+Sector+Country+Sector * Country 
In keeping with the triangulation strategy of this research study, data from 
online survey was also subjected to multivariate analysis of variance as a 
further and final assessment of the validity of the dataset generated from 
corporate social reports. The online survey data (Table 7.7 below) confirm 
that both sector and institutional contexts have influence (at a significant 
level of p<0.05) on corporate stakeholder salience. 
Table 7-0-7: Multivariate Tests (c) Result of data from Online Survey 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai's Trace . 949 85"093(a) 7.000 32.000 . 000 
Wilks' Lambda . 051 85"093(a) 7.000 32.000 . 000 
Hotelling's Trace 18.614 85.093(a) 7.000 32.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root 18.614 85"093(a) 7.000 32.000 . 000 
Sector Pillai's Trace . 557 1.818 14.000 66.000 . 054 
Wilks' Lambda . 471 2.087(a) 14.000 64.000 . 024 
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Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Hotelling's Trace 1.062 2.352 14.000 62.000 . 011 
Roy's Largest Root 1.003 4.729(b) 7.000 33.000 . 001 
Country Pillai's Trace . 523 5"009(a) 7.000 32.000 . 001 
Wilks' Lambda . 477 5.009(a) 7.000 32.000 . 001 
Hotelling's Trace 1.096 5. oo9(a) 7.000 32.000 . 001 
Roy's Largest Root 1.096 5.009(a) 7.000 32.000 . 001 
Sector* Country Pillai's Trace . 324 . 910 14.000 66.000 . 553 
Wilks' Lambda . 689 "936(a) 14.000 64.000 . 527 
Hotelling's Trace . 433 "959 14.000 62.000 . 504 
Roy's Largest Root . 386 1.819(b) 7.000 33.000 . 117 
a Exact statistic 
b The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
c Design: Intercept+Sector+Country+Sector * Country 
However, the suggestion that sector and country have interactive influences 
on corporate stakeholder salience as identified through corporate social 
reports data is insignificant in the outcome of the online survey data. But 
either way, the two sources of data confirm the sectoral and institutional 
influences on manifestations of corporate stakeholder salience patterns. In 
summary, then, the outcomes of the multivariate analysis of variance from 
both sources of empirical data suggest that the UK and German institutional 
contexts generate different patterns of corporate stakeholder salience 
profiles, as well as the different sectors used in this study. This makes it more 
interesting to argue for an interaction effect between sectoral and 
institutional influences on corporate stakeholder salience patterns; but more 
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would be needed from the data to further unpack the implications of these 
interactive effects on the predictions of the varieties of capitalism for the UK 
and German institutional contexts, which constitute the main propositions of 
this research study. In order to do this, the research leverages outcomes of 
the multivariate analysis of data from corporate social reports, which is the 
main data source of this study, to search for between-subjects effects as 
shown in Table 7.8 below. 
Table 7-0-8: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects using data sets from 
corporate social reports 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model Employees 2650.774(a) 5 530.155 3.394 . 009 
Networks 8032.162(b) 5 1606.432 2.718 . 028 
Shareholders 5299.023(c) 5 1059.805 1.641 . 163 
Environment 53357.156(d) 5 10671.431 4.229 . 002 
Community 4760.228(e) 5 952.046 3.760 . 005 
Consumers 3120.781(f) 5 624.156 4.517 . 001 
Management 5275.906(g) 5 1055.181 2.893 . 021 
Intercept Employees 22827.927 1 22827.927 146.129 . 000 
Networks 21588.877 1 21588.877 36.526 . 000 
Shareholders 42177.793 1 42177.793 65.297 . 000 
Environment 172290.993 1 172290.993 68.278 . 000 
Community 16001.315 1 16001.315 63.191 . 000 
Consumers 7079.067 1 7079.067 51.230 . 000 
Management 47729.543 1 47729.543 130.880 . 000 
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Type III Sum 
Source Dependent Variable of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Sector Employees 1548.101 2 774.051 4.955 . 010 
Networks 1216.085 2 608.042 1.029 . 363 
Shareholders 179.089 2 89.544 . 139 . 871 
Environment 13453.307 2 6726.653 2.666 . 078 
Community 161.241 2 80.621 . 318 . 729 
Consumers 412.814 2 206.407 1.494 . 232 
Management 2363.083 2 1181.541 3.240 . 046 
Country Employees 159.697 1 159.697 1.022 . 316 
Networks 367.898 1 367.898 . 622 . 433 
Shareholders 465.820 1 465.820 . 721 . 399 
Environment 10809.497 1 10809.497 4.284 . 043 
Community 1936.527 1 1936.527 7.648 . 007 
Consumers 1222.298 1 1222.298 8.846 . 004 
Management 215.722 1 215.722 . 592 . 445 
Sector * Country Employees 851.110 2 425.555 2.724 . 073 
Networks 6214.885 2 3107.443 5.258 oo8 
Shareholders 5261.707 2 2630.853 4.073 . 022 
Environment 26656.011 2 13328.005 5.282 008 
Community 874.190 2 437.095 1.726 . 186 
Consumers 462.702 2 231.351 1.674 . 196 
Management 2894.370 2 1447.185 3.968 . 024 
Error Employees 9685.502 62 156.218 
Networks 36645.052 62 591.049 
Shareholders 40048.371 62 645.941 
Environment 156449.217 62 2523.374 
Community 15699.606 62 253.219 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 259 of 438 
Type III Sum 
Source Dependent Variable of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Consumers 8567.234 62 138.181 
Management 22610.218 62 364.681 
Total Employees 35297.675 68 
Networks 70898.971 68 
Shareholders 97808.814 68 
Environment 382992.160 68 
Community 40043.893 68 
Consumers 20668.829 68 
Management 85255.227 68 
Corrected Total Employees 12336.275 67 
Networks 44677.214 67 
Shareholders 45347.393 67 
Environment 209806.372 67 
Community 20459.834 67 
Consumers 11688.015 67 
Management 27886.124 67 
aR Squared =. 215 (Adjusted K squarea = . 152); nK bquarea =. 160 (Aa)ustea K. -)quarea = . 114); CK 
Squared = . 117 (Adjusted R Squared = . 046); 
dR Squared =. 254 (Adjusted R Squared =. 194); eR Squared = 
. 233 
(Adjusted R Squared = . 171 
fR Squared =. 267 (Adjusted R Squared =. 208); gR Squared =. i89 
(Adjusted R Squared =. 124) 
From the result tables above, both country and sector level data offered 
what could be considered contradictory results in isolation, when matched 
against the postulations of the varieties of capitalism model. In other words, 
neither of the results in isolation confirms the postulations of the varieties of 
capitalism model. The country level data suggest that German and UK firms 
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differ on the Environment, Community and Consumers patterns of 
stakeholder salience, which is rather directly opposite to the propositions of 
this research study. The sector level data on the other hand suggest that the 
sectors differ only on Employees, Environment and Management patterns of 
stakeholder salience. However, it is difficult to read off varieties of capitalism 
postulations from sector level data in isolation of country influences. A 
further probing into the joint sector/country influences on patterns of 
stakeholder salience, shows that the German and UK institutional contexts 
interact with sector level influences to shape patterns of corporate 
stakeholder salience profiles. The results of the multivariate statistic analysis, 
once again, confirm the interaction effect between sector and country level 
data on patterns of corporate stakeholder salience presented in corporate 
social reports. They also confirm the propositions explored in this research 
except the postulated similarity between German and UK firms in their 
pattern of environmental salience. However, this similarity is further 
established through a post hoc data analysis (Bonferroni and Scheffe) - see 
appendix for details. 
In a nutshell, Table 7.9 below highlights the implications of the influences of 
sector, country and sector-country interactions on corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns, expressed through UK and German corporate social 
reports, in support of the propositions derived from the varieties of 
capitalism model employed in this research study. 
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As a result, it could be concluded therefore, that corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns are reflections of meso (organisational fields) and macro 
(national contexts) institutional characteristics, as well, and not entirely 
dependent on managerial discretion. This is the core argument of this 
research study, which has been empirically demonstrated. 
7.3: Chapter Summary 
Drawing from triangulation of two data sources (0) corporate social reports 
of UK and German Fortune Global 500 firms in aviation, financial services and 
the utilities, and (2) online survey questionnaire of UK and German Fortune 
Global 500 firms; and three data analytic methods: (1) correspondence 
analysis; (2) Pearson's chi-square statistic and (3) multivariate analysis of 
variance, this chapter has demonstrated that German and UK institutional 
contexts exhibit distinct stakeholder salience patterns that interact 
significantly with sector level patterns of stakeholder salience to fit the 
postulations of the varieties of capitalism analytical framework, which this 
study draws from to account for variations of corporate stakeholding and 
social responsibility across institutional and sectoral contexts, respectively. 
The next chapter will further discuss the findings articulated above drawing 
from extant literatures on corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, 
varieties of capitalism and new institutionalism. It will also bring in debates 
on globalisation-induced convergence and divergence of national and 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 270 of 438 
sectoral systems by leveraging dynamics of corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns in the sectors and countries of this study. 
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CHAPTER 8: CORPORATE STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE - AN 
INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
8.1: Tone setting 
This chapter will focus on bringing together the literature on comparative 
political economy and stakeholder management theory on which the entire 
thesis is built. It will draw on corporate stakeholder salience and empirical 
data extracted from corporate social reports to argue for the institutional 
embeddedness of corporate stakeholder salience and accountability. The aim 
is to stretch theorisation of corporate stakeholder salience beyond its current 
domination by managerial rationality and discretion by providing a different 
twist to understanding the same from an institutionalist perspective - i. e. 
institutional rationality (Lounsbury, forthcoming). The empirical analysis and 
findings of this research study will be situated within current debates in 
comparative political economy, stakeholder management theory, corporate 
accountability/governance and corporate social responsibility literatures in 
order to draw new insights and enhance our knowledge of the association 
between corporate stakeholder salience patterns and the institutional 
contexts in which they are embedded and enacted. It will also relate these to 
debates on the converging and or diverging influences of globalisation on, 
hitherto, different national institutional contexts - in our case, the German 
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and UK contexts. In addition, it will explore the interaction between macro 
and micro processes of organisational practices. In this case, corporate 
stakeholder salience profiles expressed through representations in corporate 
social reports are used as a proxy practice to explore how the two economies 
are either converging or diverging. However, two key findings of this study 
are: (i) corporate stakeholder salience patterns are implicated in the 
interactions between national contexts and sector variations; and from this 
finding the study infers that (2) globalisation interacts with national systems 
at different levels - therefore, it could be concluded that convergence and 
divergence of institutional characteristics occur simultaneously and at 
different levels, differently. In other words, the one size fits it all approach to 
institutional convergence and divergence should be assessed with caution. It 
is also suggested that regulatory and social pressures on enhancing 
managerial accountability should aim to balance these pressures in line with 
the demands of macro level institutional characteristics. 
However, it is important to reinforce at this stage that the main objective of 
this study is to explore if there are identifiable national and organisational 
field patterns of corporate stakeholding against the set background of the 
UK and German institutional contexts, respectively, as a way of signalling a 
complementary view of stakeholder salience to the managerialist /actor- 
centric views. The characteristics of these institutional contexts have been 
framed along the varieties of capitalism theoretical framework, which is 
explored in details in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis (see Hall and Soskice, 
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2002; Amable, 2003; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Hancke et al., 2007 for more 
details). This chapter takes these institutional characteristics as foreground 
information and seeks to present and discuss the different manifestations of 
stakeholder salience patterns across national boundaries and trans-national 
social spaces, in line with the central research question of this study (see 
research problematique on section 4.4: pp" 138ff of this thesis) and as much 
as the content analysis data employed in this research study allow. 
Notwithstanding, the chapter takes discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 
2002,2003) seriously and offers some `loose insights' that would require 
complementary empirical grounding, as further suggested and articulated in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
8.2: New Institutionalism: Bridging the divide between macro 
and micro institutional research agendas 
New institutionalism has, in recent times, continued to distance itself from a 
past trajectory anchored on accounting for institutional stability and 
isomorphism. This sort of approach dominated earlier works in the field -a 
classic example being the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) - and has 
come under heavy criticisms: first for mainly failing to credibly account for 
change; and secondly for being overly dependent on path dependency. It has 
also been critiqued for orchestrating institutions as deterministic structures 
over and above agents within these institutions. In this regard, it promotes 
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institutional a-rationality and positions agents (individuals and firms) as socio- 
cultural dopes (Lounsbury, forthcoming). While these criticisms are 
substantially credible, it is worthwhile to place the new institutionalism 
movement within its historical antecedent, which was at a time a mere 
response to the overly rationalised social scientism, championed by utility 
maximising neoclassical economists and rational choice theorists, particularly 
in such fields as sociology and political science. Notwithstanding its 
contributions in providing complementary and sometimes alternative lens to 
understanding social reality, new institutionalism appears to have pushed 
itself too far to the extent that its pragmatic value is questioned. In this 
regard, and reflecting on it historical antecedents, Scott (forthcoming) 
opined that: 
A focus on the explanation of non-rational features of organizations 
threatened to condemn institutional theorists to play the role of 
subordinate hand-maiden to rational analysts (in their numerous 
guises), who would themselves attend to the adult concerns of 
constructing accounts of efficient organizations, leaving to 
institutionalists the scraps, accounting for the error-term in their 
equations (cited in Lounsbury, forthcoming) 
Contrary to its past, stuck in accounting for institutional stability and 
isomorphism, new institutionalism has come to adopt a different approach 
that focuses on accounting for change and innovation. This new approach 
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acknowledges that both change and stability are complexly interwoven and 
arise from multiple sources and levels. These sources and levels could be 
societal, extra-organisational and intra-organisational processes. The 
challenge in the literature, then, is to understand how these changes at 
multiple levels and from multiple sources interact and are enacted. This has 
also led to the shift from institutions as `a-rational' or `irrational' routines to 
an understanding of institutions as embodiments of rational practices - i. e. 
institutional rationality (Lounsbury, forthcoming). Accounts of how 
organisational fields and practices are created, maintained and disrupted 
have dominated organisational theory in the last couple of decades 
(Lawrency and Suddaby, 2007). Scholars have engaged with this new 
approach from different schools of thought as well as different communities 
of practice. Two communities of practice stand out clearly: (a) those focusing 
on macro institutional changes and (b) those focusing on micro-process and 
practices. 
Sustained academic interests in neo-institutionalism, structurationism and 
the dynamics of trans-national institutions, in particular, have, in recent 
times, given rise to novel research interests in such areas as institutional 
entrepreneurship and institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2007). 
institutional entrepreneurs are "... organized actors who skilfully use 
institutional logics to create or change institutions, in order to realize an 
interest that they value highly" (Leca and Naccache, 2oo6: 634). Lawrence 
and Suddaby (2007) broadly categorised institutional entrepreneurship into 
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three `life-cycle' activities: (a) creating, (b) maintaining and (c) disrupting. 
Creating entails initiating institutional changes through shifting institutional 
logics; maintaining involves ensuring a form of stability in an institutional 
context through reproduction of status quo; while disrupting involves 
attacking or undermining of mechanisms that lead members to comply with 
institutions through deinstitutionalisation. Lawrence and Suddaby also 
suggested that each of these activities is further sustained by series of other 
sub-activities, as shown in the table below: 
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Institutional entrepreneurship is a major shift from the mimetic isomorphism 
that dominated neo-institutional theory for a long time. It has become a 
powerful and complementary perspective to accounting for institutional change 
and inertia; and has at the same time necessitated complementary ways of 
explaining organisational change and inertia (Feldman and Pentland, 2003), 
strategy and strategizing (Whittington, 20o6; Jarzabkowski, 2005), innovation 
and institutions (Swan et al., 2007), and diffusion and translation of ideas 
(Abrahamson, 1996; Scarbrough and Swan, 2001; Czarniawska and Joerges, 
1996) in different sectors, organisations and national systems. However, some of 
these schools and communities of practice run the risk of existing as isolated 
silos shielded from developments in complementary fields. For instance, there 
have been incessant calls (e. g. Lounsbury, forthcoming; Whittington, 2oo6; 
Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) for scholars focusing 
on macro-institutional changes and innovation to account for how their findings 
inform understanding of micro-institutional processes - i. e. how broader 
institutional dynamics relate to intraorganizational processes - and vice versa. 
Accordingly, Lounsbury (forthcoming) argues that: "By focusing on how fields 
are comprised of multiple logics, and thus, multiple forms of institutionally-based 
rationality, institutional analysts can provide new insight into practice variation 
and the dynamics of practice". 
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The research study outlined in this thesis, fits well into this new institutionalist 
agenda of accounting for the links between macro (institutional or industry 
contexts) and micro (firm level practices) institutional practices. The research 
problematises corporate stakeholding and social reporting as contemporary or 
emergent organisational practices that need to be understood from a different 
lens apart from those of managerial rationality, which have dominated the 
extant literature on corporate accountability, corporate governance, corporate 
social responsibility and stakeholder management as a strategic management 
practice. The lens chosen for this study is the comparative political economy 
perspective - particularly those of comparative business systems (e. g. Varieties 
of Capitalism). 
The varieties of capitalism analytical framework seeks to explain variations 
between capitalist systems as manifestations of institutional characteristics of 
the context in which they are enacted. It broadly categories capitalist economic 
systems into: (a) liberal market economies (typified by Anglo-American models 
of the UK and USA economies) and (b) co-ordinated market economies 
(exemplified by such economies as the German and Japanese economic 
systems). From this perspective it argues that firm performance is implicated in 
the degree of complementarity between different sub-systems within an 
institutional context. It leverages this categorization to go beyond firm 
performance to account for how institutional innovation and change are either 
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constrained or enabled by the inherent complementarities or non- 
complementarities within an economic system (Vitols, 20o6). In the same line of 
criticisms levelled against micro-institutional theorisation, the varieties of 
capitalism research perspective has largely focussed on macro-institutional 
contexts with minimal interests in accounting for intra-organizational processes 
and practices. It has often been accused of theorising firms as homogenous 
entities responding to institutional contexts with approximately similar 
strategies (Crouch and Ferrell, 2004; Deeg and Jackson, 2007). This view of 
varieties of capitalism model has received significant criticisms in the literature. 
Crouch (2005), in particular has rebuffed the seemingly simplistic categorisation 
of economies by the varieties of capitalism model arguing that firms are not 
socio-cultural dopes but are rational actors who interact with institutional 
contexts through extensive recombinant strategies. This research study is 
primarily designed to explore the relationship between stakeholder salience 
patterns manifested through corporate representational practices (corporate 
social reports) and the institutional context in which they are embedded and 
enacted. 
The research acknowledges that practices could be studied at different levels: 
i. e. at the micro (managerial/firm), meso (industry) and macro (country) levels. 
This study methodologically brackets the micro level aspect (Giddens, 1979) 
since corporate stakeholder salience has been extensively examined at micro- 
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level by scholars working in such fields as corporate accountability, social 
accounting, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and strategic 
stakeholder management (see chapter two of this thesis for an extensive 
literature review on various shades of corporate stakeholding approaches). It 
focuses more on meso and macro levels of corporate stakeholder salience 
theorisation given that this aspect is under-emphasised and theorised in the 
extant literature. However, it does not ignore managerial influences on 
corporate stakeholder salience but rather assumes the case that managers 
(practitioners) are "... the critical connection between intra-organizational 
praxis and the organizational and extra-organizational practices... " 
(Whittington, 2006: 620) and these influences are in turn externalised through 
corporate social reports. Continuing, Whittington (2oo6: 621) argues that 
11 ... practitioners draw upon the set of practices available from their 
organizational and extra-organizational contexts..... These organizational 
practices will likely comprise both locally generated routines and practices 
originating from outside - such as standard strategy discourse - that have 
become thoroughly internalized". In other words, this research study presents 
"... an approach to practice that takes institutions more seriously" (Lounsbury, 
forthcoming). 
Summary of findings of the empirical analysis supporting this research study 
suggests that there are identifiable patterns of corporate stakeholder salience 
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between the UK and German institutional contexts. When these patterns are 
further probed, they confirm the research propositions of this study anchored 
on postulations of the varieties of capitalism framework, especially along those 
characteristics that have been suggested to be fundamental to each of the 
institutional contexts in the study. But there are still some key questions begging 
for answers. For example why do we find these patterns of corporate 
stakeholder salience across sectors and institutional contexts; and what is it 
about institutional contexts that shape corporate stakeholder salience in these 
patterns? The next sections of this chapter will focus on discussing these 
findings along these lines of enquiry and exploring the implications they could 
have for our understanding of corporate accountability, corporate social 
responsibility, corporate governance and finally the influence of globalization on 
institutional contexts. 
8.3: Exploring representations of corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns across sectors and institutional contexts 
it is worthwhile to point out that the interpretations of the findings of this 
research study are largely based on the varieties of capitalism model of 
comparative capitalism. They are also founded on the recognition that 11 ... firms 
are situated within a given society and political tradition, which will influence the 
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decisions of individuals within the firm... " (Aguilera et al., 2006: 148). This 
understanding goes beyond the discretional managerial rationality that has 
dominated corporate stakeholding theorisations for a long time - wherein 
stakeholder management is theorised as outcome of managerial perception and 
bounded rationality (Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et at., 1999). However, the study 
offers a perspective that does not claim to provide answers to the `processes' 
through which institutional contexts directly impact on corporate 
representations of stakeholder salience. It rather offers `high-level 
interpretations of institutional characteristics' and operates from the perspective 
that corporate representations of stakeholders in social reports - as a form of 
discursive institutional work (Schmidt, 2002,2003) - reflect managerial attempts 
to express some form of institutional legitimacy to their `relevant publics' 
(Lindblom, 1994), which will in turn suggest that corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns are not only functions of managerial discretion and rationality, as often 
presented in the extant corporate social responsibility literature, but are also 
reflections of their institutional influences. In sum, therefore, and as already 
stated, the findings of this research study suggest that corporate stakeholder 
salience patterns are not solely a function of managerial discretion but are also 
products of multiple institutional influences. In other words, managerial 
decisions in relation to corporate stakeholder salience patterns are reflections or 
internalisation of institutional influences in which the firms are embedded in. It 
also suggests that firms are products of their institutional environments. 
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These findings are in line with extant literature on the interactions between 
institutions, organisations and strategic choices (e. g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Suchman, 1985; Peng and Heath, 1996; Hall and Soskice, zoos; Amable, 2003). For 
instance, Peng and Heath (1996) found that firms in planned economies in 
transition follow different strategies of growth compared to the `traditional 
strategies for growth found in the West' - i. e. generic expansion and acquisition. 
in the contrary, firms in planned economies in transition adopted network-based 
strategy of growth, building on personal trust and informal agreements among 
managers due to the peculiarities of planned economies - e. g. State 
involvement, their social norms and practices. As such, Peng and Heath 
(1996: 500/501) conclude that: 
Institutional frameworks interact with both individuals and 
organizations.... They influence individuals' decision making by 
signalling which choice is acceptable and determining which norms and 
behaviours are socialized into individuals in a given society. 
Institutional frameworks also affect the actions of organizations by 
constraining which actions by those organizations are acceptable and 
supportable within the framework.... In other words, institutions 
provide the rules of the game in which organizations act and compete. 
Such interaction between institutions and organizations shapes 
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economic activities.... As a result, any attempt to explore a firm's 
strategic choice requires an understanding of the institutional 
framework in which the firm is embedded. 
This understanding of the interactive influences of institutions on firms is one of 
the key and fundamental tenets on which new institutionalism is established 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The bid to explain how institutions impact on firm 
behaviour has led to different traditions of institutionalism in the literature. 
Amongst these is the comparative capitalism tradition -a term used to refer 
"... to a diverse set of approaches and analytical frameworks with common 
concerns in understanding the institutional foundations of diverse national 
'varieties' of business organization" (Deeg and Jackson, 20o6: 149-15o). The 
varieties of capitalism model as one of the variants of comparative capitalism 
tradition offers a comparative framework to understand the political economy 
of firm behaviour and performance. As an offshoot of institutional theory it 
seeks to explain variations and change within the capitalist system, since the late 
8os, following the demise of the competing threat of communism as a viable 
alternative (Kang, 2oo6). The central theme of the varieties of capitalism model 
is the macro-economic dichotomization of institutional contexts in which firms 
operate, based on such indices as legal and governance systems, sources of 
finance and skills, and other socio-legal indices like degree of labour unionisation 
and incursions of regulatory authorities. According to Vitols (zoos), varieties of 
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capitalism model "... offers a framework within which the linkages between 
external investors and other actors relevant to the firm can be systematically 
explored". And "... the concepts of coordinated market economies (CMEs) and 
liberal market economies (LMEs) provide a broader institutional context within 
which stakeholder and shareholder models of governance, respectively, can be 
analyzed" (Vitols, 2001: 337/8). Applying this framework to the results of this 
study explains clearly the variations between UK and German corporate 
stakeholder salience patterns as postulated in the guiding propositions of the 
study. 
It is evident that the UK and German firms differ significantly on those 
parameters that are uniquely peculiar to the two different institutional contexts. 
The principle of co-determination in Germany, which is absent in the UK, for 
instance gives an indication that the employee stakeholder group could be 
important in the German context. However, this difference is not a 
straightforward one, because this does not completely manifest across all the 
sectors in a similar pattern. This is not limited only to the employee stakeholder 
salience but also applies to shareholders, management and networks 
stakeholder groups, as shown in Table 8.2 below. 
Table 8-0-2: Within Country Sector Averages 
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WITHIN COUNTRY SECTOR AVERAGES 
Aviation Financial Services Utilities 
Germany UK Germany UK Germany UK 
Community 18.8 18.6 4.9 24.6 9.3 24.9 
Consumers 10.5 10.8 2.7 14.7 6.5 22.1 
Employees 23.0 26.1 7.8 19.4 24.5 20.0 
Environment lo8.2 51.0 75.6 20.0 23.8 53.4 
Management 48.0 22.0 27.2 37.0 18.1 22.5 
Shareholders 23.2 34.2 36.5 20.3 13.8 36.2 
Networks 36.2 0.5 15.9 14.9 14.4 35.6 
The data show that this difference is more apparent in the Utilities sector and 
appears less significant in ranking in both Financial Services and Aviation sectors 
(see also Table 7.2 on pages 234-235). The employee stakeholder group is ranked 
highest in German Utilities and appears at the bottom of UK Utilities ranking. 
However, it made the first top four on the ranking lists of both Financial Services 
and Aviation. This could further be appreciated if the data are disaggregated into 
years (i. e. 2000 to 20o6). The graph (see Figure 8.1, below) shows that, at least, 
patterns of employee stakeholder salience in the UK and German Aviation 
sectors are moving in similar directions. 
One way to unpack this similarity and differences could be to argue that both 
Financial Services and Aviation sectors in UK and German are much more open 
to internationallglobal pressures that are forcing them to adopt similar practices 
than the Utilities sector that is to a large extent still part and parcel of national 
public services infrastructure and fabric (Arrowsmith and Maund, forthcoming; 
Arrowsmith, 2000,2oo6) and closer to government's grips than either Financial 
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Services or Aviation. It has also been noted that the parallel existence of co- 
determination and collective bargaining regimes, respectively, in recent times in 
Germany, undermines the institutional stability of the German model (Hassel, 
1999). The emphasis on employees in both Financial Services and Aviation could 
also be a reflection of the service nature/orientation of the two industries, in 
which competition is driven by quality and people-embodied competences. 
Reflecting this service orientation and link to employee interests, Martin Schmitt 
- Senior Vice President Executive Personnel, Lufthansa - wrote: 
For Lufthansa as a service provider, this is a decisive 
perspective. Every day, more than 28, ooo Lufthansa employees 
in direct customer contact demonstrate our high levels of 
service quality. This requires a willingness to perform which we 
can only achieve with enthusiastic and highly qualified 
employees (Lufthansa, 2004: 4) 
And this could not be better expressed than in the words of Sir Fred Goodwin - 
the Group Chief Executive of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS): "We need the trust 
of our customers, or we will not win their business, and the trust of our 
employees, or we will not be able to attract and retain the best people" (RBS, 
2004: 5). As such one can argue that both sectors (i. e. Financial Services and 
Aviation in UK and Germany) are exhibiting service pressures induced by the 
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people-centred knowledge economy (Sturdy and Fleming, 2003; Sturdy, 1998), 
while the Utilities sectors (i. e. the contrasting dissimilarity in attention paid to 
employees in UK and Germany) instead reflect more of the distinguishing 
characteristics of their respective institutional contexts. 
Figure 8-0-1: German and UK Employees stakeholder salience trend (2ooo-2oo6) 
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This link to service and the knowledge economy is also reflected in the attention 
paid to customer stakeholder groups and management as providers of service 
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and knowledge. In both instances, the Financial Services and Aviation sectors in 
both UK and Germany show similar patterns of corporate stakeholder salience 
profiles, respectively. As earlier stated, attention to customer needs has been 
identified as a key survival strategy in contemporary globalised economy 
(Deshpande et at, 1993), and the diffusion of this ideology has been sustained to 
a large extent through organisational practices of Transnational Corporations 
(Abrahamson, 1991; Siu and Darby, 1995), management consultants and the 
international media (Bloomfield and Danieli, 1995; Jackson, 2001). 
Figure 8-0-2: German and UK Consumers stakeholder salience trend (2000-2oo6) 
Country 
UK 
0 
0 o 0 
0 
® o 
0 0 0 
d 
n 
cD 
0 N 
6. 
CD E 
0 
U 
60. 
20.00- 
0.00- 
01234 
0 
OO 
00 
0 
Year 
I2345 
CN 
CD 
Ö 
N 'ý 
D 
ýi 
0 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 293 of 438 
x 
Figure 8-0-3: German and UK Management stakeholder salience trend (2000- 
2oo6) 
Country 
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A similar analysis and explanation could apply to the priority emphasis on the 
environment in both UK and German Aviation sectors, while the UK and German 
Financial Services and Utilities sectors placed non-similar ranking emphasis 
between each sectors of the two economies, respectively. The priority placed on 
the environment by the Aviation sectors of both institutional contexts (see Table 
7.2 on pages 234-235) also signals the unique international global demands 
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2ecr, 
D 
0 
placed on the Aviation sector in relation to care for the environment. This 
pressure is even on an increase as the discourse on ecological sustainability and 
climate change grows (Amaeshi and Crane, 2oo6). In the quest for 
environmental sustainability, therefore, such sectors like transport (especially 
aviation) are negatively notorious, given their level of pollutant emissions, 
amongst others. In the EU's Fifth Environmental Action Programme, endorsed in 
1993 and subtitled, `Towards Sustainability', transport is identified as one of five 
target sectors in recognition of the point that it can never be environmentally 
neutral. The Programme argues that present trends in air (and road) transport 
are leading towards greater environmental costs - congestion, pollution, 
wastage of time and value, damage to health, and danger to life (CEC, 1996). 
Accordingly, Graham and Guyer (1999) argue that transport in general 
constitutes the most important negative environmental externality of the Single 
European Market (SEM), creating noise, atmospheric pollution and consuming 
large areas of land, while being dependent on non-renewable energy resources. 
Although its aggregate impact is minor compared to road traffic, air transport 
accounts for around co% of all transport energy consumption in the EU and is 
responsible for approximately 15% of all CO2 emissions (Stanners and Bourdeau, 
1995). In this regard, there is need for airports and airlines to be driven by 
sustainability goals in their quest for development. And as Graham and Guyer 
(1999: 168) put it: "Any enhancements to airport capacity, whatever their form, 
depend on a proactive environmental policy on the part of airport operators, 
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addressing not only noise but the entire suite of environmental externalities 
engendered by the air transport industry". These environmental externalities are 
likely to affect or be affected by different stakeholders; therefore, one possible 
way of addressing them would be to proactively engage with the different 
stakeholders. 
Figure 8-0-4: German and UK Environment stakeholder salience trend (2000- 
20o6) 
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Another interesting fact coming from the data is how corporate stakeholder 
salience reacts to shock in an industry. The global Aviation sector witnessed an 
immense shock following the 9/11 event of 2001 that led to massive losses in 
revenues, profits and employment. Since most reports are likely to be a year 
behind the actual activities of firms, it could be argued that the 2002 data 
internalised the shock of the preceding year. It is on this assumption that the 
sharp rise on the emphasis on shareholders in both institutional contexts could 
be appreciated. And it appeared like a one off increase in German data that went 
down again from 2003, but continued in an upward direction in the UK data (see 
graph below). It is therefore possible to argue that in faces of adversities, 
shareholders are likely to be emphasised in corporate social reports. This is in 
line with The Economist (2005) prediction that "when commercial interests and 
broader social welfare collide, profit comes first" (The Economist Jan ii, 2oo5 
p. 4). It also confirms the strong accountability hold the investor community has 
on firms. In an antithetical dynamics, emphasis on employees went up in the 
same direction as shareholders in Germany in the same period (2001 to 2002 - 
see employee data graph), while employees and shareholders went in opposite 
directions in the UK in the same period (zoos to 2002 - see employee data 
graph). This finding is in line with similar studies (e. g. Blyton et al., 2002; Turnbull 
et al., 2004) that found German and UK firms responded differently to 
employment pressures arising from the 9/11 slow down in the global aviation 
industry - an event that led 11 ... to a major restructuring of management-labour 
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relations in many airlines" (Turnbull et al., 2004: 288). Turnbull et al. (2004) 
argued that "... management responses to the crisis were markedly different 
where social partnership was already well established and embedded in national 
employment law and corporate HR policies than where more adversarial 
patterns of industrial relations prevailed" (p. 292). The UK institutional context 
will perfectly represent the latter scenario while German institutional context 
fits the former. A further distinction between these institutional contexts, 
according to Turnbull et al., (2004) is that "Many UK firms are prepared to `open 
the books' when company is in difficulties, but are very reluctant to share 
corporate information or consult employee representatives at other times. In 
coordinated market economies, in contrast, management is legally obliged to 
provide information, consult employees, and negotiate with trade unions on a 
wide range of financial, operational, and employment issues. This counteracts 
the asymmetry of power in organizations, thereby promoting cooperation 
between management and labour" (p. 289-29o). 
Figure 8-0-5: German and UK Shareholders stakeholder salience trend (2000- 
2006) 
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As earlier argued in this thesis, institutions shape the social and political 
processes of how stakeholders' interests are defined ("socially constructed"), 
aggregated, and represented with respect to the firm. A trend that has been 
hanging over recent debates in comparative capitalism is the idea that the 
different systems are converging under the powerful influence of globalization. 
There have been an increasing number of voices suggesting convergence of 
global corporate governance systems. For example it has been argued that both 
Japan and German, which have been widely conceptualised in the extant 
literature following the stakeholder model, are gradually opening up and 
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adapting to the Anglo-Saxon shareholder governance model, albeit with some 
frictions (Morgan, zoos Dore, 2000; Amable, 2003; Jackson, 2005, et cetera). As 
such, on one hand, it is argued that national business systems succumb to the 
globalised world order. On the other hand, the argument is that national 
business systems do not disappear, but rather find new and innovative ways of 
internalising influences coming from globalisation while retaining their 
distinctiveness (Whitley, 2002). A comparative study of UK and German systems 
provides a fertile ground to examine this notion of convergence and or 
distinctiveness. 
Our data confirm that the UK and German models of capitalism are still very 
much unique in their ways and non-converging in the main - the UK system is 
still shareholder dominated while the German system is stakeholder dominated. 
However, one would have expected the Employee stakeholder group to be top 
on German agenda following the co-determination practice of industrial relations 
in Germany. The drop in Employee stakeholder salience could be linked to the 
gradual introduction of neo-liberal economic practices in Germany which is 
leading to the following: pension reforms, gradual introduction of subsidies and 
tax advantages to private and occupational schemes, and introduction of a less 
generous pension-indexation mechanism which have culminated in reduced 
protection against dismissal for white-collar and small-firm workers (Amable, 
2003: 248). These reforms also confirm German's gradual conformity to neo- 
S 
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liberal corporate governance practice (Amable, 2oo3; Shinn, 2001). But in 
summary, these changes in themselves do not suggest any radical deviations or 
changes in the German system. These sort of radical changes are not easily 
foreseeable given that "... welfare systems are embedded in national regulations 
which are difficult to change without substantial transformation in the structure 
of interest groups" (Amable, 2003: 246). Continuing, Ambale strongly argue 
that: 
The Continental European model of capitalism still exists and will do so 
in forthcoming years. Its features have nevertheless been altered: bank- 
based finance has not vanished althogher, but it no longer plays the 
role it used to; the labour market has been made more `flexible' and the 
prospects for an increase in job security are uncertain; the social- 
protection system has experienced a limited adjustment to times of 
austerity and will have to face the challenges of the ageing population 
and social exclusion.... As always, one can expect increased pressure 
for real-wage moderation and a wave of relocation of the most labour- 
intensive activities.... This is likely to augment unemployment problems 
in segments of the labour force where they are already serious, i. e. for 
low-paid and low-skilled workers..... (However)... a move towards a 
generalization of the market-based model on the Continent is not 
foreseeable (p. 261). 
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Moreover: 
The VoC approach, however, recognizes that the barriers to 
fundamental institutional change are very high and is therefore 
sceptical about wholesale convergence arguments. Institutions derive 
from deeply rooted historical traditions and typically are defended at 
the least by vested interests if not by powerful actors within national 
systems who will recognize the comparative advantages of their 
institutions. The typical nature of institutional change should therefore 
be incremental, reflecting the politics of bargaining between 
`traditionalists' and `modernizers'. (Vitols, 2001: 346) 
In summary, then, whilst the UK and German institutional contexts continue to 
remain distinct in many ways, corporate stakeholder salience patterns also 
reflect the ongoing changes in both economies. The findings of this study, on 
one hand, give further credence to the embedded nature argument of both 
corporate governance and corporate stake-holding practices and, on the other 
hand, challenges the view that globalization is converging hitherto divergent 
capitalist systems. What could be happening at best is the internalisation (or 
hybridization - see Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) of global pressures in distinct 
ways by the different capitalist systems. What these findings suggest is that 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns are outcomes of sectoral, national and 
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or international influences. And therefore, managers' stakeholder salience 
decisions are likely to be constrained and enabled by these influences. In 
combination, however, the results of this study suggest that these influences are 
harmonised or internalised by the different varieties of capitalism in such a way 
as not to compromise on their national distinctiveness. This ability of national 
institutional contexts to find new ways of adapting to external influences 
(especially those arising from globalisation and regionalisation - in the case of 
Europe), is one of the critical current challenges confronting comparative 
capitalism models. Commenting on this and in line with the findings of this 
research study, Vitols (2001) says: 
Since VoC stresses the embeddedness of national institutions as well 
as the possibility of `complementarities' between different 
combinations of these institutions, VoC hypothesizes that responses 
to [internationalisation or globalisation] other than convergence are 
possible. Companies may respond very differently to similar sorts of 
pressures and distinct sets of `best practice' contingent on the 
national context may emerge (Vitols, 2001: 338) 
Diagrammatic representations of the interactions between sectoral, national 
and global influences on corporate stakeholder salience patterns are presented 
below (figures 8.6 and 9.1). Some influences arising from international and 
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global scenes penetrate both sectors and institutional contexts from different 
directions. Examples of such global influences are such discourses as customer 
orientation, environmental and social responsibility, which are internalised by 
different sectors in different intensities. The results of this research study show 
that aviation sectors of both UK and German institutional contexts show similar 
patterns of corporate stakeholder salience towards global environmental 
discourses, whilst the UK and German financial services and utilities sectors 
responded to these environmental discourses in distinct ways. Both sector and 
country influences also interact. This interaction between sector and 
institutional context lies at the heart of the complementarity principle in 
comparative capitalism framework. As a result, Deeg and Jackson (2006: 152) 
write: 
A key concept for understanding configurations of capitalism is 
institutional complementarities.... Complementarities may be 
defined as situation where the difference in utility between two 
alternative institutions U(x'}U(x") increases for all actors in the 
domain X, when z' rather than z" prevails in domain Z, and vice versa. 
If conditions known as `super modularity' exist, then x' and z' (as well 
as, x" and z") complement each other and constitute alternative 
equilibrium combinations. 
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Figure 8-o-6: Multiple sources of influence on corporate stakeholder salience 
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In this case, the corporate governance structure in Germany that promotes co- 
determination and high degree of labour unionisation is a complementary 
influence to firms within the German system in their emphasis on employee 
stakeholder group. In the same vein, the social norms and practices of German 
institutions that emphasise inter-firm collaboration and institutional trust as 
opposed to contractual or market-based relations are complementary 
institutions towards networks stakeholder salience in the German context. In 
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contrast, UK firms gravitate towards shareholders salience in line with 
institutional provisions of the liberal market economy, since "[T]he UK Is 
characterized by dispersed ownership by share-price-oriented financial 
institutions while Germany is characterized by concentrated ownership by actors 
pursuing a mix of financial and strategic goals" (Vitols, 2001: 343). These patterns 
of German and UK stakeholder salience are shown through the correspondence 
analysis graph. 
Another source of possible interaction between country and sectoral influences 
that will have implications on corporate stakeholder salience patterns at the 
micro level is the extent of State involvement in and or degree of economic 
liberalisation of particular sectors, either directly or indirectly through policies 
and regulations. The involvement of the State in these sectors could be for a 
number of non-economic (non-market) reasons such as protection of national 
security, enhancement of national identity, provision of social welfare and duty 
to the citizenry, to mention but a few. This State involvement, which often runs 
contrary to economic liberalisation agenda, is likely to give rise to variations of 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns across sectors. Relating this lens (or 
degree) of State involvement in (and or degree of economic liberalisation of) an 
industry to the results of this study offers some interesting insights. In the first 
instance, German and UK economies are different in relation to State 
involvement in the market. While the UK runs on liberal market economy, 
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Germany runs on coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2ooo). It is 
argued that the State displays more propensity to intervene in coordinated 
market economies than in liberal market economies where the private actors 
take leading roles. As a result and in paraphrasing Hall and Gingerich (2004), 
Hancke et al (2007: 23) comment: 
CME-type strategic complementarities, positive spillovers, and public 
goods provision are inhibited by power asymmetries, organizational 
fragmentation, and class conflict, as (for the same reasons) are the 
complementarities that derive from the less visible market discipline 
found in LMEs. Yet instead of facing permanent and destructive 
economy dysfunctionality, in economies that exhibit such patterns - 
e. g. France, Italy, or Spain - stability appears to prevail as well (as too 
does strong economic performance), and often the state provides that 
element of stability (if not fully fledged coordination) by compensating 
for weaknesses elsewhere in the political economy. 
Other scholars of comparative capitalism - particularly Vivien Schmidt (2002) 
and Richard Whitley (2005) - have argued for the State to be brought back in 
comparative capitalism discourse. However, the broad brush application of the 
typology could distract from industry level typologies that could cut across 
varieties of capitalism framework. Some sectors within both German and UK 
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economies are also likely to exhibit different degrees of economic liberalisation, 
given their trans-national nature. For instance, there are some industries that 
attract significant national interests given their strategic positioning in the 
economy and or their likely impacts on the citizenry. Some of these industries 
tend to be in the Utility sectors - energy, electricity, post, telecommunication, 
water, transportation, et cetera (see Arrowsmith and Maund, forthcoming; 
Arrowsmith, 2000,20o6 for details). With regards to the proximity of the Utility 
sector to governmental influences, Arrowsmith (2oo6: 341) states that: "... utility 
sectors, ... [are] potentially subject to governmental influence to favor national 
industry (for example, because of dependency on government for their 
operating licenses) and [are] not subject to the kind of commercial pressures 
that would enable them to resist such influence". 
The findings of this research study (as shown in Table 8.3 below) exhibit the 
characteristics of these two dimensions of State interventionism and national 
identity, on one hand, and degree of economic liberalisation, on the other hand, 
at both the national and industry levels, respectively. 
Table 8-0-3: Country Level and Across Country Sector Averages 
COUNTRY LEVEL ACROSS COUNTRY SECTOR 
AVERAGES AVERAGES 
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Germany UK Aviation Financial 
Services 
Utilities 
Community 11.0 22.7 18.7 14.8 17.1 
Consumers 6.6 15.9 10.7 8.7 14.3 
Employees 18.5 21.8 24.6 13.6 22.3 
Environment 69.2 41.5 79.6 47.8 38.6 
Management 31.1 27.2 35.0 32.1 20.3 
Shareholders 24.5 30.2 28.7 28.4 25.0 
Networks 22.1 17.0 18.4 15.4 25.0 
The financial services sector, for instance, is the most liberalized and globalised 
of the sectors used in this study (see: Berger et al., 2000). In Europe the 
economic liberalisation of the financial services sector is further enhanced by EU 
policies such as the Single Market Programme and European Monetary Union. 
On the other hand, network utilities, which include gas, electricity, water, rail, 
and fixed link telephony, often operate under terms set by the State, given the 
tension that often arise between investors (often monopolies) and consumers in 
these sectors (Newbery, 1999). As shown in Table 8.3, these two sectors (i. e. 
Financial Services and Utilities) exhibited the unique characteristics of LME and 
CME, respectively - with the Financial Services sector placing emphasis" on 
Shareholders (2nd, average = 28.4) and Management (z"d, average = 32.1) 
stakeholder groups, whilst the Utilities sector places emphasis on Networks (1st, 
average = 25) and Employees (2nd, average = 22.3). As such the study confirms 
the propositions that: 
27 Emphasis in this case is loosely determined by a sector coming either in or 2 "d on 
average scores on a stakeholder group 
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Proposition boa: Irrespective of national institutional characteristics, the higher the 
degree of liberalisation of a sector, the more a sector exhibits the core 
characteristics of the Liberal Market Economy (e. g. emphasis on shareholders and 
management stakeholder groups) 
Proposition lob: irrespective of national institutional characteristics, the higher the 
degree of State influence on a sector, the more a sector exhibits the core 
characteristics of the Coordinated Market Economy (e. g. emphasis on employees 
and networks stakeholder groups) 
Aviation could be rightly considered as an averagely liberalised sector given 
11 ... that the industry is not perfectly contestable" (Dodgson, 1994: 355), 
especially due to `flag carrier duopolies'28 and the fact that domestic markets in 
Europe were only fully liberalised in 1997 (Morrell, 1998). Although 
11 ... international aviation 
has been slower to introduce unilateral liberalization" 
(Gillen, 2006: 367), the sector is equally susceptible to global pressures (Morrell, 
1998). Therefore, in its mixed-mode dual identity, the Aviation sector could be 
rightly theorised to be more likely to seek legitimacy amongst more `relevant 
publics' cutting across the LME and CME divides than either the Utilities or 
Financial Services sectors would, as evident in Table 8.3. The Aviation sector 
28 Signifying the State influence on the Aviation sector 
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came either first or second on the averages against the following stakeholder 
groups: Employees (1St, average = 24.6); Management (1st, average = 35); 
Shareholders (1St, average = 28.7) and Networks (z"d, average =18.4). This finding 
confirms the proposition that: 
Proposition ioc: Irrespective of national institutional characteristics, sectors with 
mixed degree of State influence and degree of liberalization, also exhibit mixed 
characteristics of both Coordinated Market Economy and Liberal Market Economy 
Figure 8-0-7: State Involvement vs. Degree of Liberalisation 
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In addition, given the liberalised nature of the Financial Services sector it could 
be said to be less strategically positioned to attract national interests and or 
impact adversely on the citizenry than industries in the Utility sectors29. As such, 
it is not surprising for the German Financial Sector, for instance, to deviate 
significantly from both German Utilities and Aviation; and gravitate more 
towards the UK liberal market economy than both Utilities and Aviation in that 
order. Utilities in both countries tend to display significant degree of State 
involvement - to the extent that the correspondence analysis data shows that 
the UK Utilities sector is closer to the border-line of the German coordinated 
market economy than both Aviation and Financial services sectors, respectively. 
In the case of Utilities, in particular, it could be the case that some European 
Utilities that have bought into UK Utilities sector are beginning to infiltrate 
German practices into the UK Utilities sector as a way of maximising 
comparative institutional advantage, which "... actually leads to a stronger 
pattern of industrial specialization rather than the convergence of industrial 
19 it is important to point out that this may not hold in periods of global financial recess 
and or economic turmoil - especially where an economy is strongly built around the 
financial services sector. The current rescue of the Northern Rock Bank, by the UK 
Government is a classical example. The data collected for this study do not capture any 
of such eras of financial recession and economic turmoil. Nonetheless, it would be nice 
to explore this proposition in previous eras of global financial recessions and 
subsequent corporate social reports following the current threat of recession. 
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profiles between the UK and Germany". (Vitols, 2001: 350). Along this line of the 
influence and reach of German Utilities, The Economist in its edition of 
September 15th -21 St 2007 presents a satirical but insightful depiction of German 
and French energy companies out to conquer the rest of European energy 
market, with the protectionist support of their national governments, as shown 
below. The accompanying graph below, also, shows that German and French 
energy companies have the highest market capitalisation in Europe as at 
September 11,2007 
Figure 8-o-8: French and German Energy firms 
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The Economist September 15th - 21st 2007 (p. 83/84) 
This internationalisation strategy characteristic of the Utilities, across both 
divides, as a way to adapt to influences arising from globalisation pressures has 
been recognised in the literature, as a way these capitalist systems adapt to 
change. Hancke et al (2007: 6) eloquently confirm this interaction between 
globalisation pressures and their implications for varieties of capitalism 
strategies: 
Globalization will often reinforce comparative institutional 
advantage, for foreign direct investment (FDI) will flow to locations 
rich in either specific or co-specific assets, depending on investors' 
sector or firm-specific requirements. CMEs and LMEs will be located 
at different points in international production chains, again 
reflecting their respective institutional advantages: high value- 
added, high skill-dependent, high-productivity production will tend 
to remain in the core CMEs; lower value-added, lower-skill, price- 
oriented production will relocate to lower-cost jurisdictions.... 
(however) rational owners and stakeholders in CMEs will not 
demand a wholesale adoption of Anglo-American management 
practices if it would endanger their comparative institutional 
advantage. Although an economic shock may trigger changes to 
existing institutions and practices, and may even entail a period of 
conflict and suboptimal outcomes, a new equilibrium will be 
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induced by the incentives for renewed coordination imparted by 
existing deliberative institutions.... Change, therefore, is most likely 
to be path-dependent, and significant path-shifting or equilibrium- 
breaking behaviour on the part of actors - producing a fully fledged 
shift from a CME to an LME, for example - is very unlikely to occur 
due to the `general efficiencies' for distinctive political economies 
created by `complementarities'. 
In other words, it could be conclusively argued that the tripartite influences 
(international, national and sectoral) together then shape, constrain, and enable, 
corporate stakeholder salience at both the firm and managerial levels. 
8.4: Chapter Summary 
Drawing from comparative business systems theorisation of firm behaviour, this 
chapter reinforces the view that corporate stakeholder salience patterns also 
reflect the characteristics of their institutional contexts (i. e. national and trans- 
national - including degree of State influence and degree of economic liberation 
of both national and transnational social spaces). It explores and accounts for 
how these patterns of corporate stakeholder salience manifest across different 
sectors. In addition, it highlights how these corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns reflect influences from multiple meso and macro level sources - i. e. 
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sectoral, national and trans-national. It primarily aims to provide complementary 
perspectives to the managerialist view that has dominated corporate 
stakeholding theorisation in the extant management and organisation studies 
literature. The next chapter leverages the findings of this research study to 
advance theory and articulate the policy and empirical implications of the study, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 9: EPILOGUE: CORPORATE STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRY INFLUENCES 
9.1: Tone Setting 
This chapter wraps up the main line of argument advanced in the entire thesis - 
i. e. that corporate stakeholding is not only a by product of managerial discretion 
and rationality, but that it is also constrained and enabled by the institutional 
context in which it is enacted. As such, the chapter creates a link between 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns, on one hand, and meso and macro level 
institutional influences (sectoral, national and trans-national), on the other. 
Drawing from this amalgamation of ideas, the chapter advances theory, 
contributes to empirical advancement and offers policy and professional 
contributions. It also suggests possible areas for future research. 
9.2: National Institutions, Trans-national Social Spaces and 
Corporate Stakeholder Salience Patterns: Theory Extension and 
Implications for the study of corporate social responsibility and 
accountability 
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As earlier indicated in the course of this research study, corporate stakeholding 
and to a significant extent its sister concepts - corporate accountability and 
social responsibility - have been trapped in managerial and organisational level 
theorisations. These manager-centric views of corporate stakeholding and social 
responsibility have been very dominant in the extant literature and belie the 
influences of the institutional contexts in which they are embedded and 
enacted. There have been recent calls to bring in the institutional dimensions to 
understanding corporate accountability and social responsibility discourses and 
practices (e. g. Lounsbury, forthcoming; Gray, 2002). Recently, too, there is a 
growing interest broadly in comparative corporate social responsibility and its 
associated discourses and practices - such as corporate social accountability, 
governance and stakeholder salience. 
The literature on the meaning and practice of corporate social responsibility 
across cultures and national boundaries has in the last couple of decades 
continued to blossom (for examples, see the following: Orpen, 1987; Langlois 
and Schlegelmilch, 1990; Bennett, 1998; Jones, 1999; Quazi and O'Brien, 2ooo; 
Maignan, 20ol; Kusku and Zarkada-Fraser, 2oo4; Hamann et at., 2005; Fig, 2005; 
Chapple and Moon, 2005; Amaeshi et al., 20o6r°. This emergent scholarship in 
3° In addition, the Journal of Corporate Citizenship has run special issues focusing on 
corporate social responsibility in Asia (2004), Africa (2005), and Latin America (20o6), 
respectively. 
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the literature challenges the `common agenda' approach to theorising corporate 
social responsibility. A common strand that runs through most of these studies, 
suggests that meaning and practice of corporate social responsibility is socio- 
culturally embedded. Matten and Moon (forthcoming), for example, use their 
`explicit' and `implicit' model to explain the difference between Continental 
European and North American versions of corporate social responsibility 
practice. They suggest that whilst the `explicit' style characteristic of North 
American firms' corporate social responsibility is vociferous about its 
contribution to the society - for example in provision of healthcare, education, 
employee welfare and other social amenities, the `implicit' style characteristic of 
Continental Europe finds it less attractive to report such social provisions as 
contributions to the society, since these provisions are already taken care of by 
the national institutions in which they operate in. The UK government's national 
health care service (the NHS) has been providing free healthcare service to its 
citizenry since the 1940s and the German system has ensured that employees' 
welfare gets top priority in organisations through its co-determination approach 
to corporate governance. 
In line with the socio-economic differences inherent in the neo-liberal capitalist 
systems, Maignan (2001) conducted a survey comparing French, German, and 
North American consumers' evaluations of economic, legal, ethical, and 
philanthropic responsibilities of firms. The study finds that while U. S. consumers 
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value highly corporate economic responsibilities, French and German consumers 
are most concerned about businesses conforming to legal and ethical standards. 
As such, Maignan suggests that these findings provide useful guidance for the 
efficient management of corporate social responsibility initiatives across borders 
and for further academic inquiries. In a similar study, Langlois and Schlegelmilch 
(1990) analyse the usage and contents of corporate codes of ethics. Comparison 
of a sample of 600 large European companies contrasted with findings reported 
for similar U. S. firms reveals that significantly fewer European than U. S. firms 
adopted codes of ethics. In addition, the study found that there are striking 
differences in content between U. S. and European codes of ethics pointing to the 
existence of a distinctly European approach to codifying ethics. 
There are also recorded differences between US and Asian understanding of 
corporate social responsibility. Burton et al (20oo) examined the orientation 
toward corporate social responsibility (CSR) of 165 U. S. and 157 Hong Kong 
business students. Although respondents from both countries viewed corporate 
social responsibility as a construct in much the same way, many differences were 
found in the types of responsibilities considered most important. Specifically, 
Hong Kong students gave economic responsibilities more weight and non 
economic responsibilities less weight than did U. S. students. Orpen (1987) found 
similar differences between US and South African managers. He assessed the 
attitudes of 164 United States and 151 South African managers towards 
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corporate social responsibility. The United States managers held significantly 
more favourable attitudes towards corporate social responsibility. In addition, 
they agreed with more pro-responsibility arguments, whereas the South African 
managers agreed with more anti-responsibility arguments. The United States 
managers felt that their society expected more corporate involvement in social 
responsibility activities than the South African managers felt was expected from 
their society. The results are explained in terms of the susceptibility of corporate 
social responsibility attitudes to cultural nouns and values - which reflect the 
different nature of the two societies. 
More recently, the Journal of Corporate Citizenship has run four special issues 
focusing on CSR in Asia (2004), Africa (2005), Latin America (20o6), and 
developing economies (ioo6), respectively. Hamann et al (2005) and Fig (2005) 
examined corporate social responsibility in South Africa and questioned the drift 
towards universalizing corporate social responsibility; while Kusku and Zarkada- 
Fraser (2004) compared corporate social responsibility practices in Australia and 
Turkey and identified some differences. Chapple and Moon (2005), explored 
corporate social responsibility reporting in seven Asian countries. They found 
some variations in corporate social responsibility practice across the Asian 
countries studied, which in their opinion were not as a result of the development 
of these countries but mainly a reflection of their different national business 
systems. This finding is counter-intuitive as one would ordinarily expect the level 
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of development of a country to correlate with its corporate social responsibility 
practice (Jones, 1999); and the involvement of Western countries in corporate 
social responsibility has often been attributed to their economic prosperity. Even 
in the West, Worthington et at (2oo6) found a different attitude to and practice 
of corporate social responsibility amongst South Asian small enterprises in the 
UK. These differences further strengthen the perspective that firms are 
products of their cultural and social milieu; and as such question the current 
trend towards the globalization of corporate social responsibility practice 
through multinational corporations and multinational institutions3' j2 In sum, 
however, these studies suggest that the meaning and practice of corporate 
social responsibility is socio-culturally embedded (Bennett, 1998). 
Surprisingly, corporate stakeholding has not witnessed similar interests from 
either institutionalist or cultural perspectives. This study pushes the 
institutionalist frontier of research to corporate stakeholder salience - which is a 
precursor and intrinsic to both corporate accountability and corporate social 
-' These multinational bodies tend to work from the assumption that the global 
economic system is converging. While the global economic system convergence theory 
seems plausible, it has been confirmed that business practices are socially and context 
bounded 
" For instance some countries in the coordinated market (e. g. Germany and Japan) are 
gradually opening up to the tenets of liberal-marketism, albeit painfully. 
Kenneth Amaeshi, PhD on Political Economy of CSR, Warwick Business School, UK Page 322 of 438 
responsibility (Jones, 1999; Wood, 1991). it takes a step backwards to uncover 
the institutional influences behind corporate stakeholder salience that ultimately 
condition such practices as social accounting, corporate accountability and 
corporate social responsibility. In addition, it opens a new vista of looking at 
corporate social reports. It conceptualises corporate social reports not only as 
artefacts of accountability but also carriers and reflectors of national and trans- 
national characteristics and influences. This is a contrary view to the dominant 
view of corporate social reports. Despite efforts in communicating socio- 
environmental commitment and performance through social and environmental 
reports, there is a cynical view that these reports are mainly corporate 
communication instruments for public relations and marketing (Owen et al. 
2000; Owen 2005). This view, while critical and necessary in constructively 
challenging managerial practices, further subtracts from the `good' intentions of 
corporate social and environmental reporting and tends to suggest that 
corporate social and environmental reporting activities border on the edge of 
spin. At the same time too, it appears to give a lot of prominence to agency in 
the construction of social reports. Both the negative connotation associated 
with corporate social and environmental reporting, as corporate spin, and its 
emphasis on agency have to a large extent inhibited the interest to critically and 
constructively examine the institutional embeddedness of such reports. 
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One of the key findings of this study, leveraging the varieties of capitalism 
analytical framework, is that corporate stakeholder salience patterns are 
reflections of series of complex interactions between national institutional 
frameworks and (trans-national) industry influences on firms. This finding is not 
limited to the understanding of corporate stakeholder salience but also has 
implications for current debates and efforts to fine-tune comparative business 
models - particularly the varieties of capitalism model. In this regard, the 
varieties of capitalism model as an analytical `agenda' (Hancke et al., 2007) for 
understanding variations of political economies could be theorised as a 
reflection of the dynamism between interdependent layers of influences - one 
at specific (trans-national) sector levels, and the other arising from interactions 
between different (trans-national) sectors within a particular national context to 
generate national patterns of corporate stakeholder salience. Although the 
varieties of capitalism model is often presented as a firm centred approach 
(Hancke et al., 2007: 5) - in which "[I]t is assumed that firms behave according to 
the rules provided for them by the specific institutional arrangements, which 
thus co-ordinate and `govern' them" (Crouch et at., forthcoming) - it appears to 
abstract from these emergent interactive patterns of corporate stakeholder 
salience at the micro-level to typify national political economies, while at the 
same time paying less or minimal attention to possible heterogeneity within 
same national political economies and or influences from trans-national social 
spaces (Morgan, 2001,20o6). 
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The need to account for heterogeneity within the varieties of capitalism model 
has come at no better time than when the national culture school of thought is 
being hacked at its very foundations for taking within-nations heterogeneities 
for granted and assuming that national boundaries are fairly static/stable and 
almost impermeable (see Hofstede's and McSweeney's debates over 
implications of the national culture construct in social science research in Human 
Relations, 2002). One of the points made by McSweeney (2002a) in his 
arguments against typologies of countries based on `national cultures' is the 
tendency of such approaches to undermine national heterogeneities and then 
subsume them under socio-geographic constructions of nation states, which 
may not necessarily constitute credible representation of differences between 
and within institutional contexts. Along this line, McSweeney (2002a: 113) 
conclude that: 
Extreme, singular, theories such as Hofstede's model of national 
culture are profoundly problematic. His conflation and uni-level 
analysis precludes consideration of interplay between macroscopic 
and microscopic cultural levels and between the cultural and the non- 
cultural (whatever we chose to call it). Instead of seeking an 
explanation for assumed national uniformity from the conceptual 
lacuna that is the essentialist notion of national culture, we need to 
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engage with and use theories of action which can cope with change, 
power, variety, multiple influences - including the non-national - and 
the complexity and situational variability of the individual subject. 
The same line of criticism, therefore, could be levelled against the varieties of 
capitalism model if it continues to ignore endogenous sources of national 
system transformation and `within-system' diversity (Coates, 2005; Boyer, 2005; 
Crouch, 2005; Panitch and Gindin, 2005); and instead apply a broad-brush 
approach to characterisation of national political economies, even though it 
claims to 11 ... give micro-foundations to a more general theory of cross-national 
capitalist organization and adjustment" (Hancke et al., 2007: 5). In this vein, 
Crouch et at. (forthcoming) observe and caution that: 
Local specialisms that depart from the logic of a national system ... 
suggest that the nation state is not necessarily always the most 
important level for determining the institutional environment of 
business. It is important that research pay attention to these instances. 
The fashion for dealing only in 'stylised facts' - encouraged by many 
economists in the name of 'parsimony and elegance' - can easily 
become an invitation to deal in stereotypes and over-generalisations. 
Accounts that remain at the level of stylised facts can be likened to 
artistic guides designed for the day-tripper. if you go to Paris, make sure 
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that you go to the Louvre, the Quay d'Orsay, the Musee des Arts 
Modernes..... That will not do for an academic study of art collections in 
Paris, and it is remarkable that social-scientific accounts of national 
economies often fail to go far beyond the tourist guide level. 
Accounting for interactions between different layers of socio-economic 
coordination within a system is one of the vexing issues that have continued to 
trail system level theorisations of macro national political economies. This is 
even worsened by the parallel literatures that have developed divergently along 
macro and micro new institutionalism, which are being encouraged to talk to 
each other to resolve this complex puzzle (Lounsbury, 2007; Tempel and 
Walgenbach, 2007; Whittington, 20o6). Micro-level new institutionalist school of 
thought provides rich analytical lens to unpack these complex interactions at the 
micro level, which could be adapted to account for macro dynamics. 
Extrapolating from micro-level theorisation, particularly DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), for example, Matten and Moon (2007) offer a model to account for 
variations and institutional embeddedness of corporate social responsibility 
across national business systems. 
In accordance with macro-level theorisation, Matten and Moon (2007) - in 
accounting for variations in corporate social responsibility across different 
national institutional contexts - argue that influences from national institutional 
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framework could be transmitted through its political, financial, education and 
labour as well as cultural systems. This national institutional framework 
constitutes the foundation of comparative business systems; particularly the 
national business system (Whitley, 1998) and the varieties of capitalism models 
(Hall and Soskice, zool. Notwithstanding, national and industry influences are 
also open to global and local forces of legitimization, which could manifest in 
form of coercive isomorphisms, mimetic processes and normative pressures (see 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 for details of each of these), as illustrated in the 
schematic below. 
Figure 9-o-i: Multiple sources of influence on corporate stakeholder salience 
and new institutionalism 
--- -------------- ----- HISTORICALLY GROWN NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
(Political system; Financial System; Education and Labour System; 
Cultural System) 
COERCIVE ' 
ISOMQRI'HISMs eq 
i :....................... ...... "".................. ..... .... ..... MIMETIC CORPORATE STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE PROFILE 
PROCESSES ... ... ... 
NORMATIVE 
PRESSURES 
(TRANS-NATIONAL) ORGANISATIONAL FIELD OF THE COMPANY 
(Sector/ Industry influences) 
Global and Local 
Influences 
TIME .. _.. _.. _.... ý 
Original idea adapted from Matten and Moon (2007) 
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Borrowing from DiMaggio and Powell (1983), examples of global influences with 
coercive isomorphic bent will include international standardization programmes 
in such areas as quality control, accounting and finance that are mandatory for 
firms to conform to (Clark et al., Zooi). It is also possible to have such trans- 
national bodies as the WTO trigger coercive regulations that would initiate some 
form of isomorphism at a global and or industry levels. Local coercive isomorphic 
pressures will include national and industry regulations and practices. While 
mimetic processes could imply the transfer of `best practices' across national 
and industry boundaries - wherein some firms would tend to copy practices 
from industry leaders irrespective of their national contexts, possibly as a result 
of bounded rationality. Discourses and practices on customer service orientation 
and adoption of complex technologies could fall under this category. Normative 
pressures, on the other hand, are associated with what ought to be. Examples of 
such pressures are the global and local adoptions of corporate social 
responsibility and social reporting as `good' business practices. 
These forces of legitimacy meet both national and (trans-national) industry 
contexts at different tangents. Although this is one of the areas of intense 
current debate (Quack et al., 1999), Matten and Moon (2007) argue that these 
forces are likely to permeate the national level less directly and slower if 
compared to organisational field of the firm. One explanation for this could be 
that the national contexts are much more embedded in the societal system and 
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as such much more inter-connected systemically to the fabric of the society. This 
complexity of interactions makes it easier for organisational fields to respond 
and adapt faster to changes from either local and or global sources, and less 
likely for national institutions to undergo such step changes (Whitley, 1999a). 
While this difference in rate of change between the national and industry levels 
are appreciable, Matten and Moon (2007) seem to be silent on the possible 
interactions between national and industry contexts in shaping firm behaviour. 
As such they appear not to explicitly discuss how national and industry levels 
interact, but rather seem to suggest that or position the two as non-interactive. 
The need for an understanding of the interactive effects of national and industry 
levels is further strengthened given that industry or sector influences can 
assume a trans-national dimension, which could (re)shape national institutional 
structures (Morgan, zoos; 2oo6) and ultimately constrain and or enable 
behaviours of firms (including those relating to corporate social responsibility, 
accountability and patterns of stakeholder salience). 
Following from Matten and Moon (2007), therefore, it could be argued that 
given that organisational fields are equally open to global and local influences, 
on one hand, and change faster than national institutional contexts, on the 
other, it is possible for organisational fields to equally induce changes within the 
broader national context; especially if such organisational fields are extensions 
of trans-national spaces. A good example of this scenario would be the 
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entrepreneurial influences of most MNCs on some organisational fields, 
especially in developing economies. The oil and gas sector in Nigeria, for 
instance, is heavily driven more by global than local practices (Ite, 2004,2005; 
Frynas et at., 2oo6; Frynas, 1999), since the major actors in the sector are MNCs 
who tend to retain their home country influences, albeit with slight 
modifications (Whitley, 1999a). In this regard, multinational actors could be 
conceived as institutional entrepreneurs (Crouch, 20o6) "... who skilfully use 
institutional logics to create or change institutions, in order to realize an interest 
that they value highly" (Leca and Naccache, 2006: 634). And in such instances, 
"... companies turn away from the national context and develop their own local 
governance structure. If the national institutional structure is seen as non- 
adequate or `non-fitting' to deal with sectorally specific terms of competition, 
then the internal and external coordination of companies - in reaction to 
challenges posed by the market - is likely to deviate from the national 
structure. " (Crouch et al., forthcoming). 
Although it is possible to argue that such industry led institutional changes or 
`counter-stream model' (Crouch et at, forthcoming) are more likely to occur in 
countries with relatively weak or incoherent (i. e. non-complementary) national 
institutions, it stands to be empirically tested if this is exclusively a case for the 
so-called weak national institutions, since some sectors in most advanced 
economies are sometimes ahead of other sectors or out of sync (Crouch et al., 
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forthcoming) within these economies in certain practices. A good example of 
this is, on one hand, the case where concurrent engineering, which is an 
established practice in the automotive sector, is still grappling to permeate the 
aerospace sector particularly in Europe (Haque and James-Moore, 2005; 
Scarbrough and Amaeshi, 20o8), and on the other hand, the UK financial services 
sector has continued to define and re-define the essence of the UK knowledge 
economy given the centre stage it has continued to gain in the global capital 
market (Clark, 2002). Crouch et al. (forthcoming), also presents a case where the 
Munich-Martinsried science-based cluster "... bypass[ed] the rigidities of the 
German political economy by docking on to international structures". As such, it 
becomes necessary to lend voice to Trigilia (2004) in questioning: if the national 
level is the main determinant of economic diversity, why are not the industries 
seen as nationally 'typical' distributed evenly across the national territory? 
In addition to the dynamic interactions between national and (trans-national) 
organisational fields, the two can independently and or in conjunction, 
simultaneously, impact on global and local influences, respectively. They could as 
well be "... In competition with both supranational regulatory regimes and 
internationally available institutions, services, and persons (Brose and Voelzkow 
1999; Deeg and Jackson 2007)" (Crouch et al., forthcoming). Cases of where 
national institutional frameworks have continued to recursively shape global and 
local influences will include the wide spread and adoption of some practices 
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across the globe, especially those arising from America and Japan in the form of 
Americanization (Djeiic, 1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel, zooo) and Japanization 
(Wood, 1991) of management and organisational practices, which often extend 
to other spheres of life including consumption and lifestyles (e. g. 
McDonaldization of the society -Ritzer, 2004). McDonaldization Is also a good 
case of where an organisational field influence has transformed to a global one. 
This recursiveness amongst national, local and global influences is quintessential 
to understanding and accounting for change and stability in national institutional 
frameworks and industry level variations and similarities; as well as in accounting 
for behaviour of firms within national and trans-national spaces. According to 
Whitley (1999a: 122), international influences remain "... highly interdependent 
with national agencies' and institutions' structures and actions. As a result, 
[their] effects on established systems of economic organization and firms are 
greatly guided and limited by variations in these national institutions". Crouch et 
al. (forthcoming) put it succinctly well when they argue that: "Since national 
elements are still present in the local innovation and production system, the 
local economy has to be seen as a combination of national, sectoral, and local 
elements, which taken together make up the governance of the local innovation 
and production system". 
This conclusion fits well with the main finding of this study, which suggests that 
corporate stakeholder salience patterns - as expressions of firm behaviours - 
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are implicated in the dynamic interactions between national and sectoral 
peculiarities. However, the ability of a sector to expand beyond its national 
boundaries through internationalisation offers an insightful and interesting 
dimension to unpacking the simultaneous joint sectoral and institutional 
influences on corporate practices, as is suggested by the findings of this 
research study, which has some research implications for the study of business 
and society interactions. 
The broad literature on the role of business in the society has recently witnessed 
a burgeoning of works accounting for variations in one or more of the following: 
corporate social responsibility, stakeholder management, corporate 
accountability and governance either from a sectoral perspective (e. g. Gray et 
al., 1995a; Kolk, 2003; Griffin and Weber, 20o6) and or national contexts 
perspectives (e. g. Maignan, 2001; Chapple and Moon, 2005; Jackson, 2005; 
Amaeshi et at., 2oo6; Matten and Moon, forthcoming). These studies often tend 
to either bracket sectors or national contexts in their accounts, depending on 
which of the two they are focusing on. What this research study suggests in 
more specific terms is that such dichotomisation of sectors and national 
contexts in the study of business and society interactions could lead to lopsided 
conclusions that ignore and consequently undermine the simultaneous 
interactive influences of the two levels of governance (or socio-economic 
coordination) on corporate practices. In addition to this possible 
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oversimplification of interactive institutional influences on corporate practices, 
there is also the tendency to deconstruct national contexts as summations of 
sectors within national contexts. This in itself, could as well be misleading in that 
sectors are not necessarily and exhaustively contained by national contexts, but 
could span across national borders and as such exhibit characteristics and 
attributes different from those of national contexts. 
Good examples of such trans-national sectors will include the aerospace and 
automotive (Amaeshi et al., 2007), the oil and gas sectors (Frynas et al., 2006) 
and the financial services (Faulconbridge et. al., 2007) to mention but a few. The 
influences of these sectors are usually global reaching and could be more 
powerful in certain instances than national institutional contexts (a good 
example here will be the role of multinational dominated sectors in some 
developing countries - the oil and gas in Nigeria, for instance - Ite, 2005; 2004; 
Frynas, 1999)" Also, in their comparative study of the interaction between the 
institutional contexts of UK and German corporate law firms, on one hand, and 
the international markets for legal services, on the other, Morgan and Quack 
(2005) found that contrary to the view that law firms are highly determined by 
the national distinctiveness of professional and legal systems of the institutional 
contexts in which they are embedded, that "... the internationalization of UK 
and German law firms bears traces of institutional legacies as well as signs of 
path-modification, and that international markets for legal services may be more 
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differentiated and less dominated by Anglo-Saxon law firms and conceptions of law 
than has been so far recognized" (emphasis, mine, p. 1765) . These trans-national 
sectors provide trans-national social spaces (Morgan, 2001,20o6; Morgan and 
Quack, 2005) in which trans-national organisations draw from to interact, shape 
and or reconfigure national institutional contexts, where possible. Borrowing 
from Morgan (2001), in this case: "I take `transnational space' to refer to an 
arena of social action distinct from that of the `national' context. It is an arena of 
social interaction where the main modes of connection between groups cross 
national boundaries.... Transnational social space implies a more open-ended set 
of cross-border connections between multiple nodes in which the forms of 
interaction become more than simply the sum of interactions between different 
'national' units; it constitutes an arena in which new social actors may emerge, 
which may be labelled `transnational communities' (p. 115). 
Notwithstanding, these transnational sectors are not isolated entities. They 
rather constitute complex networks and also have the possibility of cross- 
sectoral influences and are as well susceptible to national modifications and 
translations (Abrahamson, 1991; Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). These inter- 
sectoral, inter-country and trans-sector-country interactions are schematically 
shown below. Patches of grey on the schematic indicate areas of interactions 
between trans-national sectors and national contexts, which could account for 
heterogeneity within national models (Crouch, 2005; Crouch et al., forthcoming). 
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Accordingly, Morgan (2oo6) argues that: "[T]he national and the transnational 
clearly co-exist but what is interesting is how they interact and co-evolve. Whilst 
our social spaces are becoming more transnational, our capacities to resolve the 
problems emerging from this do not seem to be keeping pace. Many powerful 
actors still follow their national patterns and this leads them to interact with 
emergent transnational institutions in ways that exacerbate difference and 
conflict" (pp. 24-25). 
Figure o-z: Country Sector Interactions 
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However, these changes occur in time. If applied to this research study, this 
temporal dimension implies that corporate stakeholder salience profiles are not 
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static but are dynamically shaped by the characteristics of both the national 
institutional framework and the (trans-national) organisational field of the firm 
(thus the wavy and dotted nature of the sketch in figure 9.1 above). By 
extension, therefore, corporate social reporting is responsive to these changing 
patterns of institutionally influenced corporate stakeholder salience, which 
reflects in the varied dominant themes of corporate social reporting over time. 
The environment, for instance, dropped-off the social reporting list in the 
198os and surfaced again in the 199os (Gray, 2002,2001). In the study of USA 
firms and environmental Lober et al (1997: 67) found that "... Employees were 
the most frequently cited target group, indicated by 82% of the companies, 
followed by shareholders at 74%. Customers and government agencies were 
cited by over one-half of the report issuers as key audiences. Environmental 
groups and the local communities were targeted by over 40% of the reports. The 
general public was a target of 35% of the reports". While these cyclical changes 
in social reporting over the decades have been attributed to the subjection 
of social accounting and its associated activities (e. g. social audits) to the 
political whims of corporations (Gray, 2001), it has also been advanced that 
the increasing trend in social reporting by firms is linked to the social 
pressures on them since the 1970s to be more socially responsible in their 
practices (Gray, 2002). Jones (1999) cite the example of the US constitutional 
rights that were originally directed at white male property owners, but over time 
come to defuse to other stakeholder groups (e. g. women and ethnic minorities) 
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because "... the basic articles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights created 
discursive space within which subordinated groups could act strategically to 
avail themselves of the same rights accorded to white men" (p. 167). 
Notwithstanding, these changes are more likely to be sticky rather than rapid or 
step changes given that large scale and far-reaching changes would require 
"... considerable institutional restructuring and realignment of major societal 
interests... [which] are unlikely to develop simply as a consequence of 
internationalization, or to occur within one or two decades" (Whitley, 
1999a: 134)" In relation to institutional changes relating to corporate governance 
structures, Vitols (2001: 339) argues that "... these developments can be clearly 
characterized as incremental - rather than fundamental - changes in existing 
ownership, employee representation, and top management institutions". In 
other words, it is advisable for comparative business and society studies to be 
aware of these dynamic interactions; recognise them in their accounts and find 
insightful ways to accommodating them in the interpretations of their research 
findings. 
9.3: Institutional Embeddedness of Corporate Stakeholding: 
Empirical Novelty and Implications for practice and policy 
In addition to its theoretical contributions, this research study is novel in three 
major empirical ways outlined below: 
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(a) To the best of our knowledge, it will be the first attempt to study corporate 
stakeholder salience patterns along the lines of their interactions with 
institutional and sectoral influences. It is also the first to examine corporate 
stakeholder salience patterns leveraging combinations of visual representations 
and texts of corporate social reports. In terms of its practical relevance, the 
findings of this study will have significant implications for the growing 
contemporary interests in corporate social responsibility and corporate social 
reporting and as such would be relevant to practitioners, different stakeholder 
groups and public policy, especially those relating to regulation of corporate 
social reporting or otherwise; it will also have an immense methodological 
contribution to study of corporate social reports and management studies in 
general. 
(b) It is also the first to apply the varieties of capitalism model to studying 
corporate social reports in the 2 major countries representative of the model. A 
trend that has been hanging over recent debates in comparative business 
systems is the idea that the different systems are converging under the powerful 
influence of globalization. As such, on one hand, it is argued that national 
business systems succumb to the globalised world order. On the other hand, the 
argument is that national business systems do not disappear, but rather find 
new and innovative ways of internalising influences coming from globalisation 
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while retaining their distinctiveness (Whitley, 2002). A comparative study of this 
sort provides a fertile ground to test this hypothesis of convergence and or 
distinctiveness, which have been demonstrated through this research study. 
(c) In addition, corporate social reporting has over the decades been subjected 
to the political whims of corporations (Gray, 2001; Unerman, 2003) in response 
to the social pressures on firms since the 1970S to be more socially responsible in 
their practices (Gray, 2002) and as such, are still largely unregulated. There has 
been a serious but undermined voice in the corporate social responsibility 
discourse on the need to regulate corporate social responsibility and social 
reports. However, to a large extent, corporate social reports have been left to 
voluntarism and self regulation. The findings of the study will be of help to policy 
makers in this area in weighing the options to regulate (or not to regulate) the 
production of these reports, as their counterparts are - i. e. corporate annual 
reports. By uncovering links between corporate social reports and 
global/national institutional contexts, the findings from this study will further 
inform the debate on corporate social responsibility as a self-regulatory 
mechanism. It will provide policy makers and regulators insights on how 
corporate social reports could be used to advance the role of firms in fostering 
sustainable and viable economic development. This move is to establish a global 
governance mechanism for social and environmental reporting, which has 
hitherto being voluntary and self-regulated. Such initiatives as the Global 
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Reporting Initiatives and SustainAbility social reporting guides are assuming 
global dimensions, especially in the post-Enron years. According to Deeg and 
Jackson (20o6), "One consequence of multi-level governance is the growing 
heterogeneity among firms within national models - in short, "models within 
models".... Institutional layering of this kind may allow differential adoption of 
`old' and `new' business practices according to sectoral and firm-specific 
characteristics. " (Deeg and Jackson, 2006: 14). This piece of research will talk in 
significant ways to people involved in crafting these social reporting global 
governance mechanisms. An understanding of how institutional contexts and 
sectoral characteristics either constrain or enable social accountability will help 
policy makers, researchers and consultants working in this area. It will also be of 
use to practitioners trapped in the boundary-less-ness of Transnational 
Corporations. And help managers (e. g. investors and corporate social 
responsibility managers) to make better and informed decisions if they 
understand the consumption undertones embedded in corporate social 
reporting process. 
9.4: Suggestions for further research study and final comments 
This research study has been built mainly on what firms say they do, or who 
firms say are important to them. This perfectly fits well with the broad agenda of 
the role of discourse in institution-building (Phillips et al., 2004; Schimdt, 2002). 
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While the study of discourses (in its broadest sense as any form of texts and 
language - Phillips et al., 2004) is worthwhile in its own right and appropriate in 
addressing the core questions of this research study, it will be nice to 
complement it with a practice lens. The practice lens goes beyond talk to 
consider what happens in action. This will be particularly interesting in 
understanding and deconstructing the influences of different levels of socio- 
economic governance mechanisms on firm behaviour. For instance it has been 
argued that firms talk about themselves in an ideal form that is far from their 
practices (Dore, 20oo). And this even becomes more interesting to uncover if 
corporate social reports are articulated as communicative artefacts geared 
towards achieving the strategic goals of the firm - be they reputation 
(Hooghiemstra, zooo) and or legitimacy (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Brown 
and Deegan, 1998; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). 
Since the 199os, however, there has been a radical movement to incorporate a 
socio-cultural perspective to the study of organisational strategy and 
strategizing, which has given rise to varied re-conceptualisation of `strategy', for 
example, as narrative (Barry and Elmes, 1997; Dunford and Jones, 2000), 
discourse (Hardy et at., zooo; Hendry, zooo; Lilley, zoos) or a social practice 
oriented activity (Whittington, 1994,20o6; Jarzabkowski, 2005). One of the key 
goals of the `practice turn' in strategy is to demonstrate that strategy is not 
necessarily what a firm has but what a firm does. It is an attempt to recognise 
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strategizing research as a search for 'know how', 'know when', and know where' 
as opposed to the much more conventional approach to the study of strategy as 
a search for `know what' (Balogun et al., 2003). So the emergent scholarship 
community on strategy as practice emphasises the role of praxis, practices and 
practitioners (Whittington, 20o6) in understanding and influencing strategy and 
strategising. For instance, Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2002) examined 
strategizing in a traditional institution like a university and through their study of 
what top management does were able to account for continuity and change in 
the universities studied. There have been some studies also that have looked at 
strategizing from macro-practice perspective. However, one of the key 
challenges confronting strategy as practice, according to Whittington (20o6), is 
the need to integrate micro and macro accounts of practices and to 
demonstrate how they are co-produced, as has been done in other aspects of 
organisation studies emphasising the practice dimension - i. e. knowing in 
practice (Gherardi, zoos). A good example of this new way is Rouleau (2005) 
which accounted for how micro-practices of middle managers in a clothing 
company link into the macro-practices of the clothing industry in Canada. 
Researchers applying the `practice lens' as source of empirical knowledge have 
borrowed from such theoretical frameworks as the activity based theory (e. g. 
Jarzabkowski, 20o6) and structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) as theoretical 
frameworks of analysis. Giddens' work on The Constitution of Society (1984), for 
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instance, has been a major contribution towards resolving the dichotomy 
between structure and agency in social theory. Instead of opposing objective- 
subjective or voluntarist-determinist dimensions, Giddens challenged the 
premise of mutual exclusivity and assumed the duality of structure and action, 
proposing the structuration theory (Pozzebon, 2004). According to Giddens, 
structure is what gives form and shape to social life, but is not itself that form 
and shape; and it only exists in and through the activities of human agents. In 
turn, agency does not refer to people's intentions in doing things but more to 
the flow of people's actions (Pozzebon, 2004). In addition to duality of structure, 
the structuration theory recognises the competence and reflexivity of social 
actors, which enable them to act upon and reproduce structure. Whittington 
(1988) provides a framework that situates structuration theory within the 
dichotomy of structure and agency amongst other competing scholarly 
paradigms (see figure below). The distinguishing factor of structuration theory 
from other perspectives is its unequivocally equal emphasis on both structure 
and agency in its account of social change and stability. 
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Figure 9-0-3: Multiple applications of structuration theory 
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Although structuration theory is primarily concerned with the society at the 
macro-level, it has been used at the micro-level to account for organisational 
theories and practices. It has also been used to complement other perspectives 
of organisational theories - e. g. with institutional theory (Cooper et al. 1996), 
social constructivism (Cosio, 1998), sensemaking (Wright et al., 20oo) and 
network theory (Sydow and Winderer, 1998) - for details and other 
combinations, see Pozzebon (2004). With regard to the varieties of capitalism 
model and the findings of this research study, in particular which place emphasis 
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on diversity within institutional and sectoral contexts, the practice lens provides 
a complementary means to understanding and accounting for heterogeneity 
within institutional contexts; and "[S]uch a pluralistic approach has the potential 
to extend institutionalist analysis beyond the broadly comparative to the 
strategies of individual firms" (Hung and Whittington, 1997). 
The constructivist lens could be another way to extend this line of research 
suggested through this research study by examining representations in 
corporate social reports. A constructivist lens offer the researcher flexibility to 
explore deeper meanings laced and located in corporate social reports as 
communicative artefacts - which are most of the time missed by mere counting 
of representations in social reports characteristic of the content analytical 
method. In addition, the constructivist perspective is able to `see' meaning in 
both presence (manifest meaning) and absence (latent meaning) of 
representations, whilst the content analytical method is prone mainly to 
manifest meanings. Examples of the constructivist perspective include semiotics 
and hermeneutics methodological enquiries, which are gradually gaining 
broader acceptance as methods of social research. For instance, Crowther 
(2002) applied semiotic analysis to the study of corporate financial and 
environmental reporting while Fiol (1989: 277) "In an attempt to explain 
differences in the propensity of organizations to enter into joint ventures, 
... uses a semiotic method of textual analysis to examine CEOs' letters to 
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shareholders as they reflect the existence and strength of boundaries separating 
internal organizational subunits and boundaries separating the company from 
external environments". Semiotic analysis has also been applied to the study of 
political economy (e. g. Jessop, 2004) and glocalisation (Wodak, 2005). While 
Phillips and Brown (1993), have applied critical hermeneutic approach to 
analysing communication in and around organizations. In this regard, the 
constructivist perspective would not necessarily constitute a complete 
alternative but rather complement the content analytical methodology - and 
both in conjunction providing P complete view of the real'. 
Although the Fortune Global 500 population meets the research design 
requirements of this study - especially in terms of controlling for sources of bias 
- it could be argued that firms listed in this group are by their very nature 
inclined towards some form of global convergence - one of them being an 
inclination towards shareholder capitalism or the liberal market economy 
principles. In other words, it is possible to argue that the German firms included 
in the study are not true and fair exemplars of embodiments of German 
institutional characteristics since most big German firms are family-owned and 
often not publicly quoted. This is more so since, according to Jones (1999), 
"[O]nce publicly owned, a firm becomes hostage to performance criteria 
established by the financial markets, which value optimum economic returns 
rather than social responsibility - unless social responsibility pays" (Jones, 
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1999: 17o emphasis in original). Following this line of thinking, it could be 
expected that German and UK firms listed on Fortune Global 500 would exhibit 
similar characteristics since they belong to the same population of Fortune 
Global 500. Whilst this line of argument appears appealing, it is at the same time 
undermined by the fact that the outcome of this research study is able to 
identify differences in patterns of corporate stakeholding between German and 
UK firms that are traceable to the characteristics of their respective institutional 
contexts despite the fact that they share a common characteristic by virtue of 
being members of Fortune Global 500 - which even makes the findings of this 
research study more unique. However, a possible way to extend this line of 
research might be to examine if and how similar dynamics of corporate 
stakeholding patterns identified in this study are also evident amongst firms in 
the different institutional contexts irrespective of such factors as firm ownership 
structure and size, for instance, using same theoretical and empirical 
frameworks. The same could also be extended to within-group comparisons of 
different capitalist typologies postulated by the varieties of capitalism model. A 
good example here would be to examine if UK and US firms, as exemplars of 
liberal market economies, exhibit similar corporate stakeholder salience 
patterns, on one hand, and if German and Japanese firms, as exemplars of 
coordinated market economies, exhibit similar patterns of corporate 
stakeholding profile as well. This will provide further insights to understanding 
dynamics of corporate stakeholding across national institutional contexts. 
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Finally, it is worthwhile to note that this research study has extensively 
demonstrated that corporate stakeholder salience is also a function of the 
institutional and sectoral contexts in which firms operate. Whilst giving leeway 
to managerial choices and influences on firm-stakeholder relations, it is the core 
finding of this research study that managers' choices and decisions, to a large 
extent, reflect the characteristics of their institutional and sectoral contexts, 
respectively. It is anticipated that this research study would have opened a new 
vista of enquiry, which needs to be further explored in other contexts and 
through other research methodologies. 
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Table A: List of UK and German Fortune Global 50o Companies (2006) 
1 1. 
Kingdom United 
Anglo American 
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
X 
of 
X 
o2 
x 
0; 
X 
04 
X 
05 
X 
06 
2. AstraZeneca x X X X X X 
3. Aviva x X X X X 
4. BP X X X X X X X X X X 
5. British Airways X X X X X X X 
6. Centrica x X X 
7. Corus X X X X X X X X X 
8. HBOS 
9. HSBC X X X X X X 
10. Legal and General 
Group 
X 
ii. National Grid x X X 
12. Prudential X X X X 
13. 
14. 
RioTinto 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
X x x X X X X 
x 
X 
x X 
15. 
16. 
Scottish Power 
Germany 
Bayer 
x x x x X X 
x X 
17. Bertelsmann x X X X X X x x x X 
18. BMW X X X X X x x X X X 
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94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
19. Bosch x X X X X X 
zo. Commerzbank x 
21. Deutsche Post x X 
22. E. ON X X 
23. Henkel x X X X X X X X X X X 
24. Hochtief X X X 
25. Karstadt Quelle x x 
26. KFW Bankengruppe x X X 
27. Lufthansa x X X X X X X X X X 
28. MAN AG X X 
29. Munich Re Group x X X X X 
30. Otto Group x X 
31. RWE X X X X X X X 
32. TUI X X 
33" Volkswagen x X X X 
34. WestLB X X X 
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Table C: Criteria for identifying stakeholders in pictures/images, graphics and texts in 
social and environmental reports analyzed 
Stakeholders Criteria for pictures and 
images 
Criteria for texts and 
graphics 
Operationalisatlon Rationale 
Environment/ Any pictures/images Use of the following texts Firms Interested in the 
Nature (excluding corporate logos) or synonyms: environment/nature as a 
that show the environment Environment; atmosphere, stakeholder group will use 
or nature - (e. g. animals, climate, emissions, such representations of the 
climate, wildlife, deserts, pollutions, air quality, environment and nature in 
seas, planetary bodies, natural resources, names their corporate 
landscapes, natural of animals, etc communication tools 
resources, etc) (Delaney, zoos; Proctor, 
Indices on Noise are 1998; Burgess, 1989) 
included as part of the 
environment; as well as 
recycling, packaging, 
fuelling, energy usage 
Employees Employees at work clearly Use of the following texts Firms will use such 
identified by such facts as or synonyms: representations to 
corporate logos, corporate communicate their Interests 
uniforms, in corporate Staff; employees; in their employees as 
offices and other relevant people*** stakeholders (Anderson and 
corporate artefacts and Imperia, 1992) 
symbols (e. g. company van, 
etc) 
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Stakeholders Criteria for pictures and Criteria for texts and Operatlonalisation Rationale 
Images graphics 
Where workmen/women are 
unclassified, such pictures 
would be taken as employee 
photos 
Community/ Society Any pictures/images of cities, Use of the following texts Firms will use such 
streets, villages, community or synonyms: representations to 
projects (education, communicate their Interests 
healthcare, rural Community; society; In the communities In which 
development, social clubs, people*** they operate as stakeholders 
etc) (Lutz and Collins, 1993; 
Ferree and Hall, 199o) 
Customers People using Use of the following texts Firms will use such 
products/services; corporate or synonyms: representations to 
visits, site visits, product communicate their Interests 
launch, product Customers; names of in their customers as 
adverts/pictures products and services; stakeholders (Ogden and 
people*** Clarke, 2005) 
Air rage is classified as a 
consumer (passenger) issues 
Tickets also consumers 
Networks The networks category The networks category It Is broadly Interpreted that 
includes partnerships, includes partnerships, firms operate in networks of 
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Stakeholders Criteria for pictures and Criteria for texts and Operationalisation Rationale 
images graphics 
alliances, and subsidiaries alliances, and subsidiaries other firms - which include 
suppliers, partnerships as 
well as alliances (Gulati et at., 
2000; Gulati, 1998) 
Shareholders Annual general meetings, Use of the following texts Firms will use such 
monetary symbols and other or synonyms: representations to 
financial artefacts (e. g. communicate their Interests 
graphs relating to monetary Investments; investors; In their shareholders as 
values or financial performance; stakeholders. Moreover, 
performances), performance quantification of products/ given the Investment 
indices services; people*** Interests of shareholders In a 
firm, they would be more 
interested in financial 
numbers and other 
performance Indices of the 
company than any other 
stakeholder groups. 
Corporate self Corporate logos, flags, sign Use of the following texts Firms will use such 
propagation posts, management or synonyms: representations to 
(Management) signatures and photos, and propagate their corporate 
other identification artefacts Corporate name; Identity/image (Guthey and 
and symbols (e. g. corporate management, CEO, board Jackson, 2005; Robertson 
plants, equipment, work of directors and Clarke, 1971) 
stations, etc) 
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***people - it is recognised that the use of the text `people' could vary from 
context to context. The researchers bore this in mind in deciding where to 
classify any occurrences of such in the texts and graphics analysed. Symbols, 
graphs, and photographs are also interpreted within their contexts or what the 
firms say they want them to signify. Where symbols, graphs, and photographs 
are not accompanied by texts, they are interpreted within the sections of the 
documents they appear under (e. g. employees or suppliers chapters). 
Other complementary criteria 
Fotos 
" Photos including sketches, water marks, and surrealist/impressionist pictures 
9 Where different pictures are merged (or superimposed) and without clearly 
marked boundaries between the pictures, they are counted as a single photo 
" Photos are interpreted within context represented or presented 
" Graphics including pie, bar, trend charts as well as financial performance 
tables, tables on financial expenditures, large prints of financial symbols 
" Process flowcharts are excluded 
Logos 
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" Stand alone corporate logos - i. e. logos not inserted in photographs. They 
include logos on any attached post cards within the reports. This also applies 
where a company uses its corporate name as a logo as well - for instance, 
Rio Tinto 
LOgOSýr_ wffl 
" These are corporate logos within pictures or graphs in the reports. These 
logos should be clearly visible and not inferred - this is in order to maintain 
some level of "objectivity" 
" Length of Management Statement - chairman statements and any other 
messages from management 
ana en ent Statement (paragraphs) 
9 Paragraphs of management statements - chairman statements and any other 
messages from management 
" Paragraphs include title of messages, quotes on message pages 
" Bullet points are also counted as paragraphs independently 
nOrument Pages 
" Total pages of document (s) 
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EXAMPLE OF THE ANALYSIS OF TEXT IN CSR REPORT - EXCERPT 
FROM E. ON 2005 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, P. 4 
Our Commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility 
We benave responsio y to4vards our coi! eguýs stn try 
n önm and t commünitie where we live an wor We seek to 
improve lives everywhere we operate, aiming for a healthy, safe, and 
sustainabl environeat; We consider the needs of the present generation 
and also anticipate the needs of future generations. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a fundamental part of the way we 
do business. It has five key components: responsible corporate governance, 
the marketplace, the Cvironmer t 'communities, nd the rk_p cý. In each 
of these areas, we want to become i' a 
ader in our industry. 
More specifically, we: 
" are responsible ft a secure, 
report our achievements openly, reliably, and self-criti- 
cally. This includes makin$an appropriate and balanced 
presentation of o(conom(environm¢ntal, an(sociA 
activities and achievements in line with the Global Report- 
ing Initiative's current recommendations for sustainability 
reporting. 
seek to engage in objective dialog about our activities and 
about the challenges our industry will face in the future. 
UN's Global 
environ- 
mental 
to sful long-term development in 
we live an4 wor ) 
Board of Management of E. ON AG, Düsseldorf, June 2006 
Bernotat 
ow & 
Gaul 
Bergmari , 
Krýper 
LMA 
`VVV 
Schlpporeit Teyssen 
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Sample of Online 
Survey 
Questionnaire 
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nOed Kingdom Email: kennet amaesh, ®wa". ir, a,. uk 
1,, ates a ngwred rieid 
Kenneth Amae Send form 
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wvtur /ý7 . r... r. ý. r. ýýauýýýnwwyw, ills .. " . 
Comparative Stakeholder Salience Survey 
Please, give us less than 3 minutes of your time!! 
3 Although the concept and practice of stekeholding Is central to contemporary corporeto social responsibility 
and accountability movement, less attention Is paid to its variation . cross sectors and countries. Our study 
soaks to fill this research gap by focusing on mapping stakeholder salience (I. e. order of Importance) across 
s. ctors and countries. In this regard, we will appreciate It If you could spare us lass then q minutes of your 
time to participate In our research by completing the questionnaire below. We would prefer anonymous 
responses. In return for your kind contribution to our research, we would be happy to share our research 
findings with you If you leave an .,. it address In the specs provided at the end nl the questionnaire. Please, 
feel Ma to pass this questionnaire around 
Questions 
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Japan 
Fk EQ - .w. icds Net, l, 
nabess ýI netc: I(w. *z. wsw.. x. ýM«lsWwWO, oFRS/sýaialcWe, saYercel . 
®Go irks " 
C. o glc (. rn f. O'4 emwiwb. g Faans - !<I ch. 6 alua ,) sad m. 1 salöq.. 
1.,, -- Y(. $. 0 s.. awan " ý" i esn,,, e" s. anv " wsws,, w00 0s ý. <RSSw ® caw " vM++"a. p^eýwF. w" 
comoa, - s. w m. s+A Tab 
N~ Al4 
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United States of America 
Others 
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Einanal services (ni -, yhanli", o_ and ns, ranrxl 
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orpanicanon (on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1- mist inp nrtant; 111- -1,11 Mat ro nie ra n4 numo. to ') -- r1 ,7 )-nerv 
_h an onw in the ranking execso 
" rank listed stakeholde' 
groups in their order of 
importance and ensure that no 
ank number to 7, 
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anking exercise' 12 3 4 5 61 
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Sector 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent 
Variable 
mployees Scheffe 
(I) Sector (J) Sector 
Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Bonferroni Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Networks Scheffe Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error 
Lower Upper 
Bound Bound 
-7.9241 3.41986 
-10.5800(*) 4.19676 
7.9241 3.41986 
-2.6559 4.48542 
10.5800(*) 4.19676 
2.6559 4.48542 
-7.9241 3.41986 
-10.5800(*) 4.19676 
7.9241 3.41986 
-2.6559 4.48542 
10.5800(*) 4.19676 
2.6559 4.48542 
-11.5838 6.65204 
-2.9697 8.16320 
11.5838 6.65204 
8.6141 8.72468 
2.9697 8.16320 
-8.6141 8.72468 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Interval 
Lower Upper Lower 
Bound Bound Bound 
. 076 -16.5014 . 6532 
. 049 -21.1059 -. 0541 
. 076 -. 6532 16.5014 
. 840 -13.9057 8.5939 
. 049 . 0541 21.1059 
. 840 -8.5939 13.9057 
. 071 -16.3392 . 4911 
. 043 -20.9068 -. 2532 
. 071 -. 4911 16.3392 
1.000 -13.6930 8.3812 
. 043 . 2532 20.9068 
1.000 -8.3812 13.6930 
. 228 -28.2677 5.1001 
. 936 -23.4438 17.5043 
. 228 -5.1001 28.2677 
. 617 -13.2682 30.4964 
. 936 -17.5043 23.4438 
. 617 -30.4964 13.2682 
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Dependent 
Variable (I) Sector (J) Sector 
Bonferroni Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Shareholders Scheffe Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Bonferroni Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Environment Scheffe Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error 
Lower Upper 
Bound Bound 
-11.5838 6.65204 
-2.9697 8.16320 
11.5838 6.65204 
8.6141 8.72468 
2.9697 8.16320 
-8.6141 8.72468 
. 9011 6.95408 
-. 7946 8.53386 
-. 9011 6.95408 
-1.6958 9.12082 
. 7946 8.53386 
1.6958 9.12082 
. 9011 6.95408 
-. 7946 8.53386 
-. 9011 6.95408 
-1.6958 9.12082 
. 7946 8.53386 
1.6958 9.12o82 
4.8602 13.74466 
-33.4895 16.8670? 
-4.8602 13.7446E 
-38.3497 18.0272C 
33.4895 16.8670; 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Interval 
Lower Upper Lower 
Bound Bound Bound 
. 260 -27.9523 4.7847 
1.000 -23.0567 17.1172 
. 260 -4.7847 27.9523 
. 982 -12.8545 30.0826 
1.000 -17.1172 23.0567 
. 982 -30.0826 12.8545 
. 992 -16.5403 18.3426 
. 996 -22.1983 20.6091 
. 992 -18.3426 16.5403 
. 983 -24.5716 21.1801 
. 996 -20.6091 22.1983 
. 983 -21.1801 24.5716 
1.000 -16.2106 18.0128 
1.000 -21.7936 20.2044 
1.000 -18.0128 16.2106 
1.000 -24.1391 20.7476 
1.000 -20.2044 21.7936 
1.000 -20.7476 24.1391 
"939 -29.6127 39.3330 
. 148 -75.7936 8.8146 
. 939 -39.3330 29.6127 
. 113 -83.5635 6.8642 
. 148 -8.8146 75.7936 
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Mean 
Dependent Difference 95% Confidence 
Variable (I) Sector (J) Sector (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Interval 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower 
Bound Bound Bound Bound Bound 
Utilities 38.3497 18.02720 . 113 -6.8642 83.5635 
Bonferroni Finance Utilities 4.8602 13.74466 1.000 -28.9609 38.6813 
Aviation -33.4895 16.86707 -155 -74.9938 8.0148 
Utilities Finance -4.8602 13.74466 1.000 -38.6813 28.9609 
Aviation -38.3497 18.02720 . 112 -82.7087 6.0093 
Aviation Finance 33.4895 16.86707 "155 -8.0148 74.9938 
Utilities 38.3497 18.02720 . 112 -6.0093 82.7087 
Community Scheffe Finance Utilities -3.1867 4.35403 . 766 -14.1070 7.7336 
Aviation -3.3377 5.34315 . 823 -16.7388 10.0634 
Utilities Finance 3.1867 4.35403 . 766 -7.7336 14.1070 
Aviation -. 1511 5.71066 1.000 -14.4739 14.1718 
Aviation Finance 3.3377 5.34315 . 823 -10.0634 16.7388 
Utilities . 1511 5.71066 1.000 -14.1718 14.4739 
Bonferroni Finance Utilities -3.1867 4.35403 1.000 -13.9005 7.5272 
Aviation -3.3377 5.34315 1.000 -16.4855 9.8100 
Utilities Finance 3.1867 4.35403 1.000 -7.5272 13.9005 
Aviation -. 1511 5.71066 1.000 -14.2031 13.9010 
Aviation Finance 3.3377 5.34315 1.000 -9.8100 16.4855 
Utilities . 1511 5.71066 1.000 -13.9010 14.2031 
Consumers Scheffe Finance Utilities -6.6888 3.21638 . 124 -14.7558 1.3782 
Aviation -1.5747 3.94706 . 924 -11.4743 8.3249 
Utilities Finance 6.6888 3.21638 . 124 -1.3782 14.7558 
Aviation 5.114 1 4.21854 . 484 -5.4664 15.6946 
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Dependent 
Variable (I) Sector (J) Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error 
Lower Upper 
Bound Bound 
Aviation 
Bonferroni Finance 
Finance 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Finance 
Aviation 
Finance 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Management Scheffe Finance 
Utilities 
Aviation 
Bonferroni Finance Utilities 
Aviation 
Utilities Finance 
Aviation 
Aviation Finance 
Utilities 
Based on observed means. 
* The mean difference is significant at the . 05 level. 
1.5747 3.94706 
-5.1141 4.21854 
-6.6888 3.21638 
-1.5747 3.94706 
6.6888 3.21638 
5.1141 4.21854 
1.5747 3.94706 
-5.1141 4.21854 
11.6610 5.22516 
-2.6469 6.41218 
-11.6610 5.22516 
-14.3079 6.85321 
2.6469 6.41218 
14.3079 6.85321 
11.6610 5.22516 
-2.6469 6.41218 
-11.6610 5.22516 
-14.3079 6.85321 
2.6469 6.41218 
14.3079 6.8532. 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Interval 
Lower Upper Lower 
Bound Bound Bound 
. 924 -8.3249 11-4743 
. 484 -15.6946 5.4664 
. 125 -14.6033 1.2257 
1.000 -11.2871 8.1377 
. 125 -1.2257 14.6033 
. 690 -5.2663 15.4945 
1.000 -8.1377 11.2871 
. 690 -15.4945 5.2663 
. 091 -1.4442 24.7662 
. 918 -18.7292 13.4355 
. 091 -24.7662 1.4442 
. 122 -31.4963 2.8806 
. 918 -13.4355 18.7292 
. 122 -2.8806 31.4963 
. o88 -1.1964 24.5184 
1.000 -18.4251 13.1314 
. 088 -24.5184 1.1964 
. 123 -31.1714 2.5556 
1.000 -13.1314 18.4251 
. 123 -2.5556 31.1714 
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